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T he main  determinants of poverty in Mexico are macroeconomic
uncertainity,  an urban bias in social and infrastructure spending,
atnd  institutional arrangements and government policies in rural
areas that discriminate against the poor.  Benefits to the poor
should be administered under a single program that simulta-
neously delivers food (through coupons rather than price subsi-
dies), preventive health services, and information on hygiene,
birth control, and food handling.
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Among the liindings  is this ambitious analysis of  increasing investment in rural roads, irrigation,
poverty in Mexico:  extension serviecs, and the like).
Mexico's  moderately poor lack some goods  *  Eliminating urban bias in social and infra-
and services that everyone should enjoy, given  structure spending
Mexico's  wealtlh. The extremely poor have so
few resources as to be at risk of undemutrition  *  Bringing private costs of production in
and  illness.  urban  areas in line with social  costs.
At most, 1  peIrcent  of ihe population is  Policies to alleviate poverny must allow for
extremely poor (probably an overestimate), and  the fact that the extremely poor are less able to
extreme poveity is mostly a rural problem. The  bear risk, have higher fertility rates, have higher
extremely poor have larger households, more  price and income elasticities of demand for
children, and the higlhest  dependency ratios.  food, and may experience more household
inequality. The moderately poor, on the other
The tlhree  main determinants of poverty are  hand, can migrate, can benefit from educational
urban hias, macroeconomic uncertainty, and  opportunities, and can participat; more fully in
institutional arrangements and government  the labor market.
policies in rural arcas that discriminate against
the poor.  Urban bias in social and infrastructure  There is a strong case for direct targeting of
spending reduces the rural poor's ability to  benefits onlt to the to the extremely poor.  Such
increase their human capital.  Macroeconomic  benefits should be administered under a single
uncertainty and stop-go cycles depress the  program that simultaneously delivers food
permanent demand foi unskilled labor and the  (through coupons rather than price subsidies),
steady stream of social spending.  Institutional  preventive health services, and education about
arrangements and resource allocation policics to  hygiene, birth control, and food preparation and
increase agricultural output deliver substantial  conservation.  Food pricing policies should be
rents to high-income agricultural producers  divorced from poverty considerations.  A
while depressing retums to land and the demand  poverty program for the extremely poor should
for unskilled rural labor, the two main assets of  direct its efforts at reducing fertility, morbidity,
the rural poor.  undernutrition, and infant mortality.
Development policies to help the poor  Intertemporal, incentive, and administrative
should focus on:  considerations all argue that the govemment can
best help the moderately poor indirectly.  This
* Furthering the process of institutional  can be done through policies that increase the
reforni of the incentive structure in rural areas.  permanent demand for unskilled labor, returns
to land, and the poor's access to education and
* Changing the way resources are channeled  social infrastructure.
to rural areals  (eliminating price subsidies and
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I. Introduction.
Tnis  paper  is concerned  with the  problem  of poverty  in  Micico. Its  four
objectives  are  to: (i)  present  evidence,  (ii)  analyze  economic  determinants,
(iii)  discuss  policy  options,  and (iv)  assess  existing  poverty  programs.
This  is an ambitious  agenda. In fact,  one  could  argue  strongly  against
attempts  to cover  so many issues  at once.  The  objectives  mentioned  present
difficult  theoretical  and  empirical  challenges,  and  require  detailed  and
systematic  work.  On the  other  hand,  something  can  be gained  from  a  self-
contained  paper  that  presents  an overview  of the  problem:  it can  help identify
the  key issues,  point  out  areas  where immediate  action  is likely  to be
beneficial,  locate  possible  errors  in current  policies,  and indicate  gaps in
our  knowledge,  so that  future  research  can  focus  vhere its  pay-off  is  high.
This is  what I attempt  here.  As the  reader  will notice,  many  hypotheses  are
introduced,  but not tested;  most topics  are  discussed,  but none are  thoroughly
dealt  with.  The paper  is therefore  sui  generis:  neither  a polished  academic
piece  nor a  policy  document  with  concrete  recommendations  for  action.
Hopefully  this  approach  will  be useful.
I divide  the  paper  into  seven  sections. Section  II giv-es  a very  brief
discussion  of recent  economic  events,  as these  set the  stage  for  poverty
programs  in the  1990's. Section  III  discusses  the  concept  and  measurement  of
poverty. Section  IV  presents  evidence  of the  extent  of poverty  in  Mexico. It
aims at answering  the  question:  who,  where  and  how  poor are  the  poor?  Section
V asks the  question:  why are  the  poor  poor?  I review  issues  of rural
development,  urban  bias  and  macroeconomic  policy. Section 'I  turns  to policy
centering  on two issues:  what should  government's  objectives with regards  to
poverty  be, and  what  are the  appropriate  instruments  to  use.  To answer  these
questions  I review  the 'stylized  facts'  about  the  behavior  of the  poor,  as
well as information  and incentive  issues  that  bear on the  design  of poverty
alleviation  programs. I then  suggest  policies  for  alleviating  extreme  and
moderate  poverty. Section  VII  assesses,  in the  light  of previous  findings,
current  government  programs  to  alleviate  poverty  and  offers  some suggestions
for  improvement. A summary  of results  and  unanswered  questions  is  presented
in Section  VIII.-4-
II.  b,,; Settin.
After  a period  of rapid  growth  during  the  oil  boom of 1978-1981,  the
Mexican  economy  entered  a prolonged  crisis,  triggered  by a negative  terms  of
trade  shock  and increases  in  world  interest  rates. The  crisis  proved  deep
given  tne large  fiscal  deficit,  the  over  valuation  of the  exchange  rate,  and
the  external  debt.  Since  1983  the  bulk of  policy  makers'  efforts  have
centered  in the  areas  of short  run  stabilization  and  adjustment  to the  change
in the  direction  of external  capital  flows.
As the  adjustment  process  was  une--'.ay,  it  became  clear  that  short  run
macroeconomic  policies,  per  se,  were insufficient  to achieve  sustained  growth.
In consequence,  concomitant  with the  adjustments  in  macroeconomic  policy,
further  structural  changes  have  been  progressively  introduced. A program  of
trade  liberalization  in the  manufacturing  sector  was initiated  in 1985  and
accelerated  in 1988.  Subsidies  granted  through  the  pricing  policies  of public
enterprises  have  been reduced. Regulations  on direct  foreign  investment  have
been relaxed. Regulations  on internal  trade  have  been liberalized,  allowing
freer  entry  and  exit (e.g.,  transportation).  Private  investment  has  been
authorized  in  areas  previously  reserved  for  the  government  (e.g.,
petrochemicals).  Tax laws  have been  modified  to  reduce  evasion  a:ad  increase
efficiency. A program  of  privatization  of public  enterprises  is currently
underway;  commercial  banks  nationalized  in  1982  are  being  re-privatized.
1 Finally,  a renegotiation  of the  private  external  debt  has  been accomplished
These  impressive  changes  are  a manifestation  of a  change  in the
government's  role in the  economy. Far  from  a simple  retrenchment  caused  by a
temporary  scarcity  of funds,  the  Mexican  government  is embarked  on a radical
redefinition  of its  role in the  economy,  its  responsibilities,  and the  nature
of its interventions. Its  role  as  producer  is diminished  (with  a few
exceptions  like  oil  and  electricity). Its  role  as regulator  is  changing:  at
the  macroeconomic  level  to set  credible  and sustainaule  policies;  at the  micro
level  to promote  the  efficient  operation  of markets. At the  same time,  the
government  maintains  its  commitment  to improve  the  welfare  of the  poor.
lVan  Wijnbergen  (1990,  p. 32)  argues  that  the  1989  debt  re-negotiation
package  "..seems  sufficient  to establish  a basis  for  sustained  growth  in
Mexico."-5-
Three  characteristics  of the  economic  environment  in the  1990's  are
important  in thinkir-  about  poverty. One, servicing  the  foreign  debt  will
continue  to  be an important  constraint  on  policy,  despite  the  renegotiation  of
the  private  component  of the  debt.  This,  together  with the  overriding  need to
keep  the  fiscal  deficit  under  control,  implies  that  stringent  resource
constraints  will continue  (barring  a  large  and sustained  positive  terms  of
trade  shock). And  while  the  government's  role  as producer  and investor  is
reduced,  there  are large  gaps in  infrastructure  that  need attention,
particularly  so given  the  cutbacks  imposed  during  the  1980's. An attack  on
poverty  requires  resources. Yet, given  this  environment,  poverty  programs
must  only reach  the target  population,  and  do so in  a cost effective  way.
Two, structural  reforms  have enhanced  the  role  of market  forces  in
resource  allocation. In this  context  distortions  in relative  prices  prove
counterproductive  as the  economy  produces  the  wrong  bundle  of goods,  or does
so with the  wrong  techniques:  it is  essential  that  prices,  including  the
product  wage,  reflect  opportunity  costs. Poverty  programs  must recognize
this.  To the  extent  possible,  these  programs  must  avoid,  or  minimize,
subsidies  and  price  controls.
Three,  the  structural  reforms  implemented  so far  are lopsided. The
environment  for industry  has  been substantially  more liberalized  than tha  f
agriculture,  both with regards  to external  and  internal  regulations. Trade
reform  has concentrated  mainly  in  manufactures;  this  sector  now operates  under
a  mostly  tariff  trade  regime2  with  relatively  few  restrictions  on entry  and
exit.  Its  legal  and institutional  environment  is  well defined;  property
rights  are identified. The  same  is not  true  of agriculture. The  external
trade  regime  is  more controlled;  there  are  significant  restrictions  on entry
and  exit;  property  rights  are  at times  uncertain. The reform  gap is,  at
present,  one  of Mexico's  key problems. If not  attended  soon  it can  deepen
disparities  in income  levels.  Reform  of agriculture  is now essential  to
redress  the  balance. Poverty  programs  must  not only  aim  at providing  minimum
welfare  levels  for the  poor.  They  must  also  be part of a larger  strategy  that
incorporates  lagging  regions  into  the  rest  of the  economy.
2At the time  of  writing  most  sectors  of manufacturing  had no prior
permits,  licenses  or QR's.  Significant  sectors  where  restrictions  remain  are
automobiles,  pharmaceuticals  and computers. Production  weighted  tariff  rates
average  12.6%,  with  a standard  deviation  of 4.3X (World  Bank,  1989c,  Vol. II,
p. 79).-6-
III.  Poverty:  concePts  and  Neasurement.
IXI.1  CI  eRts  .
A recent  study  of  poverty  in  Mexico  argues  that  approximately  60S  of  the
population  could  be  classified  as  poor  (Hernandez  Laos,  1989a,  p.  29). Of
this  total,  between  20  to  25X  were  estimated  to  live  in  extreme  poverty,  with
the  remaining  35  to  401  being  poor,  but  not  extremely-poor.  Given  an
estimated  total  population  of  81  million  in  1990,  this  study  implies  that  20.2
million  Mexicans  were  livi.lg  in  extreme  poverty,  with  an  additional  28.4
million  living  in  poverty.  A separate  study  estimated  the  number  of  poor
people  at  21.6  million,  but  made  no  distinction  between  poverty  and  extreme
poverty  (World  Bank,  1989a,  p.  i). Another  study  states  that  in  1982  211  of
all  Mexican  households  were  desperately  poor  (World  Bank,  1989b,  p.1). And
yet  another  World  Bank  study  states  chat  25  million  rsople  in  Mexico  are  poor,
with  seven  million  at  the  destitute  level  (World  Bank,  1990b,  p.  5).
Data  problems  aside,  disparities  in  estimates  arise  from  different
definitions  of  what  poverty  is,  and  of  different  methods  of  estimating  it. It
is  very  important  to  determine  just  how  many  are  poor  and  how  many  are
extremely-poor.  Overestimates  can  make  the  task  of  eradicating  poverty  look
almost  impossible;  they  may  also  imply  wastes,  as  resources  that  could  be  used
for  the  extremely-poor  are  spread  across  larger  groups.  UnderistSmates  leave
some  desperate  people  without  help. Equally  important,  confusing  poverty  with
other  phenomena  like  income  inequality  leaus  to  wrong  policies.  To  provide  a
framework  for  measurement,  and  to  properly  identify  the  target  populations  for
what  could  potentially  be  different  policies,  one  question  is  unavoidable:
what  is  poverty?
Tc  answer  this  question,  I  begin  by  observing  that  poverty  and  income
inequality  are  two  distinct  problems.  Figure  1  illustrates  the  point:  the
vertical  axis  measures  yi,  the  income  of  the  ith  individual 3, while  the
horizontal  axis  measures  the  total  population  of  the  country  (n),  ordered  by
increasing  income.  In  turn,  z  denutes  the  'poverty  line',  or  the  income  level
below  which  a  person  is  considered  to  be  poor;  finally,  f(y)  denotes  the
3The  important  distinction  between  individuals  and  huuseholds  is
discussed  in  section  IV.1. At  this  point  no  harm  is  done  by  thinking  of
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distribution  of income. Assume  that  ff1(y)ey  - ff 2(y)dy.  By some  measures  of
inequality  (e.g.  the  Gini coefficient)  f2ty) is  a more equal  distribution  of
income  than  f1(y).  Yet,  by some  measures  of poverty,  e.g.  the  head-count
ratio 4, poverty  is  greater  under  f2(y).  Policies  that  reduce  income
inequality  may,  but  need  not, reduce  poverty.  In this  paper  I focus  on
poverty.
Next,  I  make a  distinction  between  moderate  and  extreme-poverty.  A
working  approximation  to this  distinction  is to say that  extreme-poverty  is at.
absolute  condition,  while  moderate-poverty  is a relative  condition.  The
extremely-poor  are  those  who  cannot  secure  enough  nutrition  to function
adequately. People  that  are  undernourished  are  more  vulnerable  to disease,
are  at risk  of developing  anthropometric  deficiencies.  are  at times  letharqfL
and, in general,  are  less  able to lead  a  healthy  life  with sufficient  energy
to satisfactorily  perform  tasks  in  the labor  market  and/or  participate  in
educational  activities. Extreme-poverty  in this  sense  is invariant  to time
and,  within  limits,  space5. The  moderately-poor,  on the  other  hand,  cannot
avail  themselves  of  what,  at the  given  stage  of the  country's  development,  are
considered  basic  needs.  However,  their  situation  is fundamentally  different
to the  extent  that  their  health  and  nutritional  status  allows  them  to actively
participate  in the  labor  market;  to take  advantage  of educational
opportunities;  to  have  mobility;  to bear  more  risk.  Their  poverty  is relative
in the  sense  that  they  lack  some  goods  and  services  which,  given  the  national
vealth,  everybody  should  enjoy. Lack  of primary  education  can  be seen in
Mexico  in the 1990's  as a condition  of  poverty. This  was  perhaps  not the  case
100  years  ago.  The  same is true  with lack  of access  to  electricity. The line
of moderate-poverty,  as opposed  to that  of extreme-poverty,  has a larger
subjective  component;  this  is  unavoidable. The  line  of moderate-poverty
4The  head-count  ratio,  H, is  defined  as the  proportion  of the  total
population  living  in  poverty. In figure  1  H - q/n;  clearly,  H2 > H .
5Note that  by this  definition  extreme-poverty  is,  in  principle,  an
individual-specific  condition,  as the  nutritional  needs  of individuals  of the
same  age  and sex  performing  similar  tasks  may  differ. In addition,  for a
given  individual  nutritional  needs  are  defined  as a  bald,  not a point;  see
section  III.2  below.attempts  to answer  the  question:  when  do people  cease  to  be poor?  Clearly,
cultural  and  political  issues  are inexorably  linked  here 6.
From the  point  of  view of policy  distinguishing  between  moderate  and
extreme-poverty  is  very important. As argued  more fully  in 3ection  VI, the
moderately-poor  can  best  be helped  .Jy  policies  that  widen  the  set  of
opportunities  open to them.  But  the  extremely-poor  must first  improve  their
health  and  nutritional  status  to  be able  to fully  profit  from  such  policies.
The concept  of extreme  poverty  thus  identifies  a set  of individuals  who  need
direct  help to be able  to fully  benefit  from  general  policies  designeu  to
reduce  po-rerty;  the  extremely-poor  constitute  the  target  population  for
special  programs. The  concept  of extreme  poverty,  in addition,  helps to
identify  what  benefits  need to  be delivered,  where,  and in  what  priority  (cf.
section  VI.4).
Unfortunately,  the  distinction  between  moderate  and  extreme-poverty
cannot  be made  with great  precision. Some  ambiguity  is  vnavoidable  since  it
is impossible  to draw  a sharp  line  to separate  those  who, as a result  of their
better  nutritional  status,  can 'function  adequately',  from  those  who cannot.
Section  IV.2  shows  that  demographic,  exr  diture,  and  other  characteristics  of
households  follow  a continuum  when  households  are  ranked  by per capita
household  income. Households  with similar  incomes  have  similar
characteristics,  but  differences  in these  characteristics  become  significant
as differences  in income  get  larger. Hence,  although  low  and  high income
households  are  distinct,  households  that  are  slightly  above  the  line  of
extreme-poverty  (denoted  by z) and  households  that  are  slightly  below  are  not.
Yet, for  operational  purposes  policy  makers  need  a  cut-off  line.  The
challenge  is to set  this  line  at the  point;  where  it  minimizes  the  probability
.f leaving  out  of directly  tar,.jted  programs  truly  destitute  people  (whicii  is
achieved  by setting  a  high),  while  at the  same  time  recognizing  that  resource
constraints  and incentive  considerations  imply  that  not  all individuals  can,
or should,  recieve  directly  targeted  benefits  (which  is  achieved  by setting  E,
low). A line  of extreme  poverty  based  on nutritional  status  is  useful  because
6Sen (1984a)  and  Streeten  (1989a)  provide  a  useful  discussion  of this
issue. In  particular,  Sen  argues  that  a distinction  needs  to  be made  between
the  space  of 'capabilities'  and the  space  of commodities. roverty  can  be
absolute  in the  former  (what  is  needed  to  perform  well),  while  relative  in the
latter  (as  the  list  of commodities  required  to perform  well  varies  through
time  and location).-9-
nutritional  status  is closely  associated  with mauy  of the  characteristics  of
households  that  require  them  to  receive  direct  benefits  before  they  can  fully
participate  in  the  development  process.
I  end  this  sub-section  with  two  remarks.  The  first  concerns  the  temporal
dimension  of  poverty.  There  is  a  life-cycle  and  some  people  are  poor  while
young,  but  accumulate  through  life  so  thet  poverty  reduces  with  age.
Unfortunately,  there  is  no  longitudinal  data  to  trace  poverty  across  time. I
assume  here,  however,  that  the  life-cycle  component  of  poverty,  particularly
for  the  extremely-poor,  is  less  important  than  the  permanint  componeut.  Most
of  the  extremely-poor  are  born  and  stay  poor  throughout  their  lives 7
Second,  the  discussion  has  centered  on  moderate  al...  extreme-poverty  as  a
general  manifestation  of  lack  of  resources.  This  is  sometimes  labelled
primary  poverty  to  distinguish  it  from  secondary  poverty.  The  latter  is  a
condition  derived  from  inefficiency  in  the  use  of  resources:  people  that  are
poor  because  they  misallocate  their  income  in  the  wrong  diet,  suifer  from
alcoholism  or,  perhaps  more  significant,  have  some  form  of  physical  (e.g.  very
old  age,  crippled)  or  psychological  (e.g.  mental  retardation)  problem  that
interferes  with  their  productive  life. Without  negating  the  importance  of
this  phenomenon,  it  is  most  likely  the  case  that  its  quantitative  relevance
for  Mexico  is  significantly  lower,  and  that  the  policies  (and  institutions)
required  to alleviate  it  are  also  different.
In  this  paper  I  focus  on  primary  poverty:  the  set  of  individuals  that,
for  reasons  explored  below,  are  able  but  have  welfare  levels  below  those
deemed  acceptable.  With  the  right  set  of  policies  most  of  these  individuals
can  increase  their  productive  potential  and,  therefore,  Mexico's  national
income.  Political  and  ethical  considerations  aside,  reducing  primary  poverty
should  not  be  seen  as  a  burden  on  the  government's  budget.  Rather,  it  should
be  seen  as  a socially  profitable  investment.  This  investment,  as  any  other,
will  have  a gestation  period  and,  to  produce  results,  must  be  pursued
systematically.  The  challenge  is  t-  wind  policies  that,  given  the  setting  of
the  Mexican  economy  in  the  1990's,  will  make  the  investment  p-ofitable.
7Schultz  (1981)  finds  that  for  Colombia  the  life-cycle  component  of
poverty  is  less  significant  than  the  permanent  component.-10-
I  L  2  Mea.
Is  extreme-poverty  mostly  a  rural  phenomenon?  Political  considerations
aside,  which  regions  should  be  targeted  for  poverty  alleviationi  programs?
Policy  makers  need  to  know  the  number  of  people  livinz  in  moderate  and
extreme-poverty.  But  they  also  need  to  know  how  poor  are  the  poor,  where  they
are  located,  what the  regional  composition  of  national  poverty  is,  and  how
much  of  total  poverty  is  accounted  for  by  the  moderately-poor  and  the
extremely-poor.  One  often  finds  large  numbers  of  indicators  quoted  in  povert-
discussions  (life  expectancy,  literacy  rates,  child  mortality  rates,  access  t_
piped  water,  number  of hospital  beds  per region,  etc.). This information  is
useful  as  evidence  of  poverty,  but  is  less  useful  for  policy.  To  the  extent
that  these  indicators  are  highly  correlated  with  each  other,  any  one  would
suffice.  To  the  extent  that  they  are  not,  policy  makers  .: -d  to  know  which
should  guide  resource  allocation.  In  addition,  many  of  these  indicacors
confuse  inputs  with  outputs:  we  do  not  really  care  about  the  number  of
hospital  beds  per  region  but  about  health  status;  longer  life  expectancy  is  a
result  of  good  nutrition  and  healthy  ives.
|tsultiple  indicators  of  poverty  have  been  used  in  previous  studies  of
poverty  in  Mexico.  In  particular  the  influential  study  by  the  Coordinacion
General  del  Plan  Nacional  de  Zonas  Deprimidas  y  Grupos  Marginados  (henceforth
Coplqmzr),  computes  an  'indice  de  ma 6 Slnalizacionl  from  a  list  of  19  diffe-ent
socioeconomic  indicators.  For  four  rea'ons  this  is  a  doubtful  procedure.
One,  the  list  of  indicaters  is  to  some  extent  arbitrary,  and  mixes  issues  of
lack  of  infrastructure  with  evidence  of  extreme-poverty.  Two,  the  weights  on
the  19  indicators  calculated  at  the  state  level  are  not  equal  to  the  regional
weights,  which  in  turn  are  not  equal  to  the  municipal  weights  (see  Coplamar,
1985c,  pp.  30-56).  Three,  the  sign  of  the  weights  varies  as  the  geographical
level  of  aggregation  changes 8. Fourth,  the  index  of  marginalizaUion  provides
no  information  about  the  depth  or  distribution  of  poverty,  and  cannot  be  used
9 to  rank  regions  to  allocate  resources  in  a  poverty  alleviation  program
8The  weights  for  the  marginalization  index  are  obtained  using  the  method
ef  principal  components,  i.e.,  the  weights  are  the  elements  of  the  eigenvector
associated  with  the  dominant  root  of  the  square  matrix  formed  from  the  product
of  the  region/indicator  matrix  times  its  transpose;  there  is  no  guarantee  that
this  eigenvector  is  non-negative  (and  indeed  it  is  not).
9To  the  extent  that  Coplamar's  indice  de  marginalidad  is  used  by  current
government  programs  for  poverty  alleviation,  there  is  a  risk  of  mis-targeting
the  population;  I  return  to  this  point  in  section  VII.2.Measuring  poverty  consists  of  two  tasks.  First,  a  poverty  line  must  be
determined.  Second,  the  poverty  level  of  individuals  has  to  be  aggregated.
This  sub  section  deals  with  the  first  issue,  sub-section  III.3  tackles  the
second.  Data  and  numerical  results  are  presented  in  section  IV.
Two  methods  can  be  employed  to  set  the  poverty  line. In  the  first  one  a
single  indicator  is  used  (e.g.  nutritional  intake) 10. In  the  second  one  a
list  of  commodities  considered  essential  is  made. Following  the  previous
discussion,  I  argue  that  access  to  adequate  sources  of  nutrition  should
provide  the  benchmark  for  setting  the  line  of  extreme-poverty.  Hence,  I
define  the  extremely-poor  as  those  individuals  who  are  unable  to  purchase
enough  nutrients  which,  given  age  and  sex,  allow  to  maintain  health  and
performance.  The  required  level  of  nutrient  intake  is  set  at  2250  calories
per  day  for  an  adult.
Three  comments  are  relevant  in  relation  to  this  definition.  First,
caloric  intake  is  taken  as  the  reference  point  for  nutritional  status.  The
bulk  of  the  evidence  shows  that  protei.n  and  caloric  intake  are  highly
correlated:  people  that  fulfill  their  caloric  needs  will  most  likely  also
satisfy  their  protein  requirements 1l.  Second,  the  definition  makes  no
10The  minimum  wage  ia  sometimes  used  in  Mexico  to  set  the  poverty  line
(e.g.  World  Bank  (1989a)),  Lustig  (1984)):  poor  households  are  those  earning
less  thani  -he  minimum  wage. This  poverty  line  is  at  times  also  used  by  the
government  to  discriminate  among  households  for  some  of  its  food  subsidy
programs  (see  section  VII.2,  below).  This  procedure  is  probably
inappropriate.  The  real  wage  is  subject  to  transitory  deviations  arising  from
macroeconomic  shocks,  and  may  also  respond  to  political  considerations.  For
example,  if  the  real  wage  declines  then,  ceteris  paribus,  the  number  of  poor
people  falls.  Conversely,  if  for  political  considerations  the  minimum  wage  is
increased,  poverty  increases.
1 1"Malnutrition  is  not  primarily  a problem  of an imbalance  between
calories  and  proteins.  Most  surveys  have  found  that  if  energy  intake  is
adequate,  protein  needs  are  also  satisfied,  and  if  not,  protein  is  burned  up
for  energy  requirements"  (Streeten,  1989b,  p.  &).  Also:  "There  is  today
relative  consensus  that  the  indicator  'intake  of  calories'  is  more
representative  of  the  whole  nutritional  oroblem  than  the  quantities  of
proteins  or  other  nutrients"  (Garcia  et.  al.,  1986,  p.  33;  my  own
translation,  S.L.).  This  is  not  to  say  that  there  will  be  no  deficiencies  of
some  vitamins  and  other  key  nutrients  like  iron,  iodine,  and  calcium.  But
these  deficiencies  may  arise  from  cultural  factors  that  determine  the  type  of
diet,  and  not  from  lack  of  resources;  people  with  higher  incomes  can  show
these  deficiencies  too. As  mentioned  below,  a  distinction  between
undernutrition  and  malnutrition  is  required.-12-
reference  to the  composition  of the  diet;  extreme-poverty  is measured  with
respect  to a diet  based  on the  preferences  of individuals  as  well as the
prices  ruling  in the  areal 2. Third,  the  target  level  of 2250  calories  a day
per adult  equivalent  is  taken  from  WHO/FAO  food  adequacy  standards
appropriately  modified  to the  climatic  conditions  of developing  countries 13.
Satisfaction  of this  calorie  intake  avoids  undernutrition  and  permits
individuals  to,  in principle,  stay  healthy  and  participate  in  an active  life
(including  satisfactory  performance  of tasks  in the  labor  market).
Conversely,  risks  of severe  undernutrition  with  permanent  effects
(particularly  for  children  under  five),  above-normal  vulnerability  to disease,
and  anthropometric  deficiencies  appear  when calorie  intakes  are, for  a
sustained  period  of time,  below  this  level  (Lipton  (1983a)).
The  use of nutritional  status  as a  benchmark  for  measuring  extreme-
poverty  is  not  without  problems. This  is  because  the  same  nutritional  intake
is taken  as reference  point  for  all  the (adult  equivalent)  population. This
procedure  is  problematic  because  even  after  making  corrections  for  climate  and
work  ronditions,  it fails  to account  for  intra  and inter-individual  variations
14 in  nutritional  requirements . Some  researchers,  moreover,  claim  that  the
12This contrasts  with 'minimum  cost'  diets  found  using  linear  programming
techniques  that  also satisfy  a nutritional  objective. This technique  was  used
by Coplarar  to measure  undernutrition  (Coplamar,  1985a,  pp. 101-23). But  note
that  the  calculated  diet  may  not  be desired  by households,  since  it is derived
independently  of their  preferences. Significant  econometric  evidence  shows
that  issues  like  palatability,  status,  and  odor  matter  in food  selection,  even
at very low income  levels  (see  the  discussion  in section  VI.1,  below). The
approach  also  contrasts  with exogenoulsy  given  diets  either  chosen  by
nutritionists  or government  agencies  that  specify  target  levels  of individual
foods. Rationality  of the  extremely-poor  is assumed,  given  their  information.
13See  the  extensive  discussion  in Lipton  (1983a). Many  other  studies  for
LDC's  also  use this  reference  point  (e.g.  Greer  and  Thorbecke  (1986a)  for
Kenya). However,  the  World  Bank (1989b,  p. 32)  uses  a reference  point  of
2,120  for  Mexico;  a similar  number  is used  by Lustig  (1984)  and  Cepal (1990)).
On the  other  hand, the  National  Institute  of Nutrition  sets the  standard  at
2,600.
14Srinivasan  (1981,  p. 17)  argues  that:  "Many  of the  widely  used
procedures  for  assessing  nutritional  status,  by classifying  all  individuals  in
a population  as malnourished  who  have intakes  below  a  single  average  norm for
the  population  as a whole,  thereby  ignoring  intra  and inter  individual
variance  in intakes  and requirements,  will  misclassify  individuals  to  varying
degrees. This misclassification  bias need  not  cancel  out for  the  population
as a whole  and  there  is danger  of overestimating  the  proportion  of truly
malnourished"  (emphasis  added,  S.L.).-13-
autoregulatory  homeostatic  nature  of  the  body  allows  for  substantial
variability  in  energy  intakel 5, and  that  such  variability  creates  a  band  of  up
to  20X  around  the  reference  nutrient  requirement  where  intakes  can  vary. It
is  only  when  intake  is  below  the  lower  bound  of  the  band  for  a  sustained
period  of  time  (e.g.  below  1,800  calories  per  day  per  adult)  that
undernutrition  appears  as  a  permanent  condition,  with  its  associated  risks.
These  arguments  imply  that  longitudinal  data  is  required  to  identify  the
extremely-poor  and,  in  addition,  that  corrections  for  individual  variances  in
nutritional  requirements  should  be  made. Unfortunately,  the  data  to  carry  out
these  computations  in  Mexico  is  at  present  unavailable.  As  a  result,  if
'access  to  adequate  sources  of  nutrition'  is  used  to  measure  the  line  of
extreme-poverty,  the  use  of  averages  is  unavoidable  and,  as  with  any  other
procedure,  some  errors  of  classification  will  be  made.
Estimates  of  undernutrition  in  Mexico  vary  widely,  from  20  to  50X  of  the
population  (cf.  Lustig,  1984,  pp.  443-47).  Most  of  these  estimates  are  made
comparing  the  monetary  costs  of  a 'desired'  reference  intake  of  nutrients
(given,  in  most  cases,  by  an  exogenously  determined  diet  as  in  the  Coplamar
study  mentioned  before)  with  actual  food  expenditures  by  households 16. These
estimates  are:  one,  subject  to  the  Srinivasan-Sukhatme  type  of  criticisms
1 5 "There  is considerable  evidence  to show that  a  healthy,  active
individual  engaged  in  fixed  tasks  and  maintaining  near  constant  body  weight
enjoys  wide  flexibility  in  intake"  (Sukhatme,  1988,  pp.  374-75).  On  the  other
hand,  Behrman  and  Deolalikar  (1988,  pp.  654-55)  argue  that  this  evidence  is
based  on  small  sample  sizes  that  are  not  representative.  (But  Edmundson  and
Sukhatme  (1990)  present  more  evidence  to  reinforce  Sukhatme's  thesis.)
16The  Coplamar  estimates  imply  that  undernutrition  in  Mexico  is  almost
non-existent  for  the  lowest  decile  of  the  income  distribution:  urban  (rural)
households  consume  92.65  and  95.71X  (117.68  and  98.89X)  of  the  recommended
daily  intake  of  2082  calories  and  63  grams  of  protein,  respectively  (see
Coplamar,  1985a,  tables  A-3.14  and  A-3.15).  On  the  other  hand,  the  World  Bank
(1989b,  p.  32,  table  V.1)  presents  data  to  show  average  intake  of  calories  in
rural  households  in  1979  in  the  following  states  as:  Chiapas,  1609;  Oaxaca
1483;  Guerrero  1638;  Coahuila  and  Nuevo  Leon  1684;  Hidalgo  1703;  Veracruz
1746;  Yucatan  1755. Unfortunately,  it  is  not  clear  what  the  reference  point
is:  if  it  is  average  intake  at  a  point  in  time,  or  average  intake  for  a
sustained  period  of  time. In  the  latter  case  the  situation  is  very  serious,
but  need  not  be  in  the  former.-14-
mentioned  above 17. Two, do  not allow  for  differences  in preferences  across
households. Given  these  difficulties,  a  strong  case  can  be made for  measuring
undernutrition  using  anthropometric  indicators  like  height  for  age  and  weight
for  height. Unfortunately,  the  available  evidence  of undernutrition  is  not
systematic,  although  there  are  signs  that it  does  exist' 8.
It is difficult  to  put together  these  conflicting  pieces  of evidence  and
to ascertain  the significance  of undernutrition  in  Mexico. But  two  points  can
be made:  first,  a  sharper  distinction  between  under  and  malnutrition  is
required  (cf.  Schiff  and  Valdes  (1990)). Undernutrition  reflects  lack  of
resources  to buy  adequate  amounts  of food;  malnutrition  reflects  improper
choice  of food  given  incomplete  information  on the  part  of the  consumer  and
other  problems  of the  environment. As section  VI argues,  the  policy
implications  differ. Second,  systematic  data  on nutritional  status  in  Mexico
that  differentiates  between  under  and  malnutrition  is  needed. Until  such
evidence  is gathered  there  is a risk  that  resources  for  poverty  alleviation  be
targeted  to the  wrong  population,  or wrong  policies  applied  to the  right
population. Pending  such  evidence,  however,  second-best  methods  to  determine
the  poverty  line  for  the  extremely-poor  and  the  moderately-poor  have to  be
used.  Before  I discuss  these  methods,  I turn  to describe  the  construction  of
operational  poverty  indices.
7A related  problem  is  generated  by the  presence  of intra-household
inequality  (of  which  more in  section  VI).  Even  if sufficient  food is
available,  it  may  be unequally  distributed  within  the  household. Sen  puts the
matter  aptly:  "The  requirement-intake  comparisons  also suffer  from  the serious
problem  of getting  accurate  information  on the  food  intake  of each individual
member  of the  family. Obviously,  food-purchase  data  are  not adequate  for
this.  Family  members  need  to be observed  eating,  and  -more  than  that-  the
food  partaken  would  have to be  weighed  in  the  process  of its  journey  from the
plate  to the  mouth... So the  actual  intake  figures  may  well  be no  more
reliable  than the  alleged  'requirement'  figures,  and the  blind  shall  lead the
blind.  All of this  is,  in fact,  quite  the  wrong  way  of going  about  the
problem.  If nutrition  is  what  we are  concerned  with,  then  nutrition  is  what
we must observe. We have to look  not  at food intakes,  but  at signs  of
undernourishment"  (1984b,  pp. 382-3).
18For  example,  a World  Bank  report  based  on 1988  data (World  Bank,  1990a,
p. 1, table  1) shows  that  14X  of all  children  show  below  normal  weight  for  age
(which  can  be thought  of as a  measure  of cumulative  nutrition),  while  15X  of
all  babies  show  low  birth  weight.  In addition,  one-third  of women  of
reproductive  age  are  underweight.-15-
111.3  Operational  Measures  of Poverty.
Denote  by A  the  monetary  line  of extreme-poverty:  the  minimum  income
required  for  a household  of given  age  and  sex  composition,  and  the  environment
in  which it lives,  to  purchase  sufficient  food  to avoid  undernutritionl 9.
Denote  by z the  monetary  line  of  moderate-poverty;  this  line  exceeds  the  line
of extreme-poverty  by the  cost  of the  necessities  beyond  those  included  in  A
that  society  (policy  makers?  economists?)  deems  are  required  so that  people
are  not  considered  poor.  Given  a poverty  line (z  or z), it is necessary  to
aggregate  the  level  of  poverty  of individuals.  An index  of poverty  that  can
serve  as a summary  statistic  about  the  level  of  poverty  is  useful  because:
one, it  can  provide  quantitative  answers  to the  questions  posed  at the
beginning  of sub-section  III.2. Two, it can  help determine  how  poverty
changes  overtime;  a  poverty  program  needs  to  monitor  how  much progress  is
being  made,  and tracking  an index  of poverty  is  a simple  and  practical  way of
systematically  doing  such  evaluation. Three,  it  can  help to  rank regions  in
the  allocation  of resources  for  poverty  (as  discussed  in section  VI.4).  Of
course,  a single  index  may fail  to  be a sufficient  statistic  of all  dimensions
of poverty;  unavoidably,  relevant  information  gets  lost in the  aggregation
process. Yet indices,  properly  used,  give  useful  insights. To provide
quantitative  assessments  of the  extent  of poverty,  and  to provide  a  mechanism
by which  progress  in  poverty  alleviation  can  be monitored,  this  sub-section
discusses  some  properties  of poverty  indices 20.
I  begin  by noting  two  desirable  axioms  that  an index  of  poverty  should
satisfy  (Sen  (1976)):  Monotonicity:  given  other  things,  a reduction  in the
income  of a poor  household  must increase  the  poverty  index. Transfer:  given
other  things,  a  pure transfer  of income  from  a poor  household  to any other
household  that is  richer  must increase  the  poverty  index.
These  two  axioms  are  discussed  with the  help of figure  2,  where three
distributions  are  plotted. Note that  in all  cases  the  number  of people  living
19Note that  z is  made  contingent  on the  environment. This is so  because
even if  relative  prices  are the  same  across  regions,  the  same income  level  may
translate  into  different  nutritional  status. As I discuss  in  section  VI.4,
the  relationship  between  income  and  nutrition  is  mediated  by other  factors.
20There  is a large  theoretical  literature  on the  measurement  of poverty
and  the  construction  of  poverty  indices. A seminal  paper  is Sen (1976);
further  contributions  are  by Takayama  (1979),  Foster,  Greer  and  Thorbecke
(1984),  and  Atkinson  (1987).Figure  2
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in  poverty  is  the  same,  so  that  the  three  dLstrLbutions  have  the  same  head-
count  ratlo  (H  - q/n). Yet,  it  is  intuitive  that  the  poverty  situations
descrlbed  by  these  dlstributions  are  different.  Contrast  distributions  fl(y)
and  f2(y)  in  panel  (a):  clearly,  fl(y)  is  better  in  the  sense  that  the  poor
are,  all  of  them,  less  poor  than  in  f2(y). Yet,  the  head-count  ratio  would
not  indicate  this. Horeover,  if  the  income  of  any  poor  household  (or  a111)
increased,  but  still  remained  below  z,  the  head-count  ratio  would  remain
invariant.  Evidently,  however,  poverty  would  be  less. Panel  (b)  illustrates
a  different  phenomenon.  The  poverty  level  of  all  the  people  below  z  is  not
the  same. Those  close  to  q  are  almost  non-poor,  while  those  close  to  the
origin  are  the  poorest  of  all. Yet,  the  head-count  ratio  provides  no
information  about  this. Statements  like  "x  number  of  Mexicans  are  poor"  or  "y
X  of  Mexicans  are  living  in  poverty"  are  therefore  only  partly  useful.  The
problem  with  the  head-count  ratio  is  that  it  says  nothing  about  the  severity
(or  depth)  of  poverty  nor  about  the  distributlon  of  poverty.  Put  differently,
the  head-count  ratio  satisfies  neither  the  monotonicity  axiom  (severity  of
poverty)  nor  the  transfer  axiom  (distributicn  of  poverty).
Foster,  Greer  and  Thorbecke  (1984),  FGT,  have  developed  a  class  of
poverty  indices  that  incorporate  these  concerns.  Define  the  poverty  gap  for
the  ith  individual,  gi,  as:
(1)  gi  - max [(z  - YL), 01
The  FGT  poverty  index,  denoted  by  P(a,z),  is:
q  a
(2)  P(a,z)  - 1/n E  (gi/z)  for  a  2 0.
i-l
where  q is the  number  of  individuals  for  which  gi  > 0,  i.e.,  the  number  of
people  below  the  poverty  line. The  parameter  a  is  interpreted  as  a  measure  of
societies'  aversion  to  poverty;  as  it  increases  greater  weight  is  attached  to
the  poverty  gap  of  the  poorest  individuals.  FGT  show  that  for  a  >  0  P(.)
satisfies  the  monotonicity  axiom,  while  for  a  >  1 it  satisfies  both  axioms 21.
21In  addition,  for  a  >  2  P(.)  satisfies  a  further  axlom  known  as  the
transfer  sensitivity  axiom:  If  a  transfer  t  > 0  of  income  takes  place  from  a
poor  individual  with  income  y  to  a  poor  individual  with  income  (YL  +  d),  d  >
0,  then  the  magnitude  of  the  increase  in  poverty  must  be  smaller  for  larger
Yi. In  other  words,  this  axiom  gives  more  weight  to  transfers  at  the  lower
end  of  the  distribution  than  at  the  higher  end.-17-
The  FGT  index  has  a  number  of  properties  that  make  it  useful  for  policy
22 purposes  . In  particular,  P(.)  is  additively  decomposable,  with  population
shares  as  weights.  Hence,  the  national  poverty  index  can  be  decomposed  into  a
series  of  regional  poverty  indices  which  measure  the  contribution  that  poverty
in  each  region  makes  to  the  national  total.  In  addition,  for  special  values
of  a  various  well-known  measures  of  poverty  are  obtained.  Note  first  from  (2)
that  for  a  - 0  we  have:
(3)  P(O,z)  - q/n  - H  e  (0,1]  ,i.e.,  the  head-count  ratio.
Similarly,  for  a  - 1  we  have:
q
(4)  P(l,z)  - (1/n.z).  E  gi,
i-1
Now,  the  total  income  required  to  eliminate  poverty  is  given  by  Egi,  or
area  A in  panel  (b)  of  figure  2. This  allows  us  to  define  the  income-gap
ratio,  I,  as:
q
(5)  I  - Z  gi/q.z  ;  I  e  [0,1]
i-1
or  A/(A  + B). It  follows  that:
(6)  P(l,z)  - H.I - P(O,z).I
i.e.,  P(l,z)  is  the  income-gap  ratio  normalized  by  the  head-count  ratio.  As
opposed  to  P(O,z),  P(l,z)  is  sensitive  to  the  severity  of  poverty:  it
increases  when  more  people  become  poor  (H  goes  up),  and  when  on  average  people
become  poorer  (I  goes  up). However,  neither  is  sensitive  to  the  distribution
of  poverty,  i.e.,  they  do  not  satisfy  the  transfer  axiom.  However,  the  index:
q  2 (7)  P(2,Z)  - (1/n).E  (gi/z)-
i-1
22Atkinson  (1987)  shows  that  the  FGT  class  of  poverty  indices  belong  to  a
larger  class  of  poverty  indices  that  satisfy  a  restricted  form  of  a  second-
degree  stochastic  dominance  condition.  This  is  a  useful  condition  in  making
comparisons  overtime  as  to  whether  poverty  has  decreased  or  not  when  the
distribution  of  poverty  changes.-18-
satisfies  both axioms. As a result,  I  use it  as the  basic  index  of poverty  in
the  remainder  of the  paper.
Since  P(.) is an index,  it  provides,  by itself,  little  information.
However,  as  mentioned  above,  P(.) is  additively  decomposable.  Thus,  let  the
total  population  of the  country,  n,  be divided  into  m regions,  with nj (j  -
1,2,....m)  individuals  in each  region. For  concreteness,  think  of m as the
number  of states  in  Mexico,  so that  nj is the  population  of each state. FGT
show  that  P(2,z)  can  be re-written  as:
m
(8)  P(2,z)  - E (nj/n).Pj( 2,z),  where:
1-1
(9)  Pj(2,z)  - (1/2)-  (gl/z
i-l
with qj  denoting  the  number  of poor individuals  in the  jth state,  and  gij  the
poverty  gap of the ith  individual  in the  jth  state. Alternatively,  let:
m
(10)  P(2,z)  -Z  Qj  where  Qj - (nj/n).Pj  (2,z)
J=1
so  that  TJ  Q/P(2,z)  is interpreted  as the (X)  contribution  of the  ith  state
to  national  poverty. Of course,  this  decomposition  can  be repeated  a second
time:  the  poverty  index  for  any  state,  Pj(2,z),  can  be written  as the  weighted
sum  of the  poverty  indices  of the  individual  municipios  (counties)  within  the
state. Since  the index  is  additively  decomposable  at this  second  stage,  the
procedure  yields  a decomposition  of total  national  poverty  into  the  components
accounted  for  by each  state  and,  within  each state,  by each  municipio. Thus a
geographical  poverty  profile  is  constructed;  this  provides  key information  to
identify  target  regions  for  poverty  programs  (see  section  VI.4  below).-19-
Figure  3 develops  an obvious  extension  of the  FGT  poverty  index  to
separate  the  moderately-poor  from  the  extremely-poor.  Note that I label  6  the
income  difference  between  the  two  poverty  lines;  in  addition,  the  poverty  gaps
for  each group  are  now denoted  as:
(11)  gi  - max [(X  - Yi),  01
(12) gi - max [(z  - Yi), 01 - max [(zy  +  6  - Yi), 0]
I label  P(a,7)  the index  of extreme-poverty  and  P(a,z)  the index  of
moderate-poverty.  These  two  indices  can then  be decomposed  across  states  and
municipios  along  the  lines  indicated  above.  It is clear  that the  increase  in
the  poverty  index  when raising  the  poverty  line  from  z  to z depends  on two
factors:  first,  on the  size  of 6.  Second,  on the  shape  of the  distribution
function  between  a  and  q,  which  determines  how  many  people  are  added  to the
ranks  of the  poor  when raising  the  poverty  line  by 6.  As figure  3 makes
clear,  if the  distribution  function  f(y)  is relatively  (steep)  flat,  for a
small  change  in  6  the  number  of people  'n poverty  increases  substantially
(minimally). Of course,  the  change  in the  poverty  index  also  depends  on  a,
that captures how the poverty gap of the extremely-poor is  weighted vis-a-vis
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IV.  Ouantification  of  PoErty_P.
ILA
IV.1.A.  The  Income-EXDenditure  Survey  of,1984.
The  most  recently  available  income-expenditure  survey  (IES)  for  Mexico,
carried  out  by  the  Instituto  Nacional  de  Estadistica,  Geografia  e  Informatica
(INEGI),  is  for  1984  (SPP  (1984))23.  I  make  five  observations  on  the  data.
First,  about  5,000  households  (the  unit  of  observation)  during  each  trimester
of  1984  were  surveyed.  However,  since  some  questionnaires  were  improperly
filled  out,  the  actual  size  of  the  sample  for  the  whole  year  is  18,958.
Second,  the  IES  does  not  directly  distinguish  between  urban  and  rural  areas.
Rather,  households  are  characterized  by  the  population  density  of  the  area  in
which  they  live,  and  grouped  into  two  categories:  'high'  and  'low'  density
areas.  The  former  are  municipios  with  at  least  one  of  the  following
characteristics  (see  INEGI,  1984,  p.  30):  (i)  at  least  one  locality  with  more
than  15,000  inhabitants,  (ii)  a total  of  more  than  100,000  inhabitants,  (iii)
be  the  capital  of  the  state,  or  (iv)  be  part  of  any  of  the  twelve  largest
metropolitan  areas  of  the  country.  In  this  paper  I  use  'low'  ('high')  density
areas  as  equivalent  to  rural  (urban)  areas24.
Third,  the  sample  was  designed  such  that  results  are  representative  of
the  urban  and  rural  regions  only  at  the  national  level;  unfortunately,  the
sample  is  not  representative  at  the  state  level.  Table  1  summarizes  the
number  of  households  surveyed  in  each  state  and  region;  note  that  there  are
eleven  states  where  rural  households  were  not  surveyed
23Although  a  similar  survey  was  carried  out  in  1989. Unfortunately,  the
results  of  this  latter  survey  are  not  yet  available.
240ther  authors  divide  the  population  into  urban  and  rural  using  the
occupation  of  the  household  head:  rural  households  are  those  where  the
household  head  is  a 'Jornalero  rural  o  peon  de  campo'  (roughly,  landless
agricultural  worker).  I  find  this  procedure  inadequate  because  it  misses  an
important  category  of  rural  inhabitants,  the  ejidatarios,  who  are  sometimes
classified  as  'patron'  (employer  with  one  to  five  employees)  or  as 'trabajador
por  cuenta  propia'  (self-employed  worker);  see  INEGI  (1984,  p.  144). On  the
other  hand,  if  self-employed  workers  or  employers  with  one  to  five  employees
are  included  in  the  definition  of  rural,  one  then  adds  incorrectly  all  the
urban  self-employed  as  well  as  small  scale  urban  employers.  Thus,  the
low/high  density  approximation  seems  to  be  better  since  it  focuses  directly  on
a  geographical  concept.Table  1
Sample  Characteristics
State  State Name  Number  of  households  sampled:
Number  Urbin  Rural
01  Aguascalientes  163  0
02  Baja  California  Norte  302  0
03  Baja California  Sur  152  0
04  Campeche  271  0
05  Couhuila  418  0
06  Colima  157  355
07  Chiapas  278  553
08  Chihuahua  563  355
09  Distrito  Federal  1407  0
10  Durango  145  0
11  Guanajuato  447  398
12  Guerrero  313  0
13  Hidalgo  141  180
14  Jaliso  1016  181
15  Mexico  989  502
16  Michoacan  470  180
17  Norelos  226  208
18  Nayarit  141  0
19  Nuevo  Leon  961  168
20  Oaxaca  160  186
21  Puebla  410  385
22  Queretaro  286  195
23  Quintana  Roo  153  184
24  San  Luis Potosi  165  210
25  Sinaloa  315  326
26  Sonora  432  345
27  Tabasco  152  0
28  Tamaulipas  430  545
29  Tlaxcala  157  189
30  Veracruz  653  786
31  Yucatan  159  0
32  Zacatecas  284  221
Total  12306  6652
Total  18958-21-
Fourth,  the  IES  makes  explicit  allowance  for  own-consumption.  For  each
of  the  14  expenditure  categories  considered  (food,  transportation,  clothing,
housing,  medicines,  etc.)  data  was  gathered  to  evaluate  the  monetary  value  of
consumption  from  household  own  production,  and  from  non-monetary  payments  and
gifts.  The  sum  total  of  monetary  expenditures  plus  the  monetary  equivalent  of
own-consumption  and  gifts  was  considered  as  total  expenditure.  Unfortunately,
I  had  no  information  to  divide  the  total  monetary  value  of  own-consumption
into  its  components.  Thus  I  am  able  to  rank  households  on  the  basis  of  total
expenditures,  but  not  on  the  basis  of  total  food  expenditures 25.
Fifth,  as  is  generally  the  case  with  most  IES,  income  seems  to  be
underreported 26. This,  together  with  consumption  smoothing  considerations,
propelled  me  to  use  total  expenditures  rather  than  reported  income  as  the
relevant  variable  (including,  as  just  mentioned,  the  monetary  value  of  own-
consumption).  Thus,  while  for  expositional  convenience  in  the  paper  I  refer
to  the  variable  y1 as  total  income,  the  reader  should  have  in  mind  that  total
expenditures  is  the  proxy  variable  used.
Two  adjustments  were  made  to  the  data. The  first  concerns  inflation.
1984  was  a  period  of  substantial  inflation  in  Mexico  (49.5X  according  to  the
CPI),  implying  that  average  nominal  values  of  income  and  expenditure  for  the
beginning  of  the  year  were  lower  than  for  the  end  of  the  year. This  generates
the  need  for  a correction.  Fortunately,  the  IES  included  information  on  the
date  on  which  a  household  was  surveyed,  allowing  me  to  apply  appropriate
deflators  to  express  all  monetary  flows  in  prices  of  January  of  198427.
25Differently  put,  if  yi  and  yf  is  total  expenditures  and  total  food
expenditures  (including  own-consumption)  of  the  ith  housnhold,  respectively,  I
can  obtain  f(y)  but  not  f(yf).  While  clearly  f(y)  ;  f(yy),  the  difference
between  the  two  increases  with  income  given  Less  than  unitary  food  expenditure
elasticities.
26In  particular,  total  expenditure  exceeds  total  income  for  the  lowest  16
out  of  the  20  household  groups  (ordered  by  per  capita  household  income;  see
below).
27The  IES  divided  the  year  into  36  intervals  of  10  days,  and  recorded  the
interval  in  which  a  household  was  surveyed.  I  divided  the  Banco  the  Mexico
national  monthly  consumer  price  index  for  1984  into  three  components  (assuming
a  linear  trend  within  each  ten  day  period),  constructed  a  price  series  for  the
year  with  36  observations,  and  made  the  base  for  mid-January  1984  - 1.00. All
nominal  variables  were  then  converted  into  prices  of  mid-January  1984  using
the  respective  date  and  corresponding  price  index.-22-
The  second  adjustment  concerns  the  unit  of  observation.  Data  was
collected  for  the  household,  but  information  was  also  available  on  household
size  (i.e.,  number  of  members  in  each  household).  Since  household  size  is  not
the  same  across  income  levels,  a  measurement  based  on  household  income  is  an
inaccurate  reflection  of  individual  poverty  (cf.  Anand,  1983,  pp.  63-7).
Moreover,  since  lower  income  households  are  larger  (see  table  3 below),
28 estimates  based  on  household  incomes  underestimate  poverty . To  correct  for
this  phenomenon,  I  rank  households  on  the  basis  of  per  capita  household
income,  obtained  by  dividing  the  income  level  of  each  household  by  household
size,  and  measure  poverty  at  the  level  of  the  individual.
One  final  remark.  Although  the  IES  has  very  detailed  coverage  of
expenditures,  with  special  emphasis  on  food,  it  provides  no  information  on
asset  ownership  or  ethnic  characteristics 29. Thus,  while  the  information  is
very  valuable,  it  is  insufficient  to  make  direct  connections  between  income
and  expenditure  patterns,  on  the  one  hand,  and  asset  ownership  and  productive
activity,  on  the  other.  In  particular,  it  is  important  to  know  whether
agricultural  workers'  income  levels  are  correlated  with  type  of  crop  (cereals
vs.  other;  within  cereals  corn  vs.  wheat,  etc.),  or  with  type  of  land  tenure
(ejido  vs.  private  land). This  information  is essential  to test  hypotheses  on
the  relationship  between  poverty,  crop  pattern  and  land  te-ure  status.
IV._.B.  The Lines  of  Moderate  and  Extreme-Poverty.
My  departure  point  for  constructing  x  and  z is  the  Coplamar  (1983)  study
on  basic  needs,  where  the  annual  cost  of  a  basket  of  necessities  for  an
average  family  of  4.9  members,  made  up  of  2.7  adults  (older  than  15  years  of
age),  1.66  children  (between  3  and  14  years  of  age)  and  0.47  babies  is
calculated.  Coplamar  followed  a three  part  procedure  to  construct  this
28Consider  households  A  and  B  with,  say,  household  incomes  2  and  4
(pesos)  and  household  size  1  and  3,  respectively.  Ranked  by  household  income
household  A is  poorer,  but  ranked  by  per  capita  household  income  household  B
is  poorer.  As  table  3  below  shows,  there  are  substantial  differences  in
household  size  across  income  levels  in  Mexico,  so  that  reference  to  the
'average  family'  may  for  some  purposes  be  quite  misleading.
29A potentially  important  issue  of  poverty  in  Mexico  concerns  the  fact
that  some  poor  families  belong  to  indigenous  communities;  for  some  of  them
language  and  other  dimensions  may  be  barriers  to  income  growth.-23-
basket,  labelled  the 'Canasta  Normativa  de Satisfactores  Esenciales',  CNSE.
First,  it  used the  expenditure  patterns  of households  in the  seventh  income
decile  of the  1977  IES.  Second,  it  added  a few  goods  deemed  essential
considering  "..the  rights  that  the  national  laws  grant  to the  population,
their  expectations  and  the  objective  necessities  that  society  imposes  .. "
(Coplamar,  1983,  p. 133;  my translation  and  emphasis,  S.L.). Third,  the  costs
of food  and  housing  were obtained  from  separate  studies  also  elaborated  by
Coplamar  (1985a,  1985b). In  particular,  the  food  component  consisted  of two
parts:  (i)  the  cost  of a  basket  of food  that  satisfied  exogenously  given
nutritional  requirements,  and (ii)  the  cost  of additional  food  items  also
consumed  by households  in the  seventh  decile. The  nutritional  food  basket  was
labelled  the 'Canasta  Normativa  Alimentaria',  CNA, and is  composed  of 34 food
items  that  satisfy  a minimum  of 2082  calories  and 35.1  grams  of protein  per
day for  an adult. In fact,  Coplamar  constructed  fifteen  different  baskets
that  satisfied  the  minimum  requirements  of calories  and  proteins,  but varied
in the  number  of food items  included  and  the  origins  of the  nutrients  (animal
vs.  vegetal) 30. The  chosen  CNA  was  not  the  least  cost  diet,  exceeding  the
minimum  by 36X  (Coplamar,  1985a,  pp.  102-12).
The  Coplamar  study  did  not  distinguish  between  moderate  and  extreme-
poverty,  although  other  studies  (e.g.  Hernandez  Laos.  1989a)  have taken  a
subset  of the  CNSE to  construct  a  Canasta  Sub--inima,  CSN,  to set  a  line  of
extreme-poverty  (thus  interpreting  the  CNSE  as the  line  of moderate-poverty).
on the  other  hand, the  Coplamar  study  distinguished  between  an urban  and  a
rural  basket,  but found  insignificant  cost  differences  so that  only  one  basket
was  used for  the  whole  population  (op.  cit.,  p. 146).
In this  paper I follow  a mixed  procedure  to  construct  E  and  z.  Consider
first  the  line  of extreme-poverty.  In principle  this line  is given  by the
cost  of  .the  nutritional  basket,  and  the  extremely  poor are  those  whose  food
expenditures  are  below  this  cost:  these  are  the  individuals  who lack 'access
to adequate  sources  of nutrition'. (Differently  put,  given  their  preferences
and  the  information  at their  disposal,  the  extremely-poor  maximize  welfare
allocating  their  income  across  different  goods;  if the  endogenously  determined
food  demanded  is less  then  the  nutritional  minimum,  the individual  is
30The  linear  program  reached  different  optimal  points  because  the  number
of  variables  (food  items)  and  the  number  of contraints  (mix  of foods)  was
changed  in  different  solutions.-24-
classified  as  extremely-poor.)  But  as  mentioned  in  the  previous  section,
because  own-consumption  cannot  be  separated  into  its  components,  I  can  only
rank  households  by  total  expenditures,  Yi,  and  not  by  total  food  expenditures,
yfLI This  requires  that  an  indirect  procedure  be  followed.  Because  yi  2 yf 1,
a  comparison  of  the  monetary  costs  of  the  nutritional  basket  with  yi  would
underestimate  poverty.  As  a  result,  it  is  necessary  to  scale-up  the  cost  of
the  nutritional  basket,  and  I  do  so  by  25131,32.  The  resulting  line  of
extreme-poverty,  y,  can  then  be  compared  against  the  distribution  of  total
expenditures  f(y)  to  identify  the  extremely  poor. On  the  other  hand,  I  simply
take  the  monetary  cost  of  the  CNSE  as  z33. (From  my  subjective  point  of  view
this  is  somewhat  too  high. But  because  I  do  not  propose  any  specific  policy
measures  based  on  this  line,  I  do  not  pursue  the  point  further.)  Table  2
summarizes  these  calculations.
One  final  remark.  It  is  clear  that  the  procedure  used  in  this  and  other
papers  to  set  both  z  and  z involve  some  arbitrariness.  Yet,  only  if  there  is
general  consensus  on  these  poverty  lines  can  measurements  be  widely  accepted
and  used  to  monitor  progress  in  poverty  alleviation.  Further  discussion  on
the  values  for ,  and  z  by  policy  makers  and  others  concerned  with  poverty
alleviation  would  be  called  for.
31This  procedure  can  be  rationalized  assuming  that  there  is  an
irreducible  minimum  of  expenditures  that  must  be  allocated  to  non-food  items.
Streeten  (1989b)  and  Lipton  (1988a)  present  evidence  to  show  that  this  minimum
is  around  201,  implying  a 'scaling  factor'  of  1.25. It  should  be  clear  that
this  procedure,  while  plausible,  is  somewhat  arbitrary,  since  expenditure
shares  on  diffe:.ent  goods  are  endogenous.  One  can  conceive  of  situations
where  households  do  not  purchase  sufficient  food  to  satisfy  a  nutritional
requirement,  but  still  allocate  less  then  801  of  total  expenditures  to  food.
To  avoid  this  arbitrariness,  further  work  needs  to  separate  the  components  of
own-consumption  to  obtain  f(y  ),  and  include  only  the  monetary  cost  of  the
nutritional  basket  in  y.
32Ny  line  of  extreme-poverty  differs  from  the  one  used  in  other  studies.
For  example,  Hernandez  Laos  also  defines  households  in  extreme  poverty  "..as
those  households  that  have  such  a  small  income  that,  even  if  it  was  all
allocated  to  food,  would  not  allow  'hem  to  satisfy  their  nutritional  needs"
(1989a,  p.  2;  my  translation,  S.L.).  But  his  Canasta  Sub-Minima  is  composed
as  follows:  551  food,  351  housing,  8.5X  health  and  1.51  education.
33Since  the  CNSE  was  expressed  in  prices  of  March  of  1982,  I  use  the
respective  components  of  the  national  monthly  consumer  price  index  to  express
the  cost  of  the  basket  in  prices  of  January  of  1984;  see  table  2.Table  2
Lines  of Moderate  and  Extreme-Poverty
Monetary  Cost
List  of Necessities  Moderate  Poverty Extreme-Poverty
1.  Food
1.1  nutritional  basket  41,863  41,863
(Canasta  Normativa  Alimentaria)
1.2  other  food  consumed  at home  14,073
1.3  food  consumed  outside  home  6,680
1.4  eating  & preparation  utensils  6,398
2.  Housing
2.1  maintenance  & depreciation  12,237
2.2  financial  amortization  28,342
2.3  water  & electricity  4,498
2.4  real estate  taxes  1,800
2.5  furniture,  blankets  and  similar  4,576
3. Health
3.1  Medicines  527
3.2  House  and  personal  cleaning  9,108
4.  Education
4.1  tuition  791
4.2  school  materials  1,287
5. Culture  and  Entertainment
5.1 books  6,403
5.2  movies,  vacation  and  similar  24,516
5.3 radio,  T.V.,  and  similar  3,679
6. Transport  and  Communication
6.1  transport  10,107
6.2  mail and  phone  224
(continued)(table  2  continued)
7.  Clothbna
7.1  clothing  26,020
7.2  shoes  6,270
7.3  belts,  bags  and  similar  355
8.  Per6onal  Needs
8.1  shaving  materials,  deodorants  and  similar  4,840
8.2  items  for  the  house  128
8.3  legal  and  other  services  411
Total  in  prices  of  March  1982  215,133  41,863
(25Z  expansion  factor  for  extreme-poverty)  - 52,328
Total  in  prices  of  January  1984  635,512  151,753
Total  per  trimester  (*.25)  158,878  37,938
Total  per  capita  (*1/4.9)  -
Poverty  lines  32.424  7.742
Source:  For  the  line  of  moderate  poverty  Coplamar  (1983);  for  the  line  of
extreme-poverty  own  construction.-25-
IV.2  Socioeconomic  Characteristics  of  Housgholds.
I turn  to  briefly  discuss  households'  demographic  (table  3),  expenditure
(table  4), income  (table  5) and  occupational  characteristics  (table  6).  At
this  point  I simply  describe  some 'stylized  facts';  section  VI links  these
facts  to behavior  and  policies  for  the  poor.  To accomplish  this,  households
are  classified  by location  and income  level. In particular,  20 groups  of
households  are constructed  in intervals  of 5X of the  total  sample  (so  that
each interval  contains  948  households)  ordered  by per capita  household  income
and,  within  each group,  households  are divided  into  urban  and  rural.
I  make five  observations  on table  3.  One, there  are  sharp  differences  in
household  size across  income  levels,  but  not along  rural-urban  lines. Poorer
households  are significantly  larger  than  the  average 34. Two,  poorer
households  have  both a larger  absolute  number  of children  (individuals  under
12  years  of age) and  a larger  proportion  of children  in the  household. Three,
poorer  households  have a smaller  share  of income  earners. Differently  put,
the  dependency  ratio  -the number  of people  who  do not  work over total
household  size-  is  highest  for  poorer  households;  differences  in this  ratio
between  the  poorest  and  the  richest  households  are  dramatic. Four,  average
education  of the  household  head increases  steadily  with income,  and  within
each  household  group  is always  higher  for  urban  households 35. Five,  there
appears  to be no systematic  relationship  between  the  share  of  households
headed  by females  and  either  income  or location.
Turn to allocation  of expenditures  and  sources  of income. Table  4
reveals  that:  one,  even for  the  poorest  households  the  share  of  monetary
34The  sample  contained  a total  of 96,380  individuals,  giving  an average
household  size  of 5.08.
35The IES  reports  education  for  the  household  head  as a  discrete  variable
between  0 and  10 with the  following  values:  0, no schooling;  1, finished  first
year  of primary  education;  2,  between  two  and  five  years  of primary  education;
3, finished  primary  education;  4, incomplete  secondary  education;  5, finished
secondary  education;  6, unfinished  high-school  or vocational  education;  7,
finished  high-school  or vocational  education;  8, unfinished  university
education;  9, completed  university  education;  10,  master's  or doctoral
education. The figures  reported  in table  3 are  obtained  by taking  simple
averages  of this  value  for  household  heads  in each  household  group.Table  3
DemoaraDhic  Characteristics  of  Households
Proportion  Average  Average  Average  Share  Share
Household Proportion of Female  Education Houeehold  Number  of  of
Group*  of  Headed  of  Size  of  Children  Earners
Households Households Household  Children
Head
1  Urban  0.210  0.160  1.345  7.59  3.49  0.459  0.211
Rural  0.789  0.065  1.081  7.11  3.25  0.457  0.208
2  Urban  0.345  0.100  1.756  7.52  3.26  0.433  0.229
Rural  0.654  0.077  1.229  6.65  2.88  0.432  0.234
3  Urban  0.381  0.104  1.613  7.00  3.04  0.434  0.229
Rural  0.618  0.090  1.549  6.25  2.73  0.437  0.239
4  Urban  0.430  0.125  1.853  6.87  2.71  0.395  0.242
Rural  0.569  0.085  1.418  5.89  2.38  0.405  0.261
5 Urban  0.485  0.152  2.026  6.37  2.42  0.380  0.261
Rural  0.514  0.092  1.539  5.84  2.20  0.376  0.279
6 Urban  0.564  0.142  2.190  6.40  2.46  0.384  0.267
Rural  0.435  0.118  1.479  5.59  2.06  0.368  0.281
7  Urban  0.604  0.165  2.209  5.87  2.06  0.352  0.282
Rural  0.395  0.141  1.776  5.22  1.89  0.362  0.295
8 Urban  0.659  0.147  2.481  5.98  1.99  0.333  0.284
Rural  0.340  0.148  1.783  5.07  1.61  0.318  0.308
9 Urban  0.666  0.120  2.625  5.51  1.84  0.334  0.301
Rural  0.333  0.123  1.974  5.03  1.69  0.336  0.288
10  Urban  0.683  0.120  2.683  5.58  1.83  0.328  0.302
Rural  0.316  0.143  2.000  4.61  1.47  0.319  0.314
11  Urban  0.706  0.140  2.817  5.21  1.62  0.310  0.310
Rural  0.293  0.143  2.287  4.41  1.33  0.302  0.331
(continued)(table  39 continued)
12  Urban  0.699  0.144  3.126  5.03  1.52  0.303  0.324
Rural  0.300  0.136  2.375  4.49  1.38  0.308  0.314
13  Urban  0.746  0.156  3.124  4.79  1.34  0.279  0.340
Rural  0.253  0.212  2.133  3.86  1.06  0.276  0.360
14  Urban  0.787  0.152  3.293  4.71  1.23  0.262  0.352
Rural  0.212  0.189  2.413  3.99  0.88  0.220  0.369
15  Urban  0.792  0.167  3.584  4.46  1.13  0.253  0.366
Rural  0.207  0.223  2.568  3.60  0.86  0.239  0.405
16  Urban  0.810  0.179  3.865  4.32  1.09  0.251  0.397
Rural  0.189  0.161  2.733  3.42  0.72  0.210  0.440
17 Urban  0.848  0.199  4.107  3.86  0.92  0.238  0.417
Rural  0.151  0.215  2.784  3.41  0.83  0.243  0.426
18  Urban  0.828  0.201  4.592  3.55  0.81  0.227  0.460
Rural  0.172  0.159  3.073  3.14  0.76  0.243  0.444
19  Urban  0.858  0.218  4.926  3.29  0.71  0.217  0.482
Rural  0.141  0.201  3.425  2.71  0.44  0.162  0.534
20 Urban  0.872  0.225  6.006  2.68  0.53  0.199  0.571
Rural  0.128  0.173  4.735  2.47  O.i5  0.224  0.498
Households  are  grouped  in twenty  intervals  with 5Z of the sample  each,  and  are
ranked  by increasing  household  per capita  income.Table  4
Allocation  of  Monetary  Expenditures*
Household Food  &  Clothing  Housing  Transport  &  Education Other
Group  Beverages & Shoes  Comuunication
I  Urban  0.61404  0.05759 0.09506  0.04298  0.03446 0.15584
Rural  0.59666  0.07961 0.07092  0.03731  0.02526  0.19021
2  Urban  0.60266  0.07403 0.08724  0.05445  0.03428  0.14732
Rural  0.61258  0.08463 0.06126  0.04384  0.03044  0.16723
3  Urban  0.59726  0.07278 0.09225  0.06436  0.03812 0.13521
Rural  0.60959  0.08064 0.06420  0.05734  0.03043 0.15776
4  Urban  0.60074  0.06208 0.08977  0.06828  0.04503  0.13408
Rural  0.61080  0.07867 0.06060  0.05957  0.03262  0.15771
5  Urban  0.59481  0.07332 0.08231  0.06776  0.05096 0.13082
Rural  0.58500  0.09581 0.05482  0.06535  0.03735 0.16164
6  Urban  0.58582  0.08108 0.08098  0.07270  0.04767 0.13172
Rural  0.59812  0.09331 0.05295  0.06690  0.03774 0.15096
7  Urban  0.58817  0.06964 0.08489  0.07239  0.04736 0.13752
Rural  0.58669  0.09861 0.05675  0.06787  0.03651 0.15354
8  Urban  0.56718  0.07443 0.08308  0.08314  0.05526  0.13689
Rural  0.57297  0.10126 0.05506  0.07198  0.04119 0.15752
9  Urban  0.55899  0.08052 0.08410  0.08107  0.05622 0.13907
Rural  0.54828  0.09428 0.05130  0.09895  0.04017 0.16699
10  Urban  0.56468  0.08409 0.08123  0.07907  0.05403  0.13688
Rural  0.55209  0.10872 0.05090  0.08173  0.04041 0.16612
11  Urban  0.54973  0.08913 0.07413  0.09044  0.05882 0.13771
Rural  0.54146  0.10080 0.06053  0.08932  0.04015 0.16771
(continued)(table  4, continued)
12 Urban  0.53467  0.08617  0.07905  0.09?17  0.05871  0.14420
Rural  0.51974  0.09365  0.05317  0.10534  0.04541  0.18267
13  Urban  0.51844  0.08655  0.08225  0.10438  0.06200  0.14635
Rural  0.50851  0.09424  0.04766  0.11714  0.04507  0.18734
14  Urban  0.50327  0.08745  0.07579  0.12288  0.06608  0.14450
Rural  0.50566  0.09567  0.05574  0.11322  0.06765  0.16205
15  Urban  0.47749  0.09143  0.08027  0.12754  0.07006  0.15319
Rural  0.48534  0.10312  0.05339  0.12411  0.05173  0.18228
16  Urban  0.46976  0.09627  0.07827  0.12567  0.06853  0.16148
Rural  0.46577  0.09507  0.04932  0.16346  0-04449  0.18187
17  Urban  0.44086  0.08867  0.08093  0.14422  0.07586  0.16944
Rural  0.45166  0.10298  0.04727  0.12743  0.07317  0.19746
18  Urban  0.39871  0.09516  0.08113  0.15021  0.08896  0.18580
Rural  0.38918  0.10652  0.04011  0.17169  0.05148  0.24100
19  Urban  0.35585  0.09145  0.07498  0.18310  0.09644  0.19815
Rural  0.35983  0.09311  0.04136  0.16189  0.07408  0.26970
20 Urban  0.26344  0.07463  0.06881  0.23970  0.10353  0.24986
Rural  0.22459  0.06447  0.02755  0.36034  0.04499  0.27804
*  Rows add  up to lOOS  except  for  rounding  errors.-26-
expenditures  devoted  to  food  and  beverages  is  around  60236.  Two,  even  at  the
lowest  income  levels  a significant  portion  of  expenditures  (between  15  and
20%)  is  allocated  to  items  other  than  food,  shelter  and  clothing.  Three,  as
expected,  the  food  share  declines  as  income  increases.  Table  5  shows  that:
one,  in  each  household  group  mean  household  income  is  always  lower  for  rural
households.  Two,  for  all  groups  a  significant  share  of  income  derives  from
'imputed'  sources  although,  as  noted,  its  nature  is  probably  quite  different
for  each  group. Three,  transfers  -which  in  the  IES  include  migrant
remittances-  are  a  relatively  less  important  source  of  income  for  the  poorest
households.  Four,  income  from  own  business  is,  in  each  household  group,
relatively  more  important  for  rural  than  urban  households.  Conversely,  in
each  household  group  wage  income  is  relatively  more  important  for  urban  than
rural  households.  Since  the  majority  of  the  poorest  households  are  rural
(table  7  below),  it  becomes  clear  that  wage  income  is  not  the  most  important
source  of  earnings  for  the  poorest  groups.
Finally,  table  6 shows  that:  one,  the  largest  number  of  the  poorest  head
of  households  work  as  self  employed  in  the  rural  areas  (almost  40X),  with  the
next  category  being  agricultural  worker  (21X)37.  Although  there  is  no  direct
information,  self  employed  workers  in  the  rural  areas  are  most  probably  small
scale  agricultural  producers  (but  note  that  other  activities  like  handicrafts
are  also  included  here);  hence,  even  owners  of  some  land  are  among  the  very
poor. Two,  if  we  take  the  lowest  three  household  groups  as  constituting  the
extremely-poor  (see  section  IV.3  below),  and  if  we  take  self  employment  and
employers  with  one  to  five  employees  in  the  rural  areas  to  be  mostly  small
scale  agriculture 38, and  add  to  this  agricultural  workers,  then  631  of  all
36I  note  here  that  to  construct  this  table  only  monetary  expenditures  are
considered  since,  as  noted,  information  on  the  components  of  own-consumption
was  not  available.  As  can  be  seen  from  table  5  below,  all  household  groups
show  a significant  share  for  imputed  income  (the  income  equivalent  of  own
consumption).  For  the  poor  it  may  be  non-marketed  food  grown  by  them;  for  the
rich  it  may  be  the  use  of  a  company  car. Thus,  the  poorest  groups  may  consume
more  food  than  what  they  purchase.  The  importance  of  this  resides  on  the
potential  impact  of  food  subsidies:  to  the  extent  that  not  all  food  consumed
by  the  poor  is  purchased,  the  effectiveness  of  food  subsidies  is  diminished;
see  the  discussion  in  section  VI.4.
37For  each  household  group  the  rows  of  urban  and  rural  add  up  to  100%.
38Recall  that  the  IES  did  not  report  a separate  category  for  ejidatarios.
I  assume  here  that  employers  with  one  to  five  employees  in  the  rural  areas  are
either  ejidatarios  or  are  also  involved  in  some  agricultural  activity.Table  5
Income  Sources  of Households*
Household Imputed" Wages  Own  Property Coopera-  Transfers Other  Mean**
Group  Business  Income  tives  Income
1  Urban  0.167  0.532  0.252  0.003  0.000  0.044  0.000  41,531
Rural  0.240  0.345  0.364  0.001  0.001  0.047  0.030  36,630
2  Urban  0.146  0.566  0.214  0.006  0.006  0.059  0.001  58,133
Rural  0.231  0.374  0.339  0.004  0.002  0.049  0.000  48,859
3  Urban  0.133  0.588  0.234  0.004  0.004  0.035  0.000  63,473
Rural  0.227  0.357  0.355  0.006  0.001  0.051  0.001  54,723
4  Urban  0.149  0.542  0.249  0.004  0.002  0.052  0.000  72,306
Rural  0.213  0.38i  0.326  0.011  0.001  0.066  0.000  58,217
5  Urban  0.142  0.581  0.214  0.010  0.002  0.048  0.000  79,417
Rural  0.215  0.346  0.342  0.007  0.004  0.083  0.002  69,464
6  Urban  0.144  0.614  0.185  0.007  0.009  0.037  0.001  86,078
Rural  0.207  0.405  0.311  0.008  0.003  0.064  0.0^^  70,891
7  Urban  0.154  0.562  0.217  0.008  0.005  0.052  0.000  90,186
Rural  0.190  0.373  0.342  0.007  0.001  0.085  0.000  76,109
8 Urban  0.161  0.572  0.212  0.005  0.000  0.046  0.002  104,876
Rural  0.174  0.356  0.388  0.005  0.002  0.073  0.000  91,531
9  Urban  0.157  0.601  0.174  0.014  0.003  0.042  0.005  104,896
Rural  0.184  0.329  0.404  0.014  0.016  0.047  0.005  90,563
10  Urban  0.161  0.585  0.186  0.009  0.000  0.055  0.003  114,270
Rural  0.182  0.385  0.318  0.027  0.004  0.081  0.000  90,279
11  Urban  0.167  0.563  0.194  0.010  0.005  0.057  0.002  120,046
Rural  0.207  0.413  0.308  0.010  0.001  0.058  0.001  97,343
(continued)(table  5, continued)
12  Urban  0.168  0.589  0.169  0.014  0.002  0.055  0.002  127,215
Rural  0.196  0.367  0.343  0.014  0.006  0.071  0.000  106,920
13  Urban  0.192  0.576  0.166  0.015  0.000  0.048  0.001  131,448
Rural  0.209  0.292  0.396  0.009  0.001  0.090  0.001  110,084
14  Urban  0.195  0.536  0.193  0.012  0.002  0.058  0.002  149,820
Rural  0.185  0.382  0.368  0.023  0.000  0.040  0.001  122,989
15  Urban  0.191  0.562  0.175  0.018  0.006  0.044  0.003  160,323
Rural  0.186  0.410  0.281  0.009  0.018  0.095  0.000  124,833
16  Urban  0.199  0.563  0.151  0.025  0.001  0.055  0.004  178,959
Rural  0.180  0.369  0.351  0.029  0.000  0.064  0.006  136,712
17  U:-u  0.212  0.539  0.152  0.022  0.000  0.069  0.004  186,883
Rur&:  0.192  0.350  0.315  0.038  0.016  0.086  0.001  164,343
18  Urban  0.204  0.512  0.182  0.032  0.002  0.063  0.004  211,614
Rural  0.219  0.342  0.304  0.030  0.001  0.092  0.010  189,852
19  Urban  0.217  0.535  0.141  0.029  0.001  0.065  0.012  249,924
Rural  0.242  0.378  0.249  0.038  0.000  0.089  0.004  207,328
20 Urban  0.238  0.443  0.159  0.078  0.001  0.064  0.016  385,978
Rural  0.173  0.256  0.394  0.055  0.001  0.084  0.037  330,926
*  Within  each  household  group  income  shares  for  urban  and  rural  add  up
to IOOZ  except  for  rounding  errors.
**  Imputed income  is  the  monetary  equivalent  of own-consumption  and  gift.s  see
text.
For  a trimester,  measured  in  pesos  of January  of 1984.Table  6
Ocgaoational  Characteristics  of Rousehold  Heada*
un-  non-  Employer  with  non-  member
Household employ  agri-  agri-  I  to 5  >  6  self-  remun-  of
Group  ed  cultural  cultural  employees  employed erated  coope-
worker  worker  -worker  rative
1  Urban  0.032  0.063  0.043  0.001  0.000  0.069  0.001  0.000
Rural  0.075  0.072  0.215  0.028  0.004  0.393  0.001  0.000
2  Urban  0.048  0.135  0.043  0.006  0.000  0.104  0.003  0.005
Rural  0.063  0.087  0.165  0.029  0.007  0.298  0.000  0.002
3  Urban  0.040  0.160  0.064  0.003  0.001  u.110  0.001  0.001
Rural  0.062  0.094  0.137  0.026  0.008  0.290  0.000  0.000
4  Urban  0.059  0.182  0.046  0.009  0.000  0.131  0.001  0.001
Rural  0.069  0.104  0.120  0.022  0.002  0.248  0.002  0.001
5 Urban  0.083  0.222  0.050  0.008  0.001  0.118  0.001  0.000
Rural  0.065  0.095  0.112  0.028  0.007  0.203  0.001  0.002
6  Urban  0.066  0.286  0.057  0.005  0.001  0.145  0.000  0.003
Rural  0.055  0.091  0.088  0.021  0.004  0.172  0.003  0.001
7  Urban  0.096  0.304  0.034  0.014  0.000  0.152  0.001  0.003
Rural  0.047  0.082  0.063  0.025  0.000  0.173  0.003  0.001
8  Urban  0.104  0.342  0.033  0.023  0.003  0.151  0.002  0.000
Rural  0.042  0.085  0.048  0.019  0.006  0.139  0.000  0.000
9 Urban  0.097  0.375  0.025  0.022  0.001  0.141  0.002  0.002
Rural  0.042  0.073  0.049  0.013  0.000  0.149  0.001  0.004
10  Urban  0.120  0.375  0.030  0.015  0.001  0.140  0.001  0.000
Rural  0.049  0.088  0.054  0.017  0.001  0.099  0.003  0.003
(continued)(table  6, continued)
11  Urban  0.095  0.406  0.021  0.027  0.001  0.152  0.001  0.003
Rural  0.040  0.091  0.040  0.016  0.003  0.100  0.003  0.000
12  Urban  0.097  0.425  0.017  0.020  0.004  0.132  0.002  0.002
Rural  0.052  0.086  0.031  0.009  0.002  0.115  0.001  0.002
13  Urban  0.114  0.441  0.014  0.021  0.003  0.148  0.004  0.000
Rural  0.042  0.054  0.029  0.022  0.003  0.099  0.002  0.000
14  Urban  0.117  0.443  0.021  0.023  0.003  0.174  0.005  0.001
Rural  0.037  0.064  0.016  0.021  0.003  0.068  0.001  0.000
15  Urban  0.138  0.436  0.012  0.029  0.005  0.161  0.004  0.004
Rural  0.035  0.067  0.013  0.010  0.002  0.075  0.002  0.001
16  Urban  0.149  0.488  0.010  0.033  0.002  0.122  0.003  0.000
Rural  0.036  0.050  0.016  0.016  0.002  0.069  0.001  0.000
17  Urban  0.169  0.508  0.007  0.041  0.002  0.116  0.003  0.000
Rural  0.040  0.046  0.005  0.011  0.004  0.041  0.000  0.003
18  Urban  0.158  0.466  0.008  0.046  0.005  0.138  0.002  0.003
Rural  0.036  0.055  0.010  0.018  0.003  0.047  0.001  0.001
19  Urban  0.178  0.517  0.009  0.037  0.004  0.107  0.005  0.001
Rural  0.031  0.049  0.009  0.011  0.002  0.037  0.000  0.000
20 Urban  0.160  0.563  0.006  0.045  0.021  0.072  0.002  0.001
Rural  0.017  0.049  0.005  0.017  0.007  0.029  0.001  0.001
*  Share  of total  household  heads  in each  occupational  category;  within  each
household  group  shares  add  up to 1OOZ  except  for  rounding  errors.-27-
extremely-poor  household  heads  are  principally  engaged  in  agriculture 39 .
Three,  while  the  urban  poor constitute  the  minority  of the  extremely-poor  (31X
of the  three  lowest  household  groups),  their  main occupation  is  either  as nont-
agricultural  workers  or self-employed  (28%).
IV.3  Estimates  of Moderate  and  Extreme-Poverty.
Poverty  indices  Pj(a,z)  for  a  - 0,1,2,  z  - z, z and  j  - rural,  urban  are
presented  in tables  7 and  840.  Consider  first  panel (a)  of table  7.  When
a  - 0 I find,  first,  that  19.5X  of the  sample  population  could  be classified
as extremely-poor. Second,  that  37%  of  the  rural  population  is  below  the  line
of extreme-poverty,  while  only 9.9X  of the  urban  population  falls  in this
category. Given the  respective  share  of each  population  in  the  sample  total,
t:is  implies  that the  rural  areas  account  for  almost  671  of national  extreme-
poverty. Based  on the  head count  ratio,  extreme-poverty  is  mostly  a rural
problem.  When  correction  is  made for  the  depth  of  poverty,  a  - 1, the
proportion  of extreme-poverty  accounted  for  by the  rural  population  increases
to 72.8%. Finally,  when account  is  made  of the  distribution  of poverty,
a - 2, the  proportion  of extreme-poverty  accounted  for  by rural  groups
increases  to 76.6X. The fact  that  the  share  of rural  extremely-poor  increases
with  higher  order  indices  illustrates  that  not  only is extreme-poverty  mostly
a rural  phenomenon,  but  the  poorest  of the  extremely-poor  are  almost  all in
the  rural  areas 41. (The  significance  of this  is  highlighted  recalling  that in
Mexico  more than two  thirds  of the  population  can  be classified  as urban.) It
also illustrates  the  importance  of appropriate  weighting  and  the  misleading
39Table  6 refers  to the  main  occupation  of the  household  head during  the
month  in  which  the  household  was surveyed. To the  extent  that  household  heads
may  migrate  between  urban  and  rural  locations  with the  agricultural  cycle
these  results  may  be misleading. In addition,  micro  studies  for  poor  land
owning  households  show  a diversification  of income  sources,  with some  earnings
coming  from  off-farm  labor  (cf.  Roberts  (1982)),  section  V.1  below). Also
note  that  household  heads  that  report  to  be unemployed  were so  with reference
to that  month  only,  so that  these  figures  cannot  be used to  properly  assess
unemployment  statuis.
40The  distinction  between  P[a,a(C)1  and  P[a,&(M)]  found  in table  7 is
explained  below;  at this  point  the  discussion  focuses  on P[a,(C)].
41In fact,  one  could  argue  that  table  7  underestimates  rural  poverty  to
the  extent  that  some  publicly  provided  services,  whose  effect  on poverty  is
not  captured  by the  values  of P (.),  are  relatively  more available  in  urban
areas;  see footnote  44 below.17  t
Table  7
Indices  of-Extreme-Poverty
Panel  (a):  CNA  recommended  by Coplamar,  a(C).
a  - 0  I  a  - 2
Pi  Ti  Pi  Ti  Pi  Ti
Rural  0.3719  0.6689  0.1232  0.7280  0.0572  0.7658
Urban  0.0995  0.3311  0.0248  0.2720  0.0094  0.2342
National  0.1951  1.0000  0.0594  1.0000  0.0262  1.0000
Panel  (b):  Minimum  Cost  CNA,  z(M).
a  - 0  a  -2
p  Ti  Pi  Ti  Pi  T
Rural  0.2113  0.7357  0.0617  0.7875  0.0266  0.8124
Urban  0.0410  0.2643  0.0090  0.2125  0.0033  0.1876
National  0.1008  1.0000  0.0275  1.0000  0.0115  1.0000
Table  8
Indices  of  goderate-Poverty.
a  0  a  - 1  a  2
pi  Ti  pi  Ti  pi  Ti
Rural  0.9667  0.4178  0.6351  0.4860  0.4662  0.5307
Urban  0.7281  0.5822  0.3631  0.5140  0.2195  0.4693
National  0.8119  1.0000  0.4586  1.0000  0.3037  1.0000-28-
picture  that  can  be  obtained  from  the  simple  head-count  ratio:  at  least  in  the
case  of  Mexico  there  are  sharp  differences  In  the  level  of  poverty  among  the
extremely-poor.
It  is  important  to  note  that  for  four  reasons  the  above  measures
overestimate  extreme-poverty.  One,  the  estimate  of  X  took  as  a  basis  the  CNA
recommended  by  Coplamar.  But  as  already  remarked,  this  CNA,  denoted  CNA(C),
is  not  the  least  cost  diet  to  give  2,082  calories  and  35.1  grams  of  protein
per  day. If  instead  the  'true'  minimum  cost  CNA,  denoted  CNA(M),  is  used  as
the  basis  for  computing  E  I  obtain,  P[O,I(M)]  - 0.1008,  with  73.5%  of  this
poverty  total  accounted  for  by  the  rural  population;  see  panel  (b)  of  table  7.
More  generally,  given  a  value  for  a,  as  E  falls  the  share  of  extreme-poverty
accounted  for  by tbe  rural  population  increases.  This  suggests  that:  first,
P[a,y(C)]  and  P[a,g(M)]  should  be  interpreted  as  upper  and  lower  bounds  on  the
indices  of  extreme-poverty,  respectively,  with  the  'quality'  (in  terms  of  food
variety  and  perhaps  palatability)  of  the  diet  that  satisfies  the  same
nutritional  requirement  decreasing  as  we  move  from  CNA(C)  to  CNA(M) 42.
Second,  that  while  there  is  some  uncertainty  determining  the  exact  proportion
of  the  population  that  is  extremely-poor,  the  proposition  that  extreme-poverty
is  fundamentally  a rural  phenomenon  is  very  robust.
Two,  the  above  measures  of  individual  poverty  are  based  on  per  capita
household  income,  and  while  as  seen  above  poorer  households  are  larger,  they
also  have  a greater  proportion  of  children,  requiring  a  conversion  into  adult
equivalent  income  levels.  Three,  the  existence  of  economies  of  scale  in
consumption  reduces  income  requirements  for  larger  households  (cf.  Behrman  and
Wolfe  (1984)).  Four,  finally,  only  sample  data  was  used  for  the  estimates  of
P(a,y).  But  since  the  total  value  of  consumption  expenditures  implicit  in  the
IES  is  lowar  than  the  corresponding  figure  of  the  national  accounts,  this
could  bias  the  results  upwards  (assuming  the  national  accounts  are  closer  to
the  'true'  expenditure  totals).  No  correction  was  introduced  for  this  factor
since  I  had  no  information  to  distribute  the  discrepancy  across  income
42The  CNA(C)  costs  6,193.00  pesos  per capita  per trimester,  so that  i(C)
equals  7,742  pesos;  the  CNA(M)  costs  only  4,554.10,  so that  z(M)  equals  5,692
pesos. On  the  other  hand,  if  we  assume  that  for  the  lowest  deciles  of  the
population  all  own-consumption  consists  of  food,  the  implied  share  of
expenditures  allocated  to  food  would  be  70X. Multiplying  CNA(M)  by  1/0.70
gives  a  line  of  extreme-poverty  of  6,505.85,  which  is  still  19X  below  z(C).-29-
levels 43. Aside  from  this  potential  for  overestimation,  there  is  an
additional  source  of  bias  in  the  measurements  that  arises  from  differences  in
relative  prices  across  regions,  since  in  these  circumstances  the  same  monetary
income  may  translate  into  different  consumption  levels 44. It  is  left  for
further  research  to  determine  how  significant  these  omissions  are.
I  emphasize  that  a  value  for  P[O,z(C)]  of  0.19  does  not  imply  that  in
1984  19X  of  the  population  was  undernourished.  As  discussed  in  section  III.2,
measurements  of  undernutrition  based  on  requirement-intake  comparisons  fail  to
correct  for  intra  and  inter-individual  variability  in  nutrient  requirements.
In  addition,  the  diet  implicit  in  the  monetary  value  for  z(C)  need  not
coincide  with  a  freely  chosen  diet:  even  if  an  individual  is  given  a  monetary
income  of  y(C)  there  is  no  guarantee  that  he  will  in  fact  spend  80X  of  it  on
food  and  that,  in  addition,  the  food  chosen  will  have  a  composition  equal  to
CNA(C).  Moreover,  note  that  an  equally  nutritious  diet  but  with  a  different
composition,  CNA(M),  gives  substantially  lower  estimates  of  extreme-poverty.
Of  course,  although  table  7  provides  no  direct  evidence,  the  presumption  is
t.hat  the  individuals  below  a(C)  are  in  fact  those  that  have  the  highest
probability  of  being  undernourished,  are  more  vulnerable  to  disease,  and
suffer  from  anthropometric  deficiencies,  with  this  probability  increasing  as
incomes  fall  further  below  X(C). Until  additional  evidence  of  undernutrition
is  available,  these  are  the  individuals  who  policy  makers  must  assume  are  most
in  need. Additionally,  it  is  clear  that  these  individuals  do  behave
differently,  particularly  with  regards  to  key  variables  like  fertility,
household  size  and  dependency  ratios.
430ne  could  argue  that  since  the  IES  paid  particular  attention  to  food
expenditures  and  own-consumption,  it  is  likely  that  most  of  the  under-
reporting  occured  at  higher  income  levels.  Since  P(a,y)  only  requires
information  on  the  distribution  of  income  up  to  y,  it  follows  that  the
potential  for  upward  bias  arising  from  this  factor  is  not  too  significant,
however.
"An example  of  this  is  the  provision  of  water  for  the  inhabitants  of
Mexlco  City  and  those  of  surrounding  poor  neighborhoods  (like  Ciudad
Netzahualcoyotl):  the  former  get  it  free,  while  the  latter  must  pay  for  its
delivery.  Solis  (1984)  presents  evidence  to  show  that,  on  average,  prices  in
Mexico  are  higher  in  remote  rural  regions  compared  to  urban.  Greer  and
Thorbecke  (1986a,b)  have  developed  a simple  methodology  that  allows  to  compute
the  regional  monetary  cost,  y  (J-1,2,...m),  of  a freely  chosen  diet  (i.e.,
given  individual  preferences)  that  has  the  same  caloric  content  in  a  context
where  there  is  regional  price  variation.  In  this  case  the  monetary  poverty
line  varies  across  regions,  although  the  underlying  reference  to  the  level  of
nutritional  poverty  is  the  same.Table  8  presents  the  values  for  P(a,  z).  I note,  first,  that if the
CNSE is  accepted  as the  appropriate  reference  point,  81.2X  of the  population
(and  72.8X  of all  households)  would  be classified  as moderately-poor.  While,
as argued  in section  III.1,  moderate-poverty  is  a subjective  concept,  such  a
large  number  calls  into  question  the  components  of the  CNSE (and  of other
studies  that  have also  used the  CNSE  as a reference  point)45. Second,  when
a  - 0 I find that  the  urban  areas  now  account  for  the  largest  share  (58%)  of
national  poverty. When  a  - 2 these  proportions  are reversed,  with the  rural
areas  accounting  for  53%  of moderate-poverty.  As with  extreme-poverty,  when
account  is taken  of the  depth  and  distribution  of moderate-poverty  the  rural
areas  come  to the  forefront.
To sum  up,  based  on the  1984  IES: (i)  at most 19%  of the  population  was
below  the line  of extreme-poverty,  although  it is  probably  the  case that  this
is an over-estimate,  (ii)  the  extremely-poor  are  mostly  located  in rural
areas,  (iii)  the  poorest  of the  extremely-poor  are  also found  mostly  in rural
areas,  (iv)  the  extremely-poor  have  very large  families,  have the largest
share  of children,  the  highest  dependency  ratio  and the  lowest  educational
levels,  (v)  not even  the  extremely-poor  allocate  more than  60X  of total
monetary  expenditures  to food,  (vi)  most  of the  extremely-poor  are in
agricultural  activities,  (vii)  the  urban  extremely-poor  are  relatively  better
off than the  rural,  but  have similar  demographic,  expenditure  and  educational
characteristics.
4 5The complete  basket  is found  in  Coplamar,  1983,  pp. 134-45;  a careful
look  shows  that  an important  part  of the  basket  is  made  up of items  like
refrigerator,  T.V.,  automatic  laundry  and  dry  cleaning,  vacations  and  personal
entertainment,  etc..  Recall  that  this  basket  was formed  on the  basis  of the
expenditure  patterns  of the seventh  decile;  not surprisingly,  the  value  for
P(O,z)  calculated  on the  basis  of household  incomes  is,  as mentioned  in the
text,  0.728.-31-
V.pDeterminants  of Poverty.
This section  discusses  the  determinants  of poverty. The central
hypothesis  is that lagging  rural  and  agricultural  development  lies  at  the  root
of Mexican  poverty. Independently  of the  geographical  distribution  of the
extremely-poor,  this  hypothesis  is important  in  a behavioral  sense:  urban
poverty  is  not only  quantitatively  less important,  but is to a large  extent  a
reflection  of rural  poverty,  as  migration  is a key  mechanism  through  which  the
rural  poor attempt  to reduce  their  income  differences  vis-a-vis  the  rest  of
the  population. The  poverty  profiler  of section  IV showed  that  the  extremely-
poor,  aside  from  being  located  mostly  in the  rural  areas  and  having  the lowest
levels  of education,  derive  most of their  earnings  from  self employment  and
wage labor,  presumably  in  agriculture  and  related  activities. An obvious
implication  is that  to study  the  determinants  of  poverty  is to study  the
determinants  of the  returns  to  unskilled  labor  and  land  -the  main assets
owned  by the  poor 46.
Given  preferences,  technology  and the  size  and  distribution  of
endowments,  the  returns  to land  and to  unskilled  labor  depend  on: (i)
government  policies  broadly  defined  to include  pricing,  intra  and inter-
sectoral  resource  allocation,  and (ii)  the  institutional  environment  in  which
agents  make their  decisions. Given  its  importance,  most of this  section  is
devoted  to intra-rural  policies,  including  a  brief  discussion  of the
institutional  framework  (sub-section  V.1).  However,  I  also  briefly  mention
inter-sectoral  (sub-section  V.2) and  macroeconomic  policies  (sub-section  V.3).
Two caveats:  one, discussing  all  these  issues  here involves  a substantial
risk  of over-extending  and  thinning  my arguments. I emphasize  that  my aim is
only to raise  some  key  points  and  discuss  their  bearing  on poverty;  there  is
46Actually,  some  of the  land  exploited  by the  extremely-poor  under  the
ejido  tenure  form  has important  restrictions  attached  to it,  so it should  be
thought  of as a  very peculiar  asset;  see  below.-32-
no claim  to a  complete  or systematic  analysis47. Two, I focus  attention  in
those  factors  that  have characterized  the  Mexican  economy  over the  last
decades,  since  the  current  structure  of poverty  is the  cumulative  result  of
past  policies. As I  point  out  below,  progress  has  been  made in reforming
rural  regulations,  in changing  the  pattern  of subsidies,  and in reducing
macroeconomic  uncertainty. But  these  changes  have only  occurred  recently,  so
that  their  effects  on poverty  will only  be felt  in the  future.
V.1 Rural  and  Agricultural  Develo2ment.
There is  a certain  paradox  in  the  argument  that  the  root  cause  of poverty
in  Mexico  lies in the  rural  areas. The  paradox  lies  in the  fact that  for  a
substantial  period  of time  Mexico's  agriculture  was  a success  story.  Indeed,
using  the  language  of Timmer  (1988),  during  the  period  of 'the  agricultural
transformation'  the  agricultural  sector  in  Mexico  helped  to: "..  (i)  increase
the  supply  of food for  domestic  consumption,  (ii)  release  labor  for industrial
employment,  (iii)  enlarge  the  size  of the  market  for industrial  output,  (iv)
increase  the  supply  of domestic  savings,  and (v)  earn foreign  exchange"  (op.
cit.,  p. 290).  As argued  by Yates (1981,  p. 7-8),  between  1940  and  1965
agricultural  output  in  Mexico  increased  at an average  annual  rate  of 5.71;  and
while the  population  was  growing  substantially,  output  per  capita  increased
over 2X annually  during  this  time.
Various  factors  account  for  this  magnificent  performance,  but two  need to
be singled  out: one,  there  was  an increase  in the  extensive  margin,  with
harvested  area growing  at about  31  annually  from  1940  to 1960.  Two, technical
change  generated  an increase  along  the intensive  margin  with yields  growing  at
about  2X annually. Much of the  growth  in irrigated  land  occurred  in the  orth
47Major  research  challenges  lie in  these  areas. At the  theoretical  level
it is  necessary  to develop  models  that  capture  the  incentive  and  efficiency
effects  of the  ejido/private  land  dichotomy. At the  empirical  level  more
evidence  is  needed  on the  determinants  of crop  choice,  tenancy  arrangements
and the  demand  for rural  labor. Unfortunately,  the  data for  such  analysis  is
particularly  scarce  in  Mexico. In addition,  because  some tenancy  arrangements
are illegal  (although  apparently  common),  the  quality  of the  official  data is
suspect.  ("However,  given  the  clandestine  renting  out  of ejido  land  to
private  farmers,  the  census  data  probably  fail  to reflect  the  real
distribution  of inputs  and outputs  between  the  two  sectors;  this  places  in
doubt  any  conclusions  about  relative  productivity  that  are  derived  from  the
census  data."  Heath,  1990,  p. v.)-33-
and  Northwest,  where for  geographical  reasons  public  sector  investments  had
higher  rates  of return;  fewer  irrigation  projects  were undertaken  in the
relatively  denser  South  and  Central  parts  of the  country. Rain-fed
agriculture,  on the  other  hand,  had a  much  wider  growth. Irrigation,  the
development  of  high-yielding  varieties,  and  increased  use  of fertilizers  also
allowed  Northern  agriculture  to  diversify  crop  choice. Yates,  op.  cit.,
estimates  that  about  1%  of agricultural  growth  was accounted  for  by
specialization  according  to comparative  advantage  (i.e.,  a switch  towards
higher  value  crops).
As of the  mid-1960's  this  performance  deteriorated,  however. Between
1967  and 1980  agricultural  output  grew at  an annual  average  rate  of 2.6Z,  less
than the  growth  rate  of population  (around  3.5%  at that time);  since  then
agricultural  growth  has slowed  down  even  more:  between  1982  and 1987  output
grew 1.6%  annually  on average. This slowdown  is a complex  phenomenon  but four
causes  can  be singled  out.  First,  the  extensive  margin  was exhausted;
harvested  area  peaked  in 1966  (Yates,  op.  cit.,  p. 117).  Second,  public
sector  investment  in irrigation  projects  diminished,  which  partly  reduced  the
potential  for  growth  along  the intensive  margin:  only  by switching  towards
higher  value  crops  could  agricultural  growth  be enhanced. Third,  the terms  of
trade  between  agriculture  and  industry  turned  increasingly  against
agriculture:  "..the  price/cost  relationship  began  to deteriorate  just  at a
time  when it  was  becoming  more  expensive  per  acre to  bring  additional  land
into  cultivation"  (Yates,  op.  cit.,  p. 65).  Fourth,  private  investment  in
*  agriculture  fell.  The  supply  contraction  was therefore  not caused  by weather
variations,  but  by an inelastic  supply  of land,  lower  public  and  private
investment,  and  deteriorated  terms  of trade.
Aside from  price  and  public  investment  policies,  institutional  factors
also play  a key role.  In particular:  (i)  the land  tenure  system  divides
agriculture  in two  separate  forms  of tenure,  private  and  ejido  agriculture,
and (ii)  a complex  system  of regulations  applies  to the  use of land,  labor  and
credit  in both types  of agriculture. In private  agriculture  the  are
limitations  to the  size  of land  holdings,  so that  entry  is limited;
restrictions  apply  also to the  uses  of land 48. In ejido  agriculture  land
48For  example,  private  farmers  may own  up to  a maximum  of 100  hectares  of
irrigated  land,  but  up to 150  if they  grow  cotton,  and  up to  300 if the  land
is  used for  coffee,  sugarcane,  grapes  and  other  fruit  trees. They  may own
more land  if it is  not irrigated,  or if it is  used for  cattle-grazing.  But
land  used for  cattle-grazing  cannot  be used for  crops.-34-
cannot  be sold  or mortgaged;  restrictions  apply  to the type  of labor  contracts
that can  be implemented,  and  to the  sources  and  uses of credit 49.
A full  analysis  of these  institutions  _s  beyond  the  scope  of this  paper
but some  remarks  are  necessary  since  they  are  key  determinants - earnings  in
the  rural  areas.  I focus  attention  not only  on the  ejido-private  agriculture
dichotomy  (which  is certainly  very important),  but  also on other  regulationis
that  bear on the  rural  sector. It is this  complex  of regulations  and land
tenure  institutions  that  hurts  the  rural  poor.  Unfortunately,  it is  very
difficult  to discern  which individual  regulations  are  more  binding  than
others. The difficulty  in identifying  the  relative  importance  of each
reguiation  stems  from  the  lack  of empirical  studies,  and  from the  fact  that
they  have  been in  place  simultaneously,  and  across  very different  regions. In
addition,  some  regulations  (particularly  on sharecropping  and  renting  out of
ejido  land)  are  often  by-passed;  this  probably  varies  from  region  to  region
and  on the 'political  climate'  that  determines  when  and  how carefully  the  law
is enforced50.  Thus it is  probably  the  case  that  at times  the  regulations  on
credit  to the  ejido  are  the  major  deterrent  to agricultural  growth. But  at
other  times  restrictions  on sharecropping  and  rental  might  play a  key rVle
limiting  rural  incomes,  while  yet in  other  cases  it is the  absence  of
investment  which is the  limiting  factor  (which  in turn  might  be depressed  due
to  uncertainty  or to  deteriorated  terms  of trade). I  now turn to four
particular  issues  that  merit  special  attention.
One, restrictions  on the  use  of (private  and  ejido)  land  imply  the
absence  of a mechanism  to equate  the  marginal  productivity  of land  across
various  uses.  In  private  agriculture,  land (particularly  in  large  farms)  can
at times  not  be switched  across  different  crops.  In  ejido  agriculture  land
cannot  be rented  or exploited  through  sharecropping  and  other  tenancy
49See  Yates,  op.  cit.,  chps.  7  and 8 for  a good  description  of the legal
framework,  of the incentive  problems  it creates,  and  of the  amazing  array  of
restrictions  and  regulations. Since  then  some  modifications  have  been made to
the  agrarian  laws,  although  it  appears  that  the  main impediments  and
contradictions  remain  (cf.  Heath,  1990;  Velez,  1990).
50"Although,  in spite  of the  law,  renting  is currently  widespread,  it is
reasonable  to argue  that,  in  the  absence  of any  ban on leasing,  the  incidence
of this  practice  would  be even  greater:  there  are  pressumably  a number  of
ejidatarios  (particularly  those  on bad terms  with the  ejido  leadership)  who
are  deterred  from  renting  by the  prospect  that their  parcels  may  be
confiscated"  (Heath,  1990,  p. 11).-35-
arrangements. This  need not imply  that  ejido  agriculture  is less  efficient
than  private  agriculture  (in  plots  of similar  size,  with similar  access  to
water,  etc.).  In fact,  the  empirical  evidence  on this  score  is ambiguous:  "It
is  almost  impossible  to draw  hard  and fast  conclusions  about  the  relative
productivity  of private  farms  and  ejidos  in the  recent  period"  (Heath,  1990,
p. 3).  Yet, when the  restrictions  are imposed  they imply  that the  returns  to
land  are  below the  maximum  attainable. Moreover,  the  rural  poor  own land
under  both tenure  systems,  and  poverty  is  associated  with both 51. In
addition,  they  are  also affected  by regulations  on large  private  farms  through
its  effects  on the  demand  for  labor.
Two,  regulations  in agriculture  have an effect  on the  market  for  credit,
particularly  in the  ejidos. Since  ejido  land  cannot  be mortgaged,  most credit
for  the  ejidos  comes  from  public  sources 52; in  addition,  individual
ejidatarios  are  not allowed  to contract  credit  on their  own,  but  must do so as
a joint  operation  of the  community  (although  this  changed  very recently).
Joint  provision  of credit  creates  three  problems. First,  there  is  no
53
mechanism  to insure  that  credit  is  allocated  to  efficient  producers
Second,  the  joint  nature  of credit  creates  a free  rider  problem  resulting  in
large  default  rates. In effect,  credit  becomes  a subsidy  to production  and
consumption  (Yates,  op. cit.,  p. 209).  The  associated  subsidies  to public
agricultural  credit  institutions  are  probably  regressive,  since  there  is  no
mechanism  to insure  that  the  subsidized  credit  goes to the  poorest
51As mentioned  in section  IV,  the  IES  does  not allow  one  to connect
earnings  with asset  ownership. Nevertheless,  household  studies  report  low
incomes  for  small  scale  private  agricultural  producers  and  ejidatarios,  so it
seems  safe  to assume  that  some  of  both are  among  the  poor;  see  Finkler  (1978)
and  Roberts  (1982).
52Commercial  banks  can  lend  to ejidatarios,  but  do so accompanied  by
guarantee  schemes  provided  by second  tier institutions.
53A related  problem  is that  credit  is given  in  kind  which  appears  to
create  problems  with timely  delivery,  an issue  of particular  importance  in
agriculture. In addition,  "..partly  in order  to achieve  economies  of scale  in
procurement,  (Banrural)  operates  with a  standarized  input  package  that is
insensitive  to regional  variations  in input  requirements  and  prices"  (Heath,
op.  cit.,  p. 21).-36-
ejidatarios 54. And  while agricultural  credit  is  not the  first  best in3trument
to subsidize  consumption,  this  subsidy,  by construction,  cannot  reach  landless
rural  inhabitants,  who  are  probably  among  the  poorest  of the  rural  poor.
Third,  credit  to the  ejidos  is  made contingent  on crop  choice,  with emphasis
on corn,  beans  and  basic  cereals. There  is almost  no credit  for  livestock,
nor for  other  crops  that  might  be more labor  intensive  or have  higher  value
per acre 55. This limits  the returns  to  both ejido  land  and labor.
Three,  the  rural  labor  market  suffers  from  at least  five  distortions.
First,  regulations  on  private  agriculture  (particularly  large  farms)  can  at
times  depress  the  demand  for labor,  since  land  used for  catcle-grazing  may not
be used for  crops (which  are  probably  more labor-intensive),  even if this  is
feasible  and  profitable. Second,  certain  practices  that  ejido  owners  might
engage  to reduce  risk  and diversify  their  earnings  sources  are  prohibited;  in
particular,  sharecropping  is not  allowed,  nor is the  renting  of land to
54 "Empirical  data  suggests  that  not even  the institutional  credit
channeled  through  Banrural  is reaching  a significant  portion  of the  poorest
population."  (World  Bank,  1989a,  Vol I,  p. 56).  Heath,  op.  cit.,  also  notes  a
"..tendency  to use  credit  for  political  rather  than  economic  purposes"  (p.  5).
In addition,  he notes  that "State  lending  policy  reflects  a confusion  between
the  objective  of poverty  alleviation  and the  objective  of enhancing
agricultural  productivity"  (p.  40).
55Crop  diversification  is  one  of the  key  mechanisms  to increase  the
returns  to land. Yet changes  in  cropping  patterns  have  been  very uneven. In
the  North  and  North-West  there  seems  to be a "..remarkable  degree  of
responsiveness  to  market  incentives"  (Yates,  op.  cit.,  p. 53),  but in the
Altiplano  and  Center  the  dependence  on corn  and  beans  has  been increasing,
although  these  are  among  the  crops  with the  lowest  value  in terms  of output
per  acre.  Of course,  crop  choice  depends  not  only  on access  to credit,  but
also  on risk  considerations,  access  to  water,  and  timely  access  to fertilizers
and transport;  see  below,  section  VI.5.-37-
private  producers 56.  Third,  crop choice  limitations  in ejido  land (derived
from  the  crop-contingent  nature  of  public  credit)  reduce  the demand  for labor
if ejidatarios  wanted to switch  to higher  value  and  more labor  intensive
crops. Fourth,  labor  mobility  of ejidatarios  is  reduced  given  the  risk of
losing  their  right  to exploit  a  given  parcel  of land57. Fifth,  the  law
"..prohibits  ejidatarios  from using  hired  hands  as a œubstitute  for  their  own
labor;  however,  they  may employ  hired  workers  as  a  supplement  to their  own
labor  input,  providing  they themselves  are  fully  employed  in  working  the
parcel."  (Heath,  1990,  p. 10-11).
Finally,  investment  incentives  are  reduced,  for four  reasons. First,  in
private  lands  investment  is constrained  by limits  to land  holdings,  potential
56Sharecropping  and other  rent-out  arrangements  allow  ejidatarios  to
diversify  weather-related  risks  of agricultural  production. l4ith
sharecropping  part of the output  risk is  borne  by the  worker.  Renting  land
allows  the  ejidatario  to work elsewhere  (probably  through  circular  migration)
and earn  wage income  whose  variance  is  not  correlated  with agricultural
output. In addition,  renting  out  land  might  generate  a better  pairing  of
labor  ability  with land,  as not all  ejidatarios  are  equally  skilled;
differently  put, renting  out land is  a partial  solution  to the  ejido-induced
problem  where 'bad  farmers  cannot  quit,  while  good  farmers  caxnnot  expand'.
Roberts  (1982)  discusses  some evidence  of this,  and  shows  that  even  very poor
producers  in backward  regions  of Oaxaca  (La  Mixteca  Baja)  engage  in a
combination  of on and off-farm  labor. Finkler  (1978,  p. 105)  investigates
ejido  arrangements  in  El Mezquital  Valley  in  Hidalgo  and  argues  that
"...sharecropping  provides  an avenue  for  economic  improvement." Similarly,
Heath (1990,  p. 5) notes that:  "As  well as placing  ejido  land  in the  hands  of
private  farmers,  these  practices  (i.e.,  sharecropping  and renting  out, S.L.)
also create  employment  within the  ejido;  ... ,  in any  event,  they  ensure
efficient  exploitation  of ejido  land  by placing  it in the  hands  of those  with
the  means  and  the  vocation  to  work it."  It is  now generally  recognized  that
sha-ecropping  arrangements  of various  sorts  need  not be inefficient  but rather
should  be seen  as a response  to the  absence  of a  market  for risk  and to costs
of  monitoring  (cf.  Stiglitz  (1989));  there  seem  to be neither  equity  nor
efficiency  reasons  to discourage  them.  On the  other  hand,  many observers
point  out that in  Mexico the laws  against  sharecropping  and renting  out  of
ejido  land  are increasingly  violated  (Heath,  1990,  pp.  21-2,  34).
57"Thus,  while ejido tenure  guarantees  the  peasant  a minimum  level  of
subsistence,  it also serves  to tie  the  peasant  to his  plot and  his  village  and
usually  precludes  his search  for  alternative  and  supplementary  forms  of
livelihood  outside  the confines  of the  community  or its immediate  environs"
(Finkler,  1978,  p. 104).-38-
risks  of  land  expropriation58,  and  restrictions  to  the  use  of  land. Second,
given  uncertainty  about  tenure  and  restrictions  on  sale  (and  rental),
individual  ejidatarios  have  lower  incentives  to  improve  their  plot  of  land
since  if  the  sale  is  not  allowed  by  the  ejido  authorities,  or  if  the  land  is
lost,  such  investments  cannot  be  recouped 59. Moreover,  even  if  individual
ejidatarios  are  certain  about  their  property  righlts  on  their  own  parcel,
restrictions  on  sale  might  still  deter  investments  (particularly  by the
better-off  ejidatarios),  since  the  option  value  of  liquid  capital  (or
investments  in  areas  other  than  agriculture)  will  exceed  the  value  of
investments  in  a  non-marketable  asset 60. This  implies  that  some  investments
must  be  carried  out  by  the  public  sector  (water  pumps,  irrigation  channels,
storage  facilities,  etc.). Third,  investments  by  ejidatarios  in  communal
lands  may  be  depressed 61. Four,  joint  operations  between  private  and  ejido
agriculture  are  limited 62.
58 "Vagueness  and  contradictions  in  the  law  create  a  climate  of
uncertainty  that  may  discourage  on-farm  investment  by  both  ejidatarl.os  and
private  farmers'  (Heath,  1990,  p.  ii). Uncertainty  also  derives  from  the  fact
that  different  presidents  and  state  governors  have  historically  shown
different  preferences  for  enforcing  this  or  that  law. This  also  generates  a
bias  against  projects  with  a  long  gestation  period  (e.g.  perenial  crops):  a
new  regime  always  opens  possibilities  for  different  interpretations  of  the
law. In  addition,  note  that  the  'certificados  de  inalienabilidad'  that  are  at
times  used  to  by-pass  this  problem  may  be time  inconsistent  given  their  fixed
period  nature.
59Ejidatarios  might  be  evicted  from  the  ejido  if  they  fail  to  exploit  the
land,  rent  the  land,  or  engage  in  sharecropping.  In  addition,  since  many
ejidatarios  have  parcels  that  are  smaller  than  the  legally  prescribed  minimum
of  20  (rain-fed)  hectares,  they  face  some  uncertainty  about  their  own  tenure.
(In  1981  the  average  size  of  ejido  parcels  was  7  hectares.)
60A  rental  market  for  ejido  land  could  reduce  the  deterrent  effects  on
investment,  since  improvements  to  land  could  be  reflected  in  the  rental  rates.
This  would  require  that  rentals  of  ejido  land  be  legal,  and  that  long  term
contracts  be  allowed.
61Heath  (1990,  p.  13)  notes  that  only  27X  of  ejido  lands  are  cultivated.
And  while  the  remaining  lands  are  probably  unsuited  for  agriculture  (too
steep,  etc.),  they  could  be  exploited  as  forests  or  for  other  purposes.
Communal  property  also  appears  to  produce  over-grazing  of  pasture  lands.
62"Ejidos  can  form  their  own  enterprises,  but  (the)  legal  framework
prevents  them  from  forming  cooperative  ventures  with  domestic  and  foreign
companies  who could  provide  technology  and  market  access."  (World  Bank,  1989a,
Vol.  I,  p.  55).-39-
How  can  the  incentive  structure  just  described  be  reconciled  with  strong
agricultural  growth  up  to  the  mid  1960's?  A  potential  hypothesis  is  that  in  a
context  where  the  land/labor  ratio  was  high,  land-redistribution  and  the  co-
habitation  of  different  tenure  systems  was  compatible  with  sustained  growth.
But  population  growth  implied  that  the  extensive  margin  would  eventually  be
exhausted,  a  point  that  seems  to  have  been  reached  in  the  mid-1960's.  Yet,
precisely  at  this  time  the  process  of  land  redistribution  was  accelerated 63.
An  important  effect  of  this  was  an  increase  in  uncerta!nty  regarding  land
tenure,  both  for  ejidatarios  and  for  private  owners.  For  ejidatarios
uncertainty  regarding  tenure  increased  since  while  the  law  prescribed  a
minimum  size  of  20  hectares  for  each  individual  parcel,  actual  size  was
significantly  below  this  level..  For  private  agricultural  owners  uncertainty
increased  since  expropriation  risks  were  higher64.  This  reduced  the  private
incentives  for  investment  in  agriculture  precisely  at  the  time  when  growth
along  the  intensive  margin  became  more  important.  The  slowdown  in  private
investment,  together  with  the  end  of  easy  irrigation  projects  and  deteriorated
terms  of  trade 65 is  responsible  for  the  stagnation  in  agricultural  growth
observed  since  then.
63Heath  (1990,  table  1)  shows  that  of  the  105  million  hectares
distributed  by  the  government  between  1900  and  1988,  24.7  (or  23.5X)  million
were  distributed  in  the  period  1965-70,  exceeding  the  18.7  million  hectares
distributed  during  the  Cardenas  period  (1934-1940).
64Yates  summarizeb  the  matter  aptly:  "Without  any  doubt,  the  agrarian
reform  in  its  early  years  provided  a  strong  stimulus  to  agricultural
expansion,  in  particular  by  putting  large  areas  of  mostly  good  quality  but
previously  uncultivated  land  into  the  hands  of  a  new  class  of  operators  who
were  eager  to  make  it  productive.  Yet  a  program  which  was  highly  beneficial
under  a  certain  set  of  circumstances  may  ....  cease  to  have  beneficial  effects
and  may  even  begin  to  cause  harm. For  instance,  a large  portion  of  the  ejidos
created  during  the  past  fifteen  years  (1965-80.  S.L.)  have  been  given  land
which  was  well  farmed  by its  existing  operators,  but  whose  productivity
declined  because  of  lack  of  know-how  among  the  new  settlers.  On  the  other
hand,  many  of  the  owner-operated  farmers  have  been  desisting  from  making
investments  in  improvements  because  to  do  so  would  bring  them  in  conflict  with
the  agrarian  laws  or  because  they  stood  in  continual  fear  of  possible
expropriation"  (p.  66;  emphasis  added,  S.L.).
65With  respect  to  the  terms  of  trade,  Heath  (1990,  p.  5)  notes  that:  "Two
important  studies  have  independently  reached  a  significant  conclusion  about
the  1970-82  trends:  although  total  intersectoral  resource  flows  showed  a  net
gain  for  the  countryside,  relative  price  movements  continued  to  favor  the
urban  rather  than  the  rural  sector."-40-
The  policy  response  to the  problem  of diminished  agricultural  growth  came
in the early  1970's. Given the  measures  taken,  ex-post  it can  be seen that
from  the government's  perspective,  the  problem  of agriculture  was a problem  of
food  supply,  particularly  of basic  grains. Policies  were implemented  to
increase  food  supply  and incomes  in the rural  areas  while  at the  same time
maintaining  the  same  institutional  and  land  tenure  structure.  The  policy
response  had  many elements,  chief  among  them:  (i)  an attempt  to increase
prices  for  basic  crops, (ii)  massive  infusion  of  public  credit,  (iii)  a
special  campaign  to increase  production  of beans  and  corn, (iv)  the  formation
of collectivized  ejidos, (v)  strong  emphasis  on specializing  pro-action
patterns  along  food self-sufficiency  lines  regardless  of international  prices,
and (vi)  provision  of additional  subsidies  to inputs  like  fertilizers  and
electricity  (cf.  World Bank (1989a),  (1990b)). These  policies  have  been
costly  in terms  of subsidies  to fertilizers,  agricultural  credit,  electricity,
crop  insurance  and  price supports 66, and  have probably  provide~d  large  rents  to
higher  income  producers 67. Unfortunately,  they  have  been  unable  to  produce
6 6 he  World Bank (1989a,  Vol. 1, p. vii) estimates  that  untargeted
subsidies  to agricultural  financial  institutions  and  agricultural  inputs
totalled  US 2.4  billion  in 1988.  The report  also  notes  that  these  subsidies
"..total  about  10 times  the  public  investment  in the  sector. Simply  reducing
the losses  of the financial  institutions  could  double  the total  public
investment  in the agricultural  sector"  (p.  8).
67  The evidence  on rents  is  patchy,  but  plausible. With respect  to
fertilizers  Yates (op.  cit.,  p. 212)  claims  that  "..the  fertilizer  subsidy
chiefly  assists  those  who ordinarily  use large  quantities  of fertilizer,  which
in practice  particularly  means farmers  in  the irrigation  districts,  but it
does  nothing  for the  subsistence  cultivator  in the  mountains  of Oaxaca." With
respect  to credit  see footnote  54.  With respect  to  water  Yates  notes  that "It
seems  puzzling  that successive  governments  pursued  this  policy  of subsidizing
irrigation  water,  to the  benefit  of  what is after  all  the  richest  section  of
the farming  community."  (p.  81).  With respect  to  marketing  Reath  notes  that
"..the  marketing  subsidy  manifests  the  same  contradictions  as  subsidized
credit  programmes:  it  was initially  designed  to  benefit  the  poorest  producers
but has  ended  up providing  an unnecessary  cushion  to commercial-scale
prolucers  and  wholesalers.."  (1990,  p. 44). With respect  to price supports,
an argument  that  they are also  regressive  can  be made along  Ricardian-rents
lines,  since  the  price support  affects  a crop  grown  on lands  of  very different
productivity  and a larger  share  of  marginal  lands  is cwned  by the  poorer  rural
producers:  "Horecver,  the  use of price  supports  for  maintenance  of income  may
work fairly  well in  a country  where the  gap is  not too  great  between  the
higher  and  the lower  income  farmers,  but in a developing  country  where  half
the  farm  population  operates  on a  subsistence  basis,  redistributive  objectives
cannot  be obtained  in this  way.  A corn price  which is  barely  adequate  for  a
poor  peasant  in Oaxaca  spells  riches  to an irrigation  farmer  in Guanajuato"
Yates,  op.  cit.,  p. 233.-41-
significant  increases  in agricultural  output  or generalized  rural  development
with higher  returns  to land  and  higher  wages for  unskilled  rural  labor.
V.2  Urban  Bias.
Persistent  imbalances  in inter-sectoral  resource  allocation  between  rural
and  urban  areas  also  play a fundamental  role in the  generation  of poverty. A
proper  study  of urban  bias in social  and infrastructure  spending  requires
systematic  data-gathering  to quantify  the  associated  flows. Here  I restrict
myself  to a listing  of five  areas  where  this  bias is  most directly  observed:
health,  education,  housing,  public  infrastructure,  and subsidies  for  goods  and
services.
Aspe and  Beristain  (1984)  studied  the  regional  distribution  of government
resources  for  health  and  education. With regards  to education  they  find  that
while  the  share  of public  sector  expenditure  in  education  in  GDP  rose steadily
from  1960  to 1978,  resources  allocated  to elementary  education  in  the rural
areas  have fallen,  despite  the  growth  of the  younger-aged  population  during
that  period  (pp.  291-300);  a privileged  share  of expenditures  was devoted  to
higher  education,  located  mostly  in  urban  areas.  Thus,  independently  of the
rural  poor's  ability  to demand  education  (see  section  VI.1 below),  the  supply
of educational  facilities  has  been insufficient 68. A related  phenomenon  is
observed  in the  provision  of health  services. On the  whole,  they  note that:
'The  greatest  significance  of this  study  is  a negative  one:  the (government's,
S.L.)  educational  and  health  policies  have not  been corrective  and  have not
diminished  the  disparity  in income,  but  have,  on the  contrary,  confirmed  and
reaffirmed  these  conditions"  (p.  323).  Similar  results  are  obtained  by Moore
(1984)  with regards  to the  provision  of public  housing  who notes  that:  "In
spatial  terms  it is  evident  that  housing  policy  has  been concentrated  in the
capital  city,  to a lesser  extent  in other  metropolitan  areas,  and is  almost
absent  in the  rural  context"  (p.  352). And still  the  same  type  of  biases  are
found  against  the  poorest  states  with the  higher  share  of rural  population  in
the  allocation  of public  infrastructure  investment  (cf.  World  Bank,  1989a,  pp.
13-31).
Urban  bias also  appears  in the  pattern  of subsidies. This  hurts  the
rural  poor in three  ways.  One,  urban  inhabitants  appropriate  the  bulk  of food
680f course,  issues  as to the  quality  of education  are  equally  relevant.-42-
subsidies  (see  section  VII.2  below). In addition,  urban  inhabitants,
particularly  in  Mexico  City,  also  profit  from  large  subsidies  to water,
transportation  and  other  services  provided  at the  expense  of the  whole
69 country . Two, subsidies  to Mexico  City and  other  urban  areas  reduce  private
costs  of production  below  social  costs 70. This lowers  the  demand  for  rural
labor  in those  activities  that  could  be decentralized. Three,  huge
expenditures  in the  development  of the  urban  infrastructure  reduce  available
resources  for  rural  infrastructure 71.
To sum  up: the  combined  effects  of intra  and inter-sectoral  government
policies  doubly  discriminate  against  the  rural  poor.  First,  to the  extent
that agriculture  and the  rural  areas  as a whole  receive  an inequitable  share
of the  total  resources  devoted  to social  and infrastructure  investment.
Second,  to the  extent  that  those  resources  that  are  channeled  to the  rural
areas  are  mostly  untargeted  and  benefit  better-off  producers  in those  areas.
Some  of these  policies  hurt the  rural  poor directly,  limiting  the  demand  for
their  labor  or the  returns  to their  land  by increasing  transport  costs,
reducing  crop  choice,  mobility;  others  do so indirectly,  limiting  their  access
to education,  information,  health  services  and  general  possibilities  to
improve  their  human  capital. This combination  of institutional  arrangements
and  government  policies  taxes  agriculture,  particularly  the  rural  poor,  and
generates  inefficiencies.  Taxing  agriculture  might  have  been  the  unavoidable
cost of  urbanization  and industrialization.  But  if poverty  is to diminish
this  taxation  and  these  efficiency  losses  must  end.
69The  pattern  of transfers  between  the  federal  budget  and  Mexico  City  is
complex,  but favors  the  latter;  see  World  Bank,  1989c,  Vol.  I, pp.  85-100.
70Gil  Diaz (1985)  presents  an illuminating  case  study  of the  distortions
introduced  by the  fact  that  the  private  marginal  cost  of water  in  Mexico  City
is zero;  other  services  like  transportation  are  subsidized,  while  user charges
are  below  marginal  costs.
71The relationship  between  urbanization  and  poverty  in  Mexico  deserves  a
study  of its  own.  Polak  and  Williamson  (1989)  make  the interesting
observation  that  in England  and other  countries  industrializing  in  the  XIXth
century  poverty  was  mostly  an  urban  phenomenon. They  attribute  this  partly  to
the  fact that  modern  urbanization  is immensely  capital  intensive,  requiring  a
large  share  of the  country's  resources. A. Lewis  (1978,  p. 29)  notes  that:
"Urbanization  is  decisive  because  it is so  expensive. The  difference  betwee.
the  cost  of urban  and  rural  development  does  not  turn  on comparing  the  capital
required  for  factories  and  that  required  for  farms. Each  of these  is a  small
part of the  total  investment,  and  the  difference  per  head is not  always  Ln
favor  of industry. The difference  turns  on infrastructure.'-43-
V.3  Macroeconomic  Polcy.
Lagging  rural  development  and  urban  bias  have characterized  Mexico  since
at least  the  1960's. In addition,  since  the  early  1970's  the  macroeconomic
environment  has  been less  stable. I  briefly  mention  here two  channels  by
which  this  affects  poverty. First,  as elaborated  on in the  next section,  the
poor,  and  particularly  the  extremely-poor,  have lower  ability  to  bear risk.
Uncertainty  is a fundamental  determinant  of their  decisions  with regards  to
migration,  on and  off-farm  labor,  crop  choice,  etc..  And  while some  sources
of uncertainty  are  truly  exogenous  (e.g.  the  weather),  others  derive  from
cycles  induced  by macroeconomic  policy. A general  environment  of certainty
is,  from  the  point  of  view of poverty,  a public  good.  Increases  in the  demand
for  unskilled  labor  that  result  from  unsustainable  macroeconomic  expansions
probably  fail  to  help the  poor.  If the  poor  perceive  such  increases  to  be
transitory  it  may  not induce  them  to abandon  self  employment  in their  marginal
lands. On the  other  hand,  if they  do change  their  behavior  they  will then
suffer  income  losses  when the  unsustainable  output  expansion  terminates.
Macroeconomic  uncertainty,  moreover,  depresses  the  medium  term  aggregate
demand  for  labor 72. In  addition,  given  the  extremely-poor's  need for
security,  stop-go  social  spending  programs  are  not  as effective  as those  that
deliver  steady  benefits,  even if they  cost  the  same (see  below)73.
72The effect  of uncertainty  on the  demand  for  labor  is  ambiguous
(negative)  for  a risk-neutral  (averse)  profit  maximizing  firm.  Aspe and
Blanco  (1984),  however,  find  that for  Mexico  higher  macroeconomic  uncertainty
has lead  to lower  employment;  they  measure  uncertainty  by the  one-step  ahead
variance  of the  forecasting  errors  for  two  macro  time  series  (the  price  level
and the  money  supply),  and  cannot  reject  the  hypothesis  that  for the  period
1973-80  uncertainty  increased  depressing  output  and  employment.
73An analysis  of the  impact  on the  poor  of the  1983-88  macroeconomic
crisis  is  beyond  the  scope  of this  paper. Lustig  (1990)  argues  that  most  of
the income  contraction  occurred  within  the  middle  and lower-middle  income
strata  of the  population. The  World  Bank (1989b,  p. ii),  however,  argues
that:  "The  poor  bore the  brunt  of the  economic  crisis." A fuller  analysis  of
this  issue  will be feasible  once  the  1989  IES  is available. Nevertheless,
note that  to the  extent  that  u.itargeted  subsidies  to food  and  agriculture  were
relatively  ineffective  in  reaching  the  poor,  the  direct  effects  of the  fiscal
cuts  might  not  have  been severe. The  poor,  particularly  the  rural  extremely-
poor,  were  not receiving  significant  benefits  before  the  crisis  anyway. On
the  other  hand,  the indirect  impact  could  be more significant,  as the  cuts  in
infrastructure  investments  for irrigation,  rural  roads,  etc.  have negative
medium  term  effects  on the  poor's  earnings  opportunities.-44-
Second, asymmetries in the availability of information and access  to
hedging  possibilities  imply  that  the inflation  tax  cannot  be evaded  equally  by
all. The poor  may  at times  have financial  assets  that  from  their  perspective
are  significant  (e.g.  cash  balances  held in the  interlude  between  the  sale  of
a crop  and  the  purchase  of goods  or inputs). Eroding  the  value  of these
assets  through  inflation  limits  the  poor's  possibilities  for  medium  term
accumulation.-45-
VI.  Policies  for  Poverty  Alleviation.
This  section  is  concerned  with  the  design  of  government  programs  to
alleviate  poverty.  The  objective  is  to  construct  a  poverty  program  whose
various  components  deal  most  effectively  with  the  different  dimensions  of
poverty.  Since  policy  must  be  based  on  the  behavioral  characteristics  of  the
target  population,  I  begin  in  sub-section  VI.A  with  a discussion  of  the  needs
and  behavior  of  the  extremely-poor  and  the  moderately-poor.  I  next  turn  in
sub-section  VI.2  to  discuss  four  considerations  that  affect  the  nature  of
government  intervention  in  poverty  alleviation.  In  sub-section  VI.3  I  pull
together  these  two  strands  to  identify  the  objectives  of  government
intervention  in  poverty  alleviation,  and  the  various  components  of  a  poverty
program.  Sub-sections  VI.4  and  VI.5  discuss  the  specific  components  of  the
poverty  program.
VI.l  Needs.  Behavior.  and  Policy.
Policies  to  help  the  extremely-poor  and  the  moderately-poor  must  take  as
departure  point  their  characteristics;  this  allows  to  identify  each  group's
needs  and  directs  policies  to  the  relevant  margin.  Seven  characteristics  of
the  extremely-poor  merit  attention.
One,  the  extremely-poor  have  higher  fertility  ratios  and  more  children
per  household  (Lipton  (1983b),  Birdsall  and  Griffin  (1988);  table  3  above)74.
In  these  households  children  play  the  role  of  insurance  policies  for  the
future  and,  after  age  5  or  6,  additional  labor  force 75. There  is  growing
evidence  that  high  fertility  is  a  result  of  the  characteristics  associated
741  was  unable  to  find  any  studies  linking  fertility  to  income  levels  in
Mexico.  The  tabulations  that  I  obtained  from  the  'Encuesta  Nacional  de
Fecundidad  y Salud'  carried  out  by  the  Ministry  of  Health  in  1987  only
classify  women  into  urban  and  rural  groups.  Global  fertility  ratios  for  urban
(rural)  women  for  the  period  1981-86  were  3.6  (5.6),  respectively.
75What  is  not  clear  is  how  out-migration  changes  this  situation.  If
migrants  send  remittances,  the  initial  investment  by  parents  is  recuperated
while  household  size  falls;  else  migration  can  reduce  average  incomes  for
extremely-poor  households.-46-
with poverty,  particularly  high infant  mortality  rates 76. Having  extra
children  "..can  be interpreted  as the insurance  response  parents  make in the
face of  high infant  mortality. As the  risk  of infant  mortality  declines,
these  excess  births  should  become  unnecessary"  (Birdsall  and  Griffin,  1988,  p.
36).  Thus,  it appears  that  fertility  declines  follow  reductions  in infant
mortality 77. Higher  infant  mortality,  in  addition,  increases  the  number  of
pregnancies  for  extremely-poor  females  since:  (a)  more children  are  wanted
and, (b)  more replacement  births  are  required  to  attain  the  desired  family
size.  This increases  the  dependency  ratio,  as female  members  retire  from
active  participation  in  work during  childbirth  and lactating  periods. Higher
fertility,  however,  may  also  be due  to lack  of education  and  access  to  birth
control  methods. Hence,  unwanted  pregnancies  are  higher. Unwanted
pregnancies  that  lead to  abortions  are  an additional  burden  on the  health  and
nutritional  status  of females 78; those  that  lead  to children,  on the  other
hand, further  increase  the  dependency  ratio.
76See  Mina  Valdez  (1988)  for  a study  of infant  mortality  in  Mexico. In
particular,  see  his table  5,  p. 280,  where  average  infant  mortality  rates  for
the  period  1965-79  for  eight 'social  classes'  are  computed  as follows:
bourgeoisie,  36.5;  new  petty  bourgeoisie,  30.2;  traditional  petty  bourgeoisie,
54.1;  non-wage  free  laborers,  57.3;  typical  proletariat,  59.2;  un-typical
proletariat,  53.5;  peasants,  81.2;  agricultural  proletariat,  96.7.  While  it
is difficult  to interpret  some  of these  social  classes,  these  numbers  do
roughly  indicate  a strong  association  between  lower  income  and  high infant
mortality. Also,  the  World  Bank (1989b,  p. 42)  estimates  infant  mortality
rates in  Mexico  per live  births  of 20/1000  in the  metropolitan  areas  vs.
80/1000  in  backward  rural  areas. Finally,  a 1982  nutrition  survey  in  rural
areas  of Oaxaca  found  that  women  average  nine  deliveries  during  their
childbearing  years,  with only  five  children  surviving  to adulthood  (Torche,
1990,  p. 13).
77There  is,  of course,  a lag  between  the  drop in infant  mortality  and the
behavioral  response  of parents  to limit  family  size  and increase  investments
per  child;  this lag  is sometimes  referred  to as the 'demographic  transition',
and  explains  why in  most LDC's  death  rates  fell  long  before  birth  rates.
Policy  can influence  this  lag  be reducing  child  mortality  and  increasing
income  security  (cf.  Birdsall  and  Griffin,  1988,  p. 37).
78Preliminary  results  from  the  1988  National  Nutrition  Survey  show  that
one-third  of all  pregnant  women  have an inter-birth  interval  of less  than  24
months,  and that  women  with short  birth  intervals  have significantly  worse
hemoglobin  levels  (World  Bank,  1990a,  p. 3).-47-
Two,  the  extremely-poor  may  not  be  able  to  respond  to  transitory  real
wage  declines  by  working  more  hours 79. Downturns  cannot  be  offset  by  working
more  if  households  are  already  working  all  they  can 80. This  might  be
particularly  relevant  for  rural  households  which  may  also  have  lower  mobility
(because  walking  to  distant  work  consunies  too  many  scarce  calories,  because
they  live  in  remote  regions  with  little  transportation,  or  because  they  cannot
afford  the  transportation)  and  fewer  alternative  opportunities  in  any  given
location.  Thus,  temporary  downturns  in  the  labor  market  may  have  direct
81 nutritional  repercussions
Three,  the  extremely-poor  appear  to  have  higher  age-specific
participation  rates,  which  affects  their  demand  for  education.  The  children
of  the  extremely-poor  may  participate  early  in  economic  activities  in  both
urban  (begging,  shoe  shining)  and  rural  (working  on  the  family  farm,  household
activities)  settings.  Independently  of  the  supply  of  educational  facilities,
the  opportunity  cost  to  the  household  of  having  children  in  school  is  too
high,  so  that  the  extremely-poor,  as  opposed  to  the  moderately-poor,  may  not
be  in  a  position  to  beneflt  from  educational  programs.  "In  low  income
households,  investments  in  the  human  capital  of  children,  which  provide
lifetime  returns  to  the  child  but  possibly  not  to  the  parents  making  the
investments,  may  be  sacrificed  to  more  immediate  household  needs"  (Birdsall
and  Griffin,  1988,  p.  34). Conversely,  households  with  higher  incomes  can
increase  investments  per  child,  in  a  sense  engaging  in  a  trade-off  of  quantity
for  quality.  With  larger  number  of  children  such  investments  may  be  deterred
if  parents  face  the  risk  of  losing  their  investment  through  child  death.
79The  'unemployment  rates'  registered  in  table  6  for  the  lowest  income
groups  would  seem  to  contradict  this  statement.  But  recall  that  the  IES  only
inquired  about  employment  status  on  the  previous  month,  so  that  there  is  a
large  element  of  seasonality.  A  more  detailed  study  of  labor  participation
rates  by income  groups  is  required.
80Contrast  this  with  the  usual  response  for  higher  income  groups,  where
as  income  falls  the  cost  of  leisure  is  higher;  an  increase  in  hours  worked  can
then  partly  offset  the  income  fall. At the  level  of  the  household  this  can
imply  that  members  that  were  previously  not  working  can  temporarily  join  the
labor  force  (as  probably  happened  during  the  83-88  crisis).
810A  survey  carried  out  in  1982  in  Oaxaca  by the  National  Institute  of
Nutrition  indicates  that  seasonal  variation  in  food  intake  is  widespread,  wlth
a  pattern  that  falls  between  1,900  calories  per  capita  per  day  during  harvest
time,  to  close  to  about  1,400  in  the  perlod  immediately  before  harvest.  Many
infants  between  8  and  18  months  are  not  able  to  survive  the  drastic  decline  in
food  availability"  (Torche,  1990,  p.  13;  emphasis  in  the  original).-48-
Higher  age-specific  participation  rates  also imply  that  targeting  food  to
children  through  school  lunches  or similar  mechanisms  may  miss the  extremely-
poor;  their  likelihood  of  being in  school  is lower 8 2 .
Four,  because  they  live so  close  to income-induced  nutritional  risks,  the
extremely-poor  have lower  ability  to  bear risk.  If they  have little  access  to
credit 83, and few  physical  assets,  downturns  in earnings  are immediately
translated  into  lower  consumption. This  may affect  their  ability  to
participate  fully  in the  labor  market  (or  to innovate  in the  farm  with  new
technologies). In particular,  for  extremely-poor  rural  households  holding  on
to small  pieces  of (probably  marginal)  land  that,  on average,  generate  less
income  than  participating  in the  labor  market  may  be an optimal  strategy  for
three  reasons. First,  participation  in the  labor  market  may  be risky,
particularly  in rain-fed  rural  areas  with  high  weather  variability 84. Second,
if they live  in remote  areas  with little  transportation  the  supply  of food  may
be uncertain;  erratic  or high  cost transportation  may make  autarky,
particularly  with regards  to food,  a sensible  strategy. Third,  for
ejidatarios  full  participation  in the  labor  market  may  entail  the  risk of
losing  their  land.  While  I  have  no direct  evidence  for  Mexico,  it is
plausible  to  posit  above-average  risk  aversion  for  the  extremely-poor.
82Which  is not  to deny that,  at the  margin,  school  lunches  may serve  as
an incentive  for  extremely-poor  children  to attend  school  (or  provide
incentives  to their  parents  to  send them  to school  by increasing  the
opportunity  cost  of child  labor).
83Unfortunately,  little  is  known  about  informal  credit  arrangements  in
Mexico.  If risks  are  household  specific  (as  is  more likely  in  urban  areas)
there  might  be possibilities  to  borrow  from  households  in the  same  area.  If
risks  are region  specific  (as  may  be more likely  in a given  rural  region
dependent  on rain-fed  agriculture),  such  borrowing  possibilities  may  be less
likely,  as all  households  will  be similarly  constrained.
84Risk  considerations  probably  affect  too  their  migratory  behavior
Roberts  (1982,  p. 319)  notes  that  poor  households  in  Mexico  "...cannot  afford
to undertake  the  substantial  investment  needed  to support  a circular  migrant
and the  risk that  he will not  quickly  obtain  a job and  send  remittances."
Recall  from table  5 that  migrant  remittances  account  for  a very small  share  of
the  extremely-poor's  earnings. On the  other  hand,  most studies  of labor
market  behavior  in rural  areas  concentrate  on households  who own land (either
private  or ejido). Much less  is known  about  landless  households  (cf.  Gregory,
1986,  pp. 110-13). This  is a significant  omission,  since  not  only  are
landless  rural  households  among  the  very  poor,  but also  due  to the semi-frozen
nature  of the  land  ownership  pattern  there  is a strong  likelihood  that  the
marginal  rural  poor is landless;  see  below,  section  VI.-49-
Five,  the  composition  of the  diet for  the  extremely-poor  is  different,  as
well as the  price  and income  elasticities  of demand  for  food.  At very low
income  levels,  households  consume  a  diet  composed  of cheap  calories. Some
evidence  also  shows  that  in the  range  of extreme-poverty  Engel's  Law (as
income  ir,creases  the  proportion  spent  on food  falls)  is  violated 85. There  is,
in addition,  "...  compelling  evidence  that the  poor are  more responsive  - to
income,  own-prices,  and  cross-prices  - than the  rich" (Behrman  and  Deolalikar,
1988,  p. 677).  Studies  also show  that  a distinction  is required  between  the
income  (or  expenditure)  elasticity  of demand  for food  and the  income  (or
expenditure)  elasticity  of demand  for  nutrients  (of  which  more  below).
Six,  for  extremely-poor  households  nutritional  status  appears  to have  a
direct  impact  on productivity,  both for  adults  and  for  children. For  adults
studies  by Strauss  (1986)  for  Sierra  Leone  and  Deolalikar  (1988)  for  India
find  that  agricultural  labor  productivity  increases  with calorie
86 availability  6.  For  children  it  appears  that  school  performance  also improves
with nutrition:  anthropometric  indicators  like  height  for  age (which  reflects
the  cumulative  outcome  of nutrition)  appear  to  positively  influence  both the
87 probability  of  being in  school  as well as relative  performance
Finally,  the  importance  of intrahousehold  inequality  is  higher. While
this inequality  is  probably  not  unique  to the  extremely-poor,  it is
85Lustig  (1984,  pp. 443-4  and  table  14.4)  presents  evidence  based  on the
1977  Income-Expenditure  Survey  that  shows  significant  differences  in the  diet
composition  of Mexicans  when classified  by income  groups;  she  also  runs log-
linear  regressions  of food  expenditures  on total  expenditures  for  poor
households  in 18  regions  and  finds  that  the  associated  elasticity  exceeds
unity  in 13 out  of the  18 regions  (op.  cit.,  table  14.8). Lipton  (1988a)
quotes  evidence  of the  failure  of Engel's  law  for  Northeast  Brazil;  see  also
Streeten  (1989b).
86Note that  the  causality  between  nutrition  and  productivity  is  not
obvious:  if  higher  labor  productivity  increases  income  then  nutrition  may also
increase  (given  greater  food  consumption);  conversely,  more  nutrition  may
increase  labor  productivity  which  then  increases  income. The  Strauss  and
Deolalikar  studies  correct  for  this  endogeneity  (see  Behrman  and  Deolalikar,
1988,  pp. 683-86).
87These  results  are  found  in studies  of children  in China  and  Nepal;
Behrman  and  Deolalikar  (1988,  pp.  688-89)  point  out,  however,  the  possibility
of self-selection  bias:  school  performance  is  observed  only  for  those  who  did
go to school  (and  did  not drop  out).-50-
operationally  more important,  as it  determines  how additional  resources  for
the  household  as a whole  translate  into  resources  for  each  member  of the
household 88. If such inequality  is significant,  it  may imply  that  additional
resources  for  the  household  as a whole  may fail  to reach  some  individual
members  (e.g.  children) 89. Under  these  circumstances  more detailed  targeting
may  be required90.
VI.2 Determinants  ofJnterventionin_Povertv  AlleviatJ  io.
The  central  aim  of government  poverty  programs  should  be to create
conditions  where  the  poor  can increase  their  income  and improve  their  living
standards. To translate  this  aim  into  operationally  useful  objectives,  it is
necessary  to consider  not  only  how the  poor  behave,  but  also other  factors
that  condition  the  form  of government  intervention.  There  are four  dimensions
of this  problem  that  I want to  emphasize.
First,  an inter-temporal  dimension:  the  extent  of poverty  in  Mexico
implies  that it  cannot  be eliminated  in  a short  period  of time (say,  two  to
three  years). This creates  a need for  balanced  interventions  that  help the
poor immediately,  but also  create  conditions  for  them  to grow  out of  poverty.
A poverty  program  that  contemplates  a permanent  need  for  generalized  income  or
88Unfortunately,  little  is  known  about  this  problem  in  Mexico.  Sen
(1988)  and  Bardhan  (1988)  discuss  its  importance  for  India  (with  emphasis  in
sex  bias);  Behrman  (1988)  presents  evidence  of age-bias  in poor  rural  Indian
households,  with parents  discriminating  in favor  of earlier  born children  in
the  allocation  of nutrients  (with  the  effect  having  a seasonal  component).
Haddad  and  Kanbur  (1989),  on the  other  hand,  find  that  intra-household
inequality  may lead to  underestimates  of the  true  levels  of poverty  and
inequality,  but that the  estimated  patterns  of poverty  across  groups  are
relatively  invariant.
89This  may or may  not  be a  manifestation  of sex  or age discrimination.
It may  pay for  the  household  as a  whole  to concentrate  resources  on the  more
able members  who are  the  principal  'bread  winners'.
90This  provides  the  rationale  for  targeting  individual  members  within  the
household,  like  milk to  children  under  five  years  of age,  or additional  food
for  pregnant  and  lactating  mothers. In the  absence  of household  inequality
such  degree  of targeting  would  be unnecessary. On the  other  hand,  note that
if such inequality  is significant,  the  effects  of this  targeting  may  be partly
offset  if the  amount  of own  household  resources  allocated  to the  targeted
members  is  reduced  when the  targeted  program  is implemented  so that,  for
example,  after  a shool  lunch  program  parents  no longer  give  milk to their
children  since  they  expect  them to  get it  at school;  see  below,  section  VI4.-51-
consumption  subsidies  is,  even  if budgetarily  feasible,  not focusing  on the
right  objectives. The appropriate  mix  between  policies  that increase  current
consumption  of the  poor and  investment  policies  that  generate  future  growth  in
their  income  is  a key issue. Now, if  the  government  has one  peso to spend  on
poverty  programs,  should  this  be spent  to increase  current  income 91, or should
it  be allocated  to investment? In a world  of full  information  and  no
externalities  the  answer  is that  if the  objective  is to  maximize  the  poor's
welfare,  the  government  should  increase  their  current  income;  then,  depending
on the  poor's  discount  rate,  they  can  chose  the  optimal  mix between
consumption  and investment,  i.e.,  the  optimal  mix is determined  by the  direct
beneficiaries  of the  program. For three  reasons  this  solution  is inadequate
for  Mexico  (and,  presumably,  for  other  developing  countries). One, the
presence  of externalities  associated  with infrastructure  and  other  investments
generates  a difference  between  the  private  and the  social  rate  of return  to
investment:  if the  government  does  not  carry  out the  investments  in,  for
example,  roads  in  poor rural  regions,  it is  unlikely  that  poor  people  will do
so.  The  unfeasibility  of full  private  appropriation  of the  benefits  from
roads  reduces  the  private  incentive  for  this  type  of expenditure. Two,  some
investments  are lumpy  and  indivisible,  so single  individuals  on their  own at
low  levels  of income  might  not  be able to  purchase  the  required  amounts.
Three,  the  existence  of intra-family  inequality  implies  that  current  income
transfer  may fail  to increase  investment  by the  family  in the  welfare  of some
of its  members  (e.g.  schooling  for  children).
Second,  there  is an informational  dimension:  identifying  the  poor is
difficult  and  costly. In addition,  some  might  live  in remote  areas.
Targeting  and  delivering  income  or consumption  subsidies  to the  poor is
therefore  administratively  difficult,  and  raises  the  cost of subsidy  programs.
Moreover,  if  direct  subsidy  programs  are  permanent  frequent  testing  to
determine  eligibility  will be needed. Of course,  as I discuss  below,
targeting  can  be refined  by methods  that induce  self  selection  of the
beneficiaries,  through  either  the  location  of  where  benefits  are  given,  the
quality  of the  goods  delivered,  or the  type  of goods  subsidized. But  any
realistic  program  of direct  subsidies  to the  poor  will leak  to the  non-poor.
From the  viewpoint  of  poverty  alleviation  this is  a net loss.
91Current  income  can  be increased  either  by direct  income  transfers  or
indirectly  via subsidies  to consumption;  from  our  perspective  here consumption
subsidies  (say  for food)  should  be thought  of as additional  purchasing  power;
see  section  VI.4  below.-52-
Third,  there  is an incentive  dimension:  policies  that  help the  poor  need
to avoid  the  creation  of a  class  of 'welfare  dependents';  the  incentive
structure  must  be such  that,  at the  margin,  it  always  benefits  the  poor  to
work and  earn additional  income. This  point  is illustrated  in figure  492,
where  the  horizontal  axis  plots  the  income  of individuals  before  any
government  program  (or  'original  income'),  while  the  vertical  axes  measures
income  levels  after  the  government  program  (or  'final  income');  as  before,  z
denotes  the  poverty  line.  Assuming  the  government  can  measure  everybody's
income,  it  can  potentially  increase  each individual's  income  bv the  difference
between  z and the  450  line.  This  eliminates  poverty  (with  the total  cost  of
the  program  given  by the  triangle  OAz).  The  program  is financed  by taxes  on
individuals  with incomes  above  z, so that  their  final  income  lies  below  the
450 line.  Note  now that  when original  income  increases  along  the  range  Oz,
individual's  final  income  stays  constant. Differently  put, along  the  range  Oz
poor individuals  face  a  marginal  tax  rate  of lOOX.  In this  type  of transfer
scheme  every  additional  peso  earned  by the  poor is  matched  by one  peso of
transfers  taken  away.  The  problem  with this  scheme  is that  the  transfer
depends  on individuals'  income. Under  these  circumstances  it is  natural  to
expect  that individuals  will modify  their  behavior  to take  advantage  of  this
scheme  (or  any  other  so-called  'means-tested'  scheme  where  benefits  depend  on
characteristics  that  are  under  the  beneficiaries's  control). Clearly,  schemes
that  simply  transfer  income  to the  poor  give  no incentive  for  them  to  work93.
Thus,  incentive  considerations  argue  strongly  against  direct  income  transfers.
Finally,  there  is a dimension  of  bounded  rationality  and  administrative
capability:  there  is  a limit  to the  number  of policies  and  programs  that  the
governme:.t  can  run in a cost-effective  and  efficient  way.  A large  number  of
programs  opens  more possibilities  for  waste  and  duplication  (cf.  section
VII.1,  below). In addition,  programs  that  create  multiple  prices  for  the  same
commodity  open  possibilities  for  graft. A desideratum  is for  the  government
to concentrate  on a few  programs,  but to implement  them  well.  As in any  other
area  of intervention,  minimizing  the  possibilities  for  government  failure  is
also important.
92This  discussion  is  based  on Besley  and  Kanbur  (1990).
93Note  also that if  as a result  of this  transfer  scheme  the  poor fail  to
work,  the  cost  of the  program  doubles  to the  square  OzAz,  requiring  higher
marginal  tax  rates  on the  non-poor  population  to finance  it, i.e.,  the  solid













VI.3  Oblectives  in  Poverty  Alleviation.
Given  the  needs  and  behavior  of  the  poor,  and  the  intertemporal,
incentive  and  other  considerations  just  made,  what  should  the  objectives  of
the  government  in  poverty  alleviation  be? There  should  be  a fundamental
difference  in  objectives  for  the  moderately-poor  and  the  extremely-poor.  The
four  considerations  discussed  in  section  VI.2  point  in  the  same  direction:  the
orientation  of  government  programs  for  the  moderately-poor  should  be  tilted  in
favor  of  investment  and  the  creation  of  opportunities  to  enhance  their
earnings  potential.  Informational,  incentive,  externality  and  administrative
reasons  all  imply  that  the  comparative  advantage  of  government  intervention  in
the  alleviation  of  moderate  poverty  is  to  help  people  indirectly,  rather  than
through  direct  income  or  consumption  subsidies.  Resources  can  be  most
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effectively  used  to  create  institutional  environments  where  the  earnings
potential  of  the  assets  owned  by  the  poor  (in  particular,  thelr  land  and
labor)  is  enhanced,  at  the  same  time  that  the  possibilities  for  them  to
acquire  human  and  financial  capital  are  improved.  Over  the  medium  term,  what
matters  most  for  the  moderately-poor  are  the  design  of  institutional
frameworks  and  policies  that  do  not  discriminate  against  them,  as  has  occurred
in  the  past. There  is  no  case  for  direct  income  trans,ers  or  subsidies  to
consumption  of  any  kind,  including  food  subsidies.  This  is  not  to  argue  that
no  resources  should  be  channeled  to  the  moderately-poor;  it  is  to  argue  that
those  resources  should  be  used  for  investment:  primary  and  technical
education;  irrigation  to  increase  the  productivity  of  the  land  they  own;
timely  access  to  fertilizers  and  credit  to  increase  yields,  widen  crop  choice;
better  roads  and  transportation  to  reduce  (time  and  monetary)  costs  of
mobility  and  amplify  employment  opportunities;  infrastructure  that  promotes
regional  growth  and  permanent  outward  shifts  of  the  demand  for  unskilled
labor.  These  policies  work  directly  at  the  relevant  margin:  increasing
earnings  opportunities.
The  same  is  not  true  of  the  extremely-poor.  As  section  VI.1  argued,  they
have  a  prior  need  to  improve  their  health  and  nutritional  status  and  break  the
'vicious  circle'  in  which they  find  themselves:  unhealthy  physical
environments,  morbidity,  lethargy,  high  infant  mortality  and  high  fertility,
inability  to  take  risks,  inability  to  demand  education,  thinly  spread
resources  across  large  families,  and  transmission  of  tbis  state  of  affairs
from  one  generation  to  the  next. Only  when  this  vicious  circle  is  broken  can
they  'get  on  their  feet'  and  work  -heir  way  out  of  poverty.  Some  minimum-54-
level  of  health  and  nutrition  must  be met so people  can invest  in  numan
capital;  or  migrate  across  regions;  or participate  more  actively even though
risky)  in the  labor  market;  or engage  in  more (risky)  innovations  (new  crops,
techniques);  or  have less  children  and increase  their  investment  per child.
There Is  a case for  directly  targeted  programs  of income  transfers  or
consumption  subsidies  for  the  extremely-poor.
I argue  that  the  attack  on  poverty  should  be separated  into  two  tasks.
One, the  provision  of a basic  package  of directly  targeted  benefits  for  the
extremely-poor.  Two, the  design  of  effective  development  strategies,  where
effectiveness  is  measured  by the  potential  for increasing  earnings  of the
poor.  Separating  these  two  tasks  is  essential:  the  policies  and  institutions
,  required  ffr  each  are  different. QuemPions  like  how can targeted  programs  be
organized  in a cost-effective  way, where  should  they  be located,  and  how can
incentive  problems  be minimized,  pertain  to the  first  task. Questions  like
where  and  what type  of infrastructure  should  be provided,  what should  pricing
policies  for  agriculture  be,  what reforms  are  needed  for  the  ejido,  and  how
can the  demand  for  unskilled  labor  be increased  relate  to the  second  task.
But to argue  the  need for  directly  targeted  benefits  only for  the
extremely-poor  is not  to argue  that  they  should  receive  no other  benefits.
Precisely  the  opposite  is true.  The  extremely-poor  also  need  policies  that
increase  the  value  of their  land  and labor;  they  also  need greater  access  to
education  and other  opportunities  for  improvement. But they  require,  as
opposed  to  all other  groups,  special  attention  to  be able to fully  profit  from
those  policies.
This approach  has two  important  implicauions.  First,  the  case for  some
form  of provision  of direct  benefits  for  the  extremely-poor  is  not  a case for
distorting  food  prices  for  consumers  or producers. Based  on the
considerations  discussed  above  it  is clear  that  with the  potential  exception
of the  extremely-poor  (see  below),  all  consumers  should  face  prices  for  all
food  items  that reflect  their  opportunity  costs. Differently  put, food
prLcing  pollcies  should  be divorced  from  poverty  considerations.  Second,  the
needs  of the  extremely-poor  provide  a ranking  of  which  services  are  essential
and  must  be delivered  to get  any  results,  and  which  services  are  secondary
(e.g.  provision  of  housing). Thus,  the  approach  directs  government
intervention  in  poverty  matters  to a  well defined  set  of actions. This is
important  given  constraints  on resources  and  administrative  capabilities. The-55-
following  :..b-sections  discuss  the  specific  components  of this  general
approach  to poverty  in  more detail.
VI.4 Policies  for  the  Extremely-Poor.
Policies  for  the  extremely-poor  should  be based  on their  special  needs
and  behavior  (cf.  section  VI.2).  These  policies  must act  as close  as possible
to the  relevant  margin:  improving  health  and  nutrition. To achieve  this,  the
links  among  income,  nutrition,  health,  female  education  and fertility  must  be
considered. I deal  with  each in turn.
First,  the  econometric  evidence  on the  link  between  income  and  nutrition
is  ambiguous 94. It appears  that  when income  increases  the  demand  for  food
increases  (i.e.,  a positive  and  high income  elasticity  of demand  for  food),
but that  the  additional  food  may  not  enhance  nutritional  status:  consumers
prefer  to diversify  the  types  of food  consumed,  and improve  along  the  lines  of
presentation  and  palatability.  But  while  the  income  ela3ticity  of demand  for
nutrients  appears  low,  the  same  is not  true  of the  price  elasticities.  These
findings  "..suggest  that  certain  food  subsidies  may  not only  fail in improving
the  nutritional  status  of the  poor,  but that they  may actually  worsen  it"
(Behrman  and  Deolalikar,  1988,  p. 677)95. These  results,  together  with the
possibly  low  expenditure  elasticity  for  calories  weaken  the  case  for
generalized  food subsidies,  even  for  the  extremely-poor.  Until  more evidence
is available  for  Mexico,  one can  sensibly  make  a case,  on nutritional  grounds,
only for  some  form  of provision  of nutritionally  adequate  foods.
94For rural  South  India  Behrman  and  Deolalikar  (1987)  find the  income
elasticity  of demaiS  for  calories  for  low  income  groups  to be very low;
similar  results  for  Nicaragua  are found  by Wolfe  and  Behrman  (1982). On the
other  hand,  some  studies  reviewed  in  Behrman  and  Wolfe (1984)  find
elasticities  closer  to  unity.  See  Alderman  (1989)  for  a recent  review  of the
evidence;  apparently  the  econometric  estimates  are  sensitive  to issues  like
aggregation  and the  specification  of the  food/nutrient  conversion  ratios. The
nuu-itional  content  of even  as finely  a  disaggregated  commodity  as 'rice'
depends  on its  specific  variety,  as  well as on the  way it is cooked.
95The  econometric  studies  of  households'  consumption  demands  for  Mexico
that  I am aware  of are too  aggregated  to pick  up these  effects;  both Garcia
Alba (1986)  and  Jarque  (1987)  estimate  complete  household  demand  systems,  but.
only  one category  of food  is included. Lustig  (1984)  derives  price
elasticities  for  some  food  categories  from  a Linear  Expenditure  System,  but
does  not  compute  the  elasticities  for  calories. This is  an area  where  using
results  from  other  countries  may  be misleading,  given  differences  in the
nutritional  content  of diets  across  countries.-56-
Second,  the  link  between  food  and  nutrition  is strongly  mediated  by
health  status. Given  the  unsanitary  conditions  in  which  the  extremely-poor
live,  and the  prevalence  of diarrhea  and  other  intestinal  diseases,  making
more food  available  to them  may "...simply  meet the  needs  of the  worms  in
their  stomachs"  (Streeten,  1989b,  p. 6)96.  Improving  health  conditions  is
also  essential  to reduce  infant  mortality  and,  with a lag, fertility. The
type  of health  services  delivered  is  of central  importance. Emphasis  must be
given  to preventive  medicine  and  the  elimination  of  parasitic  and infectious
diseases. Aspe  and  Beristain  (1984,  pp. 301-09)  show  that  Mexico  has one  of
the  highest  age  adjusted  rates  of mortality  from  enteritis  and  diarrheic
diseases  in the  world;  they  also  show  that in 1975  parasitic  and infectious
97 diseases  accounted  for the  largest  share  of death  rates  by age  group
Third,  there  is  substantial  evidence  that  education  for  the  female  head
of household  has a strong  positive  effect. Rosensweig  and  Schultz  (1982)  find
in  a study  of Colombia  that  women's  education  reduces  child  mortality. Wolfe
and  Behrman  (1987)  find  that in  Nicaragua  a mother's  schooling  has a  positive
effect  on a child's  nutrition  and  health. It also  appears  that  more female
education  reduces  fertility 98. As with health,  the  type  of education  is  very
important. Since,  as just seen,  the  extremely-poor  may  not  be in  a position
to demand  formal  education,  emphasis  must  be centered  on issues  like  food
96Preliminary  results  from  the  1988  National  Survey  of Nutrition  show
that  about  20%  of pre-school  children  had diarrhea  in the  two  weeks  prior  to
the  nutrition  survey,  with  about  one  fourth  of those  cases  being  chronic
diarrhea  (World  Bank,  1990a,  p. 3).
97They also  analyze  government's  allocation  of expenditures  in  health
services  and  note that "..the  main  share  of the  sector's  investment  is devoted
to building  enormous  hospitals  with  sophisticated  equipment,  which do  not take
care  of the  problems  of the  underprivileged,"  and "..excessive  importance  and
resources  have been awarded  to curative  in  relation  to  preventive  medicine,
which  perpetuates  the  high infant  mortality  rate"  (op.  cit.,  p. 323-4).
98"Female  education  above  four  years,  however,  bears  one of the  strongest
and  most consistent  negative  relationships  to fertility.... (and)  is  also
associated  with higher  age  at marriage,  and  may well  have  some intangible
effects  on a  woman's  ability  to  plan and  on her taste  for  non-familial
activities"  (Birdsall,  1988,  p. 514). There  is also  an effect  that  works
through  the  opportunity  cost  of time:  "As  female  education  and female  wages
rise,  the  differential  between  female  and  child  wages  widens. This in itself
tends  to reduce  fertility,  since  it  means  that  the  family's  loss  of the
mother's  income  when children  are  young  is  not  easily  and  quickly  made  up by
children's  work" (Birdsall,  op.  cit.,  p. 515).-57-
preparation  and conservation,  disposal  of wastes  and  hygiene,  information  on
inoculations  for  children,  usage  of safe  water,  birth  control  methods  to
reduce  unwanted  pregnancies,  and the  like.
Differently  put, the  presence  of strong  complementarities  in the  needs  of
the  extremely-poor  has important  implications  for  policy  design. Programs  for
the  extremely-poor  that  only  provide  one  of these  components  may fail  to
achieve  the  goals  of improving  nutritional  and  health  status  and  changing
fertility  behavior,  even if they  adequately  reach  the  target  population.
Therefore,  there  is  a strong  cass  to  aim for  simultaneous  provision  of a basic
package  of food-health-education  that  exploits  the  complementarities  between
these  needs  and  has  the  specific  objectives  of: (i)  reducing  infant  mortality,
(ii)  improving  the  nutritional  and  health  status  of extremely-poor  households,
and (iii)  reducing  fertility.
The specific  policy  that I  propose  to  reach  these  objectives  is to create
Help  Centers 99 in charge  of all  directly  targeted  benefits  for  the  extremely-
poor.  PASSPA  should  have four  characteristics:  first,  location  in  areas  with
the  highest  poverty  indices  as computed  by PK[(a-l),X]. Second,  provision  of
nutritionally  adequate  foods,  perhaps  complemented  by vitamins. Third,
provision  of free  minimum  quality  but effective  levels  of preventive  medicine
and  related  education. Fourth,  sustained  provision  of benefits;  in
particular,  fiscal  resources  for  PASSPA  should  be isolated  from  fluctuations
associated  with macroeconomic  instability. I  now discuss  in  more  detail  the
elements  of this  proposal.
First,  the  argument  to centralize  the  essential  benefits  for the
extremely-poor  under  a single  program  derives  from  the  complementarities
discussed  above.  To reiterate,  more  food,  by itself,  may  only  have a
transitory  impact  on the  welfare  of the  extremely-poor,  and  will probably  not
eliminate  extreme-poverty.  Centralization  of  benefits  also  helps  to  minimize
99Perhaps  labelled  Centros  de  Atencion  a la Pobreza  Extrema,  or CAPEs.
The  proposal  made here  does  not call  for  the  creation  of  new institutions  and
organizations.  A program  with  characteristics  similar  to the  ones  described
here is  already  in operation. This  is the  Programa  de  Atencion  de Servicios
de Salud  para la Poblacion  Abierta,  PASSPA  (see  World  Bank,  1990c).
Unfortunately,  this  program  is  at present  very small. As I argue  more fully
in  section  VII.1,  with some  modifications  PASSPA  should  be made the
centerpiece  of the  fight  against  extreme-poverty.-58-
costs  (of  time  and transportation)  to the  recipients°°.  Moreover,
simultaneous  provision  of the  most  elementary  nutrition  and  health  needs,  if
perceived  as sustained  by the  extremely-poor,  will  make them feel  safer  and
less  vulnerable,  allowing  them  to change  their  behavior,  particularly  with
regards  to fertility. Note that  birth  control  methods,  by themselves,  can
help reduce  the  number  of unwanted  children,  but not the  number  of wanted
children  which,  given  the  absence  of alternative  security  arrangements,
fulfill  an economic  need' 01. Making  the  extremely-poor  feel  comfortable  with
smaller  families  helps  at the  micro  level  by reducing  the  dependency  ratio,
allowing  households  to increase  investment  per child  and resources  per capita.
It also  helps  at the  macroeconomic  level  through  a  more fundamental  process:
reducing  the  rate  of growth  of the supply  of unskilled  labor.
Second,  centralization  of benefits  can  help solve  an informational
problem. Extremely-poor  parents  may  not  know that  their  children  need to  be
vaccinated  periodically  against  smallpox,  measles  and  related  diseases. These
children  stand  a better  chance  of  being inoculated  if  parents  are informed
about  this  need  when they  come  to PASSPA  for  their  food  coupons  (see  below).
Since  food  coupons  provide  incentives  for  parents  to  come to PASSPA,  the
marginal  cost  of time  and  transportation  to  bring their  children  would  be
almost  nil.  Centralization  of  benefits  can  also  lessen  the  problem  of
intrahousehold  inequality  and  help target  food  towards  the  young.  There  is  no
mechanisii'  to deter  the  household  head from  re-selling  the food  obtained
through  the  coupons  (or  allocating  it inequitably  within  the  household).
However,  by making  food  and  health  delivery  joint,  poor children,  particularly
infants,  that  are  brought  to PASSPA  for inoculations  and other  medical
l°°"Some  of the  most  successful  nutrition  intervention  programs  have
implicitly  recognized  complementarity  of inputs  and  have linked  food
supplements  to the  provision  of  health. Such  programs  also increase  the
economic  efficiency  of staffing  through  administrative  efficiency...
Moreover,  thity  reduce  the  unit costs  for  participants  as such  costs  often
include  a  major time  investment  in travel  which  is fixed  per  visit  and  not
variable  per vervice  obtained"  (Alderman,  1989,  p. 25).
lOl"HouseLolds  are  not  necessarily  motivated  to control  their  fertility;
as we have seen,  the  poor in  particular  face  many incentives  not to restrict
fertility. In countries  where  fertility  rates  are substantially  higher  among
the  poor than  among  the  better  off  and  where  the  poor constitute  a large
portion  of the  population,  their  high fertility  pushes  the  countrywide  average
upward. This  has  been true  of several  Latin  American  countries,  notably
Brazil  and  Mexico"  (Birdsall  and  Griffin,  1988,  p. 45; emphasis  in the
original,  S.L.).-59-
services  can  be given  food  not  normally  consumed  by adults  (in  addition  to
other  food  coupons  provided  for  the  household). Since  undernutrition  at an
early  age  has lifetime  effects,  it is essential  to improve  nutrition  of
ctildren  (cf.  Wolfe  and  Behrman  (1982)). In this regard,  an implication  of
the  findings  of section  IV  must  ba highlighted:  since  the  number  of extremely-
poor individuals  exceeds  the  number  of extremely-poor  households  given  that
extremely-poor  households  are  larger,  it follows  that  children  are  heavily
represented  among  the  ranks  of the  extremely-poor.
Third,  consolidating  benefits  for  the  extremely-poor  can  help minimize
spill-overs  into  the  non-targeted  population.  Monitoring  is easier  when it is
done  by a single  agency. At the  same  time,  the  benefits  provided  by PASSPA
should  be of a quality  that,  while  effective,  also  operate  as a discriminating
device:  basic  levels  of preventive  health  and  nutritious  foods  that  are  mostly
consumed  by low income  households. Benefits  to the  extremely-poor  would  be
targeted  partly  on the  basis  of the  type  of goods  and  services  provided,
partly  on the  basis  of location,  partly  on evidence  of direct  need,  and  could
be made contingent  on behavior  (see  below). Improving  living  conditions
should  then  provide  an endogenous  mechanism  to phase  out  PASSPA. As the
extremely-poor  increase  their  income  and  access  to normal  education,  the
usefulness  of some  of the  services  provided  by PASSPA  would  diminish;  in
addition,  higher  incomes  should  also translate  into  demand  for foods  not
provided  by PASSPA. The incentives  of the  relatively  better  off  population  to
participate  in PASSPA,  while  still  there,  would  be reduced. Thus,  PASSPA
would  not  act as a disincentive  to  work.  In  particular,  participants  would
not be told that  if their  income  level  increases  their  benefits  would,  pari
passu,  diminish. They  would  keep  every  additional  peso earned.
Fourth,  the  needs  of the  extremely-poor  call for  sustained  action. Since
the  extremely-poor  are  more  vulnerable  and  risk-averse,  their  behavioral
response,  particularly  with regards  to fertility,  is slow:  stop-go  programs  of
poverty  alleviation  only  provide  transitory  velfare  gains  to the  oxtremely-
poor,  but probably  fail  to change  their  behavior  and  allow  them  to 'get  on
their  feet'  in  a permanent  way.  Moreover,  it is  obvious  that 'good  health'  is
the  result  of a cumulative  process;  unsystematic  improvements  in  nutrition
will  not do.  We must  bear in  mind that  the  benefits  provided,  while  in the
form  of support  to  current  food  consumption  and  health,  are fundamentally  an-60-
investment  in  human  capital  '.  Thus,  there  are  both  behavioral  and  budgetary
reasons  for  making  reliability  and  sustainability  key  characteristics  of
PASSPA 1 03 .
I  next  take  up  the  issue  of  what  mechanism  should  be  used  to  deliver  the
food  component  of  the  basic  package,  in  particular  the  choice  between  coupons
(or  food  rations)  or  price  subsidies  for  selected  commoditiesl 04. A food
ration  or  coupon  allows  a  beneficiary  to  purchase  a  fixed  amount  of  a
particular  food  at  a  discounted  price,  and  is  an  infra-marginal  subsidy  in  the
sense  that  any  additional  consumption  of  that  commodity  beyond  the  ration  must
be  purchased  at  market  prices.  Clearly,  this  is  equivalent  to  a  direct  income
transfer  given  by the  size  of  the  ration  times  the  price  discount.  In
contrast,  a  price  subsidy  permits  purchase  of  unlimited  amounts  of  the
commodity  at  the  subsidized  price,  so  that  marginal  amounts  of  the  commodity
are  also  bought  at  the  lower  than  market  price.  The  choice  between  these  two
has  been  analyzed  by  Besley  and  Kanbur  in  the  realistic  context  where
monitoring  and  information  costs  imply  that  perfect  targeting  is  not  feasible.
In  this  context  they  argue  that:  "Intuitively,  infra-marginal  subsidies
102The  argument  can  be  strengthened  by  pointing  out  that  the  present
value  of  costs  of  programs  that  are  temporarily  cut  and  later  resumed  is
higher  than  the  present  value  of  costs  of  programs  that  deliver  the  same
benefits,  but  do  so  uninterruptedly.  Not  only  are  the  administrative  start-up
costs  borne  twice,  but  also  during  the  absence  of  the  program  the  health  and
nutrition  status  of  the  extremely-poor  can  worsen,  thus  losing  part  of  the
ground  gained  before  and  requiring  additional  expenses  to  cover  the  same
ground  again.
103The  need  to  insulate  budgetary  allocations  for  PASSPA  from  transitory
macroeconomic  fluctuations  provides  a  further  argument  why  direct  benefits  in
poverty  alleviation  should  be  channeled  only  to  the  extremely-poor.
Macroeconomic  fluctuations  may  be  beyond  the  control  of  policy  makers  (swings
in  oil  prices,  world  interests  rates,  etc.),  implying  that  government
expenditures  may  at  times  need  to  be  reduced.  Political  economy
considerations  aside,  the  temptation  to  cut  government  expenditures  to  the
extremely-poor  will  increase  with  the  fiscal  cost  of  the  program.  Conversely,
from  the  macroeconomic  point  of  view  it  is  easier  to  leave  a  program  untouched
in  times  of  fiscal  retrenchment  if  the  program  is,  in  relative  terms,  not  so
large.
104I  center  the  discussion  on  food  because  other  benefits  delivered  to
the  extremely-poor  through  PASSPA  are  significantly  less  marketable.
Vaccinations,  treatments  for  oral  dehidratation  and  information  about  birth
control,  food  preparation  and  hygiene  can  be  delivered  to  individual
beneficiaries  with  little  risk  of  it  being  diverted  to  other  uses  or  non-
targeted  beneficiaries.-61-
transfer  purchasing  power independently  of current  income,  while  subsidies  at
the  margin  do so in  proportion  to current  consumption  of the  commodity  in
question,  and  hence (to  the  first  order)  in  proportion  to income. For  a given
budget,  therefore,  infra-marginal  subsidies  are  better  at alleviating  poverty.
However,  there  may  be administrative  difficulties  in achieving  full  coverage
of the  population,  and there  may  be take  up problems  associated  with
individuals  not  going  to ration  shops  because  they  thereby  declare  themselves
to be poor.  By contrast,  a price  subsidy....  is comprehensive  and reaches  the
whole  population"  (1988,  pp. 711-12). Thus,  the  case for infra-marginal
subsidies  is built  on the  assumption  that the  extremely-poor  could,  if they
wished,  sell  the  rationed  amount  in  the  open  market  and  translate  the  proceeds
into  income. From this  perspective,  food  rations  are  simnly  a mechanism  to
transfer  purchasing  power  to the  target  population,  and the  only  arguments
against  them  are the  administrative  difficulties,  given  cheating  and  other
problems  in identification  of the  target  population  and implementation  of the
rationing  system. Price  subsidies  are  a second-best  way of reaching  the  same
objective  -transferring  income  to the  poor-  with their  drawback  being  the
higher  costs  associated  with  universal  provision.
In this  paper,  however,  I  have  made the  case  for  delivering  food  to the
extremely-poor  not on the  grounds  of transferring  purchasing  power  to them,
but rather  as  part of a package  of benefits  of nutrition-health-education 105.
I  have also  argued  against  direct  income  transfers  both on incentive  and
inter-temporal  efficiency  grounds. The PASSPA  program  should  therefore  not  be
primarily  seen  as a  mechanism  to transfer  income  to the  extremely-poor  (even
though  this is a  beneficial  and  therefore  welcomed  by-product). From this
perspective,  the  choice  between  coupons  and  price  subsidies  should  be based  on
other  considerations.  For  three  reasons  I argue  that  food  coupons  are
preferable  to  price  subsidies:  one,  to the  extent  that  some  of the foods
provided  with the  coupons  aimed  at particular  members  of the  household  (like
milk for  children  and lactating  mothers)  cannot  be re-sold,  the  probability
that these  foods  fail  to reach  the  desired  individuals  given  intra-household
inequality  is  diminished;  this  may  be particularly  relevant  in remote  rural
contexts  where  secondary  markets  for  some  food items  may  not  exist. Two, to
the  extent  that  some  of the  extremely-poor,  particularly  in  remote  rural
105Note that the  structure  of the  argument  in Besley  and  Kanbur  has
nothing  to  do with food  qua food. The same  objective  could  be reached  by
subsidizing  any other  commodity  consumed  by the  extremely-poor.-62-
areas,  do not purchase  all the  food  they  consume,  the  effectiveness  of price
subsidies  is diminished,  while  the  spill-over  into  the  non-poor  population  is
higher. Three,  price  subsidies  are  particularly  undesirable  in an open
economy  like the  Mexican  one,  where subsidized  food items  can  be exported  to
106 the  benefit  of foreigners  . Of course,  price  subsidies  may  only  be given  in
selected  stores,  with targeting  obtained  through  locationl 07. If this  is the
case  the  budgetary  advantage  of coupons  over subsidies  is  diminished,  but not
eliminated:  since  unlimited  amounts  of particular  food  items  can  be bought  at
the  stores  with  subsidized  prices,  the incentives  for  arbitrage  are still
present,  particularly  in  urban  contexts  where  locational  and  transportation
cost considerations  are less  relevant.
I  now turn  to the  question  of  where  PASSPA  should  be located. Besley  and
Kanbur  (1988)  exploit  the  decomposability  property  of the  P(a,z)  poverty  index
to derive  regional  rules  for  allocating  resources  for  poverty  alleviation.
Assuming  from  equity  considerations  that  minimizing  national  poverty  is the
objective,  and  that  a  - 2  as discussed  in section  III.2,  PASSPA  should  be
located  in regions  where  the  income-gap  ratio  is  highest,  i.e.,  where  PJ(l,z)
is  higher 108. The  Besley-Kanbur  rule  takes  the  population  of each  region  as
given. An important  consideration,  however,  is the  extremely-poors'  migratory
106This  phenomenon  was  actually  observed  during  the 'oil  boom' (1978-81),
where large  price  subsidies  implied  that  Americans  close  to the  Mexican  border
would  actually  purchase  their  basic  staples  (and  gasoline)  in  Mexico.
107The  disadvantages  of price  subsidies  can  also  be minimized  through  the
type  of goods  subsidized,  in particular,  by subsidizing  commodities  where  the
highest  share  of total  national  consumption  is  consumed  by the  poor (which  are
not necessarily  the  commodities  that  have  the  largest  expenditure  share  in the
poor's  budget). But  note that  there  is no guarantee  that  these  commodities
will  be adequate  from  a  nutritional  standpoint;  there  might  be some  foods
which  the  extremely-poor  are  currently  not  consuming  (because  of lack  of
information,  for  example),  but that  policy  makers  may  wish they  do so.
108Using  the  notation  of section  III.2,  Besley  and  Kanbur  (1988)  solve
the  problem:
m  m
Min P(a,z)  - E (nj/n).P[(a,z),bjJ  subject  to Z  bj - B
where the  bJ's are  the  resources  allocated  to the  jth regions,  while  B is
the  total  budget  allocated  to  poverty  alleviation.  The solution  to the
problem  is to set  P  [(a-l)  ,z] - A, a constant,  for  all  j.  This implies  that
"...if  the  objectivJ  is to minimize  P(a,z)  at the  national  level,  then the
region  with the  higher  P[(a-l),z],  (not  the  region  with the  higher  P(a,z))
should  be favored  at the  margin"  (op.  cit.,  p. 707;  emphasis  in the  original).-63-
response  to regionally  unbalanced  distribution  of  benefits. To the  extent
that  extreme-poverty,  as seen in section  IV, is  mostly  a rural  phenomenon,  a
strong  case  can  be made to,  without  ignoring  the  urban  extremely-poor,  give
preference  to rural  areas  with the  highest  Pj(l,y)  indices  in locating
PASSPA 109. This  case is strengthened  to the  extent  that transportation  costs
associated  with remoteness  could  preclude  some  of the  rural  extremely-poor
from  benefiting  from  PASSPA;  in  relative  terms  transportation  costs  are  lower
for  the  urban  extremely-poor 11o.
Location  of PASSPA  together  with the  type  of benefits  provided  would  be
part of the  targeting  procedure. But to  help insure  that  benefits  reach
extremely-poor  children,  the  possibility  of making  eligibility  partly  a
function  of compliance  deserves  consideration:  delivery  of benefits  to adults
(say,  the  food  coupons)  could  be made contingent  on their  bringing  their
children  periodically  for  innoculations  and  other  type  of medical  attention.
1 09Ravallion  and  Chao (1989)  develop  a  numerical  algorithm  to apply  the
Besley-Kanbur  rule  under  the  additional  constraint  that  policy  makers  cannot
identify  within  each  region  who is  poor and  who is  not, so that  all
individuals  within  a given  region  must receive  the  same  transfer. They  point
out that:  "In  many LDCs  one  finds  that the  incidence  of  poverty,  P(O,z),  is
higher  in  rural  than  urban  areas. However,  the  relevant  shadow  price  for
minimizing  P(2,z)  is directly  proportional  to  P(l,z)  rather  than  P(O,z). Thus
a  low (although  positive)  incidence  of urban  poverty  does  not  mean that  the
poverty  minimizing  allocation  of aid  between  urban  and rural  areas  will give  a
higher  per capita  transfer  to the  latter. Similarly,  although  the incidence
of poverty  may be many times  greater  in rural  areas,  it  does  not follow  that
the  poverty  alleviation  budget  should  ignore  urban  areas. The average  depth
of poverty  may  be greater  in  urban  areas,  even  if the incidence  is lower"  (op.
cit.,  p. 218;  emphasis  in the  original). Nevertheless,  in their  numerical
applications  for  Bangladesh,  Sri  Lanka,  Phillipines  and Indonesia  they  find
that "All  of the  results  support  the  case  for  targeting  policies  towards  rural
sectors"  (ibid,  p. 223).  Similar  computations  for  Mexico  are  yet to  be
performed  (and  are  high on the  research  agenda),  but the  results  of section
IV,  together  with the  need to  reduce  migration  incentives  to the  urban  areas
support  the  conclusion  of the text.
1100f  course,  a  proper  implementation  of the  Besley-Kanbur  technique
requires  finer  disaggregation  in the  computation  of P (.)  than  the  one
presented  in section  IV.  It is probably  the  case tha'  even  computations  at
the  municipal  level  are insufficient  to solve  the  locational  problem. Thus,
before  this  technique  is implemented,  there  is  a need for  improvements  in
sampling  design  of th3  income-expenditure  surveys,  particularly  in terms  of
coverage. The  possibility  of  using  the  population  census  for  this  purpose
could  also  be explored.-64-
Sustained  and  effective  operation  of PASSPA-type  programs  i8  a
substantial  challenge;  yet this  will do the  most  to help the  extremely-poor.
Hence,  there  are strong  arguments  for  concentrating  government's  policies  for
the  extremely-poor  mainly  on this  task,  rather  than  spreading  attention  and
resources  over  a wide  variety  of goals. PASSPA  should  be the  central  program
that  directly  delivers  benefits. This implies  that  the  administration  of  most
of the  resources  d'rectly  tied  to extreme-poverty  would  fall  under  a single
program,  minimizing  duplication  and  the  possibility  of government  failure.
Success  of PASSPA  is to  be measured  by their  ability  to lower  infant
mortality,  reduce  undernutrition,  decrease  fertility,  reduce  morbidity  and
improve  elementary  health  and  hygiene  behavior. The  program  should  have no
other  objectives. In particular,  it  should  not  have  as objectives  to  directly
reduce  income  inequality  or regional  disparities,  nor should  it  have  ant
responsibilities  in the  promotion  of small  scale  agriculture,  handicrafts  or
any  other  productive  activity  nor, finally,  in the  delivery  of normal  primary
education.
VI.5 Development  Policies  for  the  Poor.
These  should  center  on increasing  the  returns  to land  and labor, is  well
as on creating  opportunities  for  the  poor  to improve  their  human  capital  and
acquire  financial  assets  (through  education  and improved  access  to credit  and
instruments  for  financial  savings). This,  in the  end, is  nothing  short  of the
design  of development  strategies,  a full  discussion  of which  is obviously
beyond  the  scope  of this  paper. In this  sub-section  I  only identify  the  main
characteristics  that,  from  the  point  of view  of the  poor,  future  development
strategies  should  have and,  following  the  discussion  of section  V, focus
mostly  on issues  of rural  development  and  urban  bias.
I  begin  by noting  that  Mexico  has to be thought  of as a land-scarce
country. While some  marginal  increases  in arable  land  can  be obtained,
population  growth  implies  an unambiguous  decrease  in the  country's  land/labor
ratio. The exhaustion  of the  extensive  margin  is  a fundamental  determinant  of
policies  for the  rural  poor.  I emphasize  three  implications.  First,  the
rural  poor should  be able  to allocate  their  land  to any  combination  of
activities  that  maximizes  returns. Given  differences  in  quality  of land,
weather,  access  to  water  and other  factors,  the  use  of land  will clearly  vary
from region  to region. Thus,  it is not  necessarily  the  case that  land  should
be used for  beans  and  corn;  it  may at times  be better  to use it for  cattle--65-
grazing,  agro-industrial  activities,  cash  crops,  export  crops  or what  have
you.  There  is one  corollary  of this:  maximizing  the  returns  to the land  owned
by the  poor is not  equivalent  to increasing  the  output  of food,  particularly
basic  cereals. Rural  development  with the  view  to reduce  poverty  should  not
be equated  to the  problem  of increasing  the  supply  of foodlll.
A second  implication  is that,  given  population  growth,  the  share  of rural
poor  accounted  for  by landless  peasants  will increase. Differently  put,  rural
labor  markets  will become  even  more important. Unless  the  earnings  of
unskilled  rural  labor  increase  it is difficult  to foresee  a reduction  in
povetty. Outward  shifts  in the  demand  for  rural  labor  and improvements  in the
operation  of the  rural  labor  market  are  essential  to reduce  poverty. To
achieve  this,  policy  should  insure  that:  (i)  the  pri-ate  cost of  labor reflect
its  social  opportunity  costs,  (ii)  any regulation  (be  it limits  on land  use,
credit,  output  and  input  prices,  tenancy  arrangement)  that  limits  the  demand
for  unskilled  rural  labor  be eliminated,  (iii)  transport  and communications
infrastructure  be developed  to reduce  costs  and  permit  easier  migration,
decentralization  of some  urban  activities  and reduction  of search  and
information  costs.
The third  implication  is  that  agricultural  growth  will  be forthcoming
only through  a switch  towards  high  value  crops  and greater  yields. But growth
along  the  intensive  margin  requires  three  key inputs:  one, investments  in
roads,  irrigation,  and  research. Two,  efficient  institutions  for  credit,
marketing  and insurance  that  permit  more intensive  use  of fertilizers,  double
cropping,  switches  towards  high  yielding  varieties  and the  like.  Three,  more
entrepreneurial  effort  to  make the  myriad  of microeconomic  decisions  that
agriculture  requires 112.
To put the  matter  differently,  rural  development  in the  1990's  should  be
seen  as more than  agricultural  development,  and  the  latter  should  be seen  as
llDifferently put, 'autosuficiencia  alimentaria'  may  be a too  costly
non-economic  objective  which,  in  addition,  is  principally  paid for  by the
rural  poor.  Free trade  in  agricultural  goods  would  allow  a decoupling  of the
production  decisions  in the  rural  areas  from  the  consumption  decisions  of the
whole  population;  part of the  relevance  of a potential  free  trade  agreement
between  Mexico  and the  United  States  should  be seen from  this  angle.
112Timmer  (1988,  pp. 290-300)  provides  a good discussion  of why  given
factors  that  are  particularly  important  in  agriculture  (e.g.  weather  risk)  the
incentive  structure  plays  a  central  role  for  effective  decision  making.-66-
more  than  increasing  the  output  of  basic  grains.  The  rural  poor  can  be  helped
the  most  by  a flexible  and  dynamic  rural  sector  engaged  in  a  multiplicity  of
activities  that  vary  from  region  to  region  according  to  climatic  conditions
and  quality  of  land,  but  that  also  adapts  easily  to  changing  world  prices,
tastes,  new  markets  (domestic  or  foreign)  and  new  technologies.  Scarce  land
must  be  used  for  the  most  profitable  activity,  with  increased  rural  production
in  many  activities  and  greater  rural  incomes  translating  into  higher  wages  for
rural  labor.
Yet,  as  seen  in  section  V.1,  rural  development  is  hindered  by
institutional  regulations  that  promote  inefficient  uses  of  land,  depress  the
demand  for  unskilled  rural  labor,  and  reduce  the  incentives  for  private
investment.  Moreover,  attempts  to  solve  the  underlying  difficulties  only  by
increasing  resources  have  resulted  in  large  untargeted  subsidies  that  have
failed  to  raise  the  rate  of  growth  of  output,  have  probably  failed  to  increase
incomes  of  the  rural  poor  and  have  given  rents  to  higher  income  producers.  At
present  development  of  the  rural  areas  to  help  the  poor  Imposes  two
requirements  on  policy  makers:  one,  modify  the  institutional  and  regulatory
regime.  Two,  change  the  form  in  which  resources  are  channeled  to  the  rural
areas.  I  discuss  each  in  turn.
I  remarked  in  section  III  that  poverty  programs  in  the  1990's  should  be
congruent  with  the  direction  that  overall  economic  policy  has  taken.  Yet  a
comparison  of  the  regulatory  nature  of  the  regime  in  the  rural  areas  vs.  the
rest  of  the  economy  shows  a  sharp  imbalance.  And  while,  after  the
macroeconomic  stabilization  has  been  consolidated,  it  is  reasonablr  to  expect
further  private  inves.ment  in  manufacturing  and  services,  the  opposite  is  true
of  the  rural  areas.  This  would:  (i)  put  all  the  budgetary  burden  of  rural
development  on  the  government,  which  it  cannot  afford,  and  (il)  commit  the
government  to  undertake  detailed  microeconomic  decisions.  This  situation  is
at  odds  with  the  regulatory  nature  of  the  environment  in  othar  parts  of  the
economy,  incongruent  with  the  overall  direction  that  economic  policy  has  taken
over  the  last  few  years,  and  has  failed  to  produce  results  in  the  past.
Recent  reforms  in  the  rural  areas  have  recognized  some  of  these  problems.
Individual  ejidatarios  can  now  recei-..  credit  on  their  own  (thus  solving  the
free  rider  problem);  virtually  no  credit  is  to  be  given  in  kind;  operational
rules  for  Banrural  Pre  being  modified.  Th^se  reforms  are  important  steps  in
the  right  direction.  But  they  are  not  enough.  To  have  a  greater  impact  in-67-
reducing  rural  poverty  it is still  necessary  to: (i)  make sure  credit  is  not
contingent  on crop choice  and  is  not  used as a consumption  subsidy;  (ii)
legalize  ejido  parcels  that  are  under  20  hectares  to reduce  uncertainty  of
eviction;  (iii)  legalize  -:enting  of ejido  land,  sharecropping,  and  joint
operatior.s  between  ejLdatarios  and  private  producers;  (iv)  clarify  the laws
with regards  to the  use  of private  lands,  while  eliminating  restrictions  on
the  use  of given  plots  of land 113.
Furthering  the  p' cess  of rural  reform  is essential;  moreover,  channeling
additional  resources  to the  rural  areas  in the  absence  of institutional  reform
will be insufficient  to help the  rural  poor.  To reiterate,  from  the  point  of
view of the  rural  poor  who  do not  own land,  the  key issue  is  what is done  with
the  land  by those  who do own it;  land  distribution  and  land  regulations  matter
only  to the extent  that  different  distributions  and  regulations  imply
different  derived  demands  for  unskilled  labor,  with different  characteristics
with regards  to risk,  location,  seasonality  and  wages.  On the  other  hand,
from  the  point  of  view of the  rural  poor  who  do own land,  what  matters  is
their  ability  to exploit  this  asset  in the  most flexible  way, either  through
sharecropping  and  other  arrangements,  or through  the  choice  of crop,  source  of
credit  and fertilizer,  or marketing  and insurance  mechanisms.
The  way in  which  resources  are  channeled  to the  rural  sector  must  also  be
reformed. In particular,  subsidies  to input  and  output  prices  need  to  be
eliminated. If indeed  over  the  medium  term  the  rural  poor  are  helped  the  most
by an efficient  and flexible  rural  sector,  then input  and  output  prices  should
be  used for  efficiency. If the  rural  areas  are  to be integrated  into  the  rest
of the  economy  not only  must the  institutional  and  regulatory  regime  be
similar,  but relative  prices  should  also  perform  the  same  allocative  and
113I  emphasize  that,  to the  extent  possible,  I center  the  discussion  only
on the  ec.nomic  aspects  of the  institutional  regime. It is  clear  that  the
land  tenure  system  and  other  regulations  in  agriculture  play  multiple  roles
which  policy  makers  must  also  consider. Still,  policy  makers  need to  be clear
about  the  economic  costs  of these  regulations,  as well as the  people  who  bear
the  brunt  of those  costs. On the  other  hand,  as discussed  in section  V.1, it
is  very difficult  to tell  exactly  which  of all regulations  are  most
responsible  for  the  slowdown  in  agricultural  growth. Thus,  it appears  prudent
to  center  attention  on those  regulations  whose  reform  is ebsential  for  further
rural  development. The existence  of rental  markets  for  ejido  land  together
with  changes  in  credit  regulations  might  be compatible  with the  inalienability
of ejido  land.-68-
informational  functions  that  they  currently  perform  in industry  and services.
Since  a substantial  part  of the  land  can in  principle  be used to  produce
tradeable  goods,  a strategy  of maximizing  the  returns  to land  should,  to a
first  approximation,  take  world  prices  as the  relevant  opportunity  costs 114.
Guiding  resource  allocation  and  valuing  inputs  and  outputs  in the  rural  sector
by world  prices  will  allow  the  rural  areas  to benefit,  just  as industry
currently  does,  from  policy  actions  that increase  the  profitability  of
tradeable  output.
The rural  areas  do need  more resources. But these  resources  must aid the
development  of agriculture  along  the  intensive  margin,  and facilitate  the
integration  of the  rural  sector  into  the  rest  of the  economy. Alternatively,
substantial  resources  need  to be devoted  to the  development  of the  rural
infrastructure,  with emphasis  on rural  roads,  irrigation,  and research  and
extension  services. Better  roads  help the  rural  poor  since  they:  (i)  lower
costs  and increase  frequency  of delivery  of goods  imported  from  the  urban
areas,  (ii)  reduce  migration  costs,  (iii)  reduce  costs  of transportation  to
and from  urban  areas  allowing  decentralization  of  productive  activities  (see
below),  (iv)  facilitate  switches  towards  high  value  crops  (vegetable,  flowers,
fruits)  that  depend  on rapid  marketing,  and (v)  give  faster  access  to
fertilizers. Irrigation  helps  the  rn  '  poor since  it: (i)  increases  yields,
(ii)  reduces  weather  rinks,  (iii)  increases  crop choice,  and (iv)  reduces  land
left  fallowl15. Research  and  extension  services  help the  rural  poor  by: (i)
developing  high  yielding  varieties  for  the specific  climatological  conditions
of each  region,  and (ii)  reducing  costs  of information  and  risks  of
innovation. In sum,  resources  must be redirected  from  price  subsidies  (to
credit,  irnputs  and outputs)  where  they  are  mostly  appropriated  by the  non-
poor,  to areas  where  the  externalities  are  greatest  and the  probability  of
reaching  the  poor is  higher.
114Issues  like  monopoly  power  in trade,  uncertainty,  etc.  may call  for
some trade  intervention.  This r  nuires  a case  by case  analysis.
115"In  a country  where  a large  proportion  of the  total  area is arid  or
semiarid,  where  a large  area is  mountainous  with slopes  too  steep  for
cultivation,  and  where  a considerable  area  is subject  to excessive  reinfall
causirg  erosion  and  flooding,  the  amount  of land  which  can  be cultivated
successfully  without  artificial  aids is relatively  limited,  and that  is  why
irrigation  has  played,  and  will  continue  to  play,  such  a vital  role in
Mexico's  agriculture."  (Yates,  op.  cit.,  p. 68).-69-
But  reform  of  rural  institutions  and  more infrastructure  is insufficient
to  help the  rural  p or.  A third  area  requires  policy  makers'  attention:
elimination  of urban  bias in  the  delivery  of social  services. The rural  poor
also  need to improve  their  human  capital  through  health  and  education. This
implies  not  only tilting  the  balance  of social  spending  towards  the  rural
areas,  but  also  allocating  those  resources  where  their  social  pay-off  is  high.
In the  short  run  improvements  can  be made  by increasing  attention  to
preventive  medicine  and  bettering  the  quality  of primary  education. These
are, again,  the  areas  where  the  risks  that  the  benefits  will  be appropriated
by the  non-poor  are smaller  and  the  externalities  higher 116.
Rural  development  is the  key to  poverty  alleviation:  this  is  where  most
of the  poor are,  and this  is  where  in the  short  run  growth  is  most needed.
But  what about  the  medium  term? Can  rural  wages  increase  sufficiently  to
reduce  poverty  in the  face  of growing  population? This is  a difficult
question  to answer,  but two  points  can  be made.  First,  it is  clear  that  over
a  longer  time-span  rural  wages  will increase  only  by increasing  the  land/labor
ratio,  which implies  the  need  for  further  rural  it  migration. Second,
however,  given  present  distortions  in input  and  output  prices,  land  use and
land  tenure,  it is  very difficult  to tell  how  much rural  wages  could  increase
in the  short  run  if these  distortions  were removed 117.  Differently  put,
reform  of the  rural  areas  may  allow  for  substantial  increases  in rural  wages
and reduce  for  some  time  the  incentives  for  rural-urban  migration
1161ssues  of urban  bias  also  call for  decentralization  of fiscal
collections  and  switching  of responsibilities  from  the  federal  to state
governments;  I abstract  from  these  issues  in this  paper,  but see  World  Bank,
1989a,  for  furthar  discussion.
117In  fact,  the  information  problem  is  quite  severe. Under the  present
set  of regulations  it is  very difficult  to tell  what is the  comparative
advantage  of the  rural  areas. It is  plausible  to argue  that  given  Mexico's
endowments  this  would  be in crops  with  high  value  per  unit  of land  and low
value  per  unit  of labor. But  issues  like  access  to marketing,  weather
upcertainty  and the  like  are  also  central.  (This  provides  yet  another  reason
why the  government  should  not take  decisions  witn regards  to the  output  mix;
this should  be decided.  uy  individual  producers  who  have the incentive  and
ability  to gather  this '.aformation.)-70-
(particularly  if  accompanied  by  the  removal  of  urban  bias  in  social
spending) 118.
Eventually  more  urbanization  will  take  place.  But  its  shape  will  depend
on  the  spatial  pattern  of  relative  prices,  and  can  thus  be  influenced  by
policy.  Further  urbanization  can  occur  through  the  growth  of  small  and  medium
size  cities  in  the  more  rural  states.  Shifting  population  to  these  urban
areas  will  allow  economies  of  scale  in  the  delivery  of  certain  services
(hospitals,  higher  education),  and  will  create  further  employment
opportunities  in  these  states;  today's  rural  poor  do  not  have  to  be tomorrow's
urban  poor. But  to  achieve  growth  of  small  and  medium  size  cities  in  rural
states  it  is  essential  to  eliminate  current  subsidies  to  the  large
metropolitan  areas.  Differently  put,  as  part  of  a  program  of  rural
development  there  is  also  a  need  for  spatial  correction  of  relative  prices  so
that  private  firms  face  marginal,  costs  in  the  large  metropolitan  areas  that
are  equal  to  social  costs.  This  will:  (i)  liberate  large  resources  currently
devoted  to  expand  the  infrastructure  of  those  areas,  (ii)  induce  private
producars  to  decentralize  some  peoduction  activities  and,  in  turn,  (iii)
increase  labor  demand  and,  more  generally,  incomes  in  small  cities  in
relatively  more  rural  states  (particularly  if  this  is  accompanied  by
infrastructure  development  in  those  states).  Serious  consideration  should  be
given  to  the  introduction  of  location  taxes  in  the  large  metropolitan  areas.
To  recapitulate.  The  core  of  the  poverty  program  suggested  consists  of:
(i)  implementation  of  PASSPA-type  programs  with  a  clear  focus  on  the
extremely-poor,  (ii)  reform  of  the  regulatory  and  institutional  regime  in  the
rural  areas,  (iii)  elimination  of  price  subsidies  and  redirection  of  those
resources  to  develop  the  rural  infrastructure,  (iv)  elimination  of  urban  bias
in  the  delivery  of  social  services,  and  (v)  correction  in  the  spatial  pattern
of  relative  prices.  This  approach  combines  directly  targeted  benefits  only
for  the  extremely-poor  with  a  strong  emphasis  on  allocative  efficiency,  is
118Yates,  op.  cit.,  p-  61  notas  that  "..a  great  deal  of  marginal  land  is
being  cultivated  by  people  who  have  no  alternative  means  of  livelihood."  But
note  that  even  if  these  larnds  are  eventually  abandoned,  these  people  need  not
migrate  immediately  to  urban  areas.  As  mentioned,  it  is  difficult  to  tell  ex-
ante  what  rural  employment  opportunities  would  be  under  a  very  different  price
and  incentiv2  regime.  Whether  these  peasants  on  marginal  lands  'abandon  their
land'  or  not  is  not  the  key  point.  Rather,  it  is  whether  with  more  rural
development  they  have  greater  opportunities  to  diversify  and  increase  their
sources  of  income.-71-
congruent  with the  overall  direction  of economic  policy,  treats  the  rural
areas  in the  same  way as  the  rest  of the  economy,  allocates  land  as any  other
productive  asset,  and  considers  that  rural  inhabitants,  just  like  urban,  have
a  continuum  of abilities  and  labor-leisure  trade-offs. This approach  does  not
imply  that 'getting  prices  right',  by itself,  will eliminate  poverty;  it does
imply  that 'getting  prices  wrong'  does  not  help the  poor.  The poverty  program
suggested  gives  a large  role to the  government. But  it concentrates
government  action  in  areas  where  the  government  has comparative  advantage:
helping  directly  only  those  who  need  help anid  helping  indirectly  all  others  by
setting  the  right  incentive  structure,  attacking  externalities  and  allocating
social  expenditures  equitably,  all in the  context  of a stable  macroeconomic
environment.-72-
VII.  Government  Programs  for  Poverty.
Poverty  alleviation  efforts  in  Mexico  are  coordinated  and supervised  by
the  Programa  Nacional  de Solidaridad  (Pronasol),  initiated  by the  Salinas
Administration  in December  of 1988. Pronasol  is an umbrella  organization  with
the  aim  of developing  health,  education,  nutrition,  housing,  employment,
infrastructure  and  other  productive  projects  targeted  on the  poorest  groups.
Since  its  inception  the  program  has  grown  bot'.  in terms  of size (as  measured
by expenditures),  and  in terms  of the  programs  it encompasses. At the time  of
writing,  Pronasol  is still  adapting  existing  programs  and  developing  new  ones;
changes  are  also  being  made  within  the  different  government  agencies
responsible  for  implementing  various  poverty  alleviation  efforts. In  what
follows  I  concentrate  only  on giving  a description  of the  main  programs  (sub-
section  VII.l)  and, in the  light  of previous  results,  offer  some  suggestions
for improvements  (sub-section  VII.2).
VII.J  Descripti  .n  of Current  Programs.
Pronasol  covers  a  wide range  of activities  through  different  specific
programs. Broad  participation  of the  beneficiaries  is sought  in setting
priorities. But  at the  same  time,  beneficiaries  are  made responsible  for
results  and,  depending  on specific  program  characteristics,  are  at times
expected  to co-finance  projects  with own  resources. Decision-making  and
implementation  is in  principle  expected  to  be the  joint  effort  of the
government  and  program  participants.  To provide  a brief  description  of
Pronasol  specific  activities,  it is  useful  to classify  them  in four  broad
areas:  1. food  support  programs,  2.  productive  programs,  3. social  services
programs,  and  4. infrastructure  programs.
1. Food  Sunport  Programsal 9. There  are  four  mechanisms  through  which  the
government  provides  food  support:  (i)  general  subsidies,  (ii)  targeted
coverage  for  the  urban  poor,  (iii)  targeted  coverage  for  the  rural  poor,  and
(iv)  targeted  coverage  for  vulnerable  groups. The total  cost  of these
programs  in 1988  was about  (US)  $  900  million,  out of  which  about  500  million
went to the  first  category. Preliminary  figures  show  that in 1989  1,400
million  was spent  on  these  programs,  with  about  900  million  allocated  to
untargeted  subsidies.
119The  following  discussion  is  based  on World  Bank (1990a).-73-
Targeted  coverage  for  the  urban  poor is  attempted  by selling  fixed
amounts  of two  food items,  tortillas  and  milk,  at subsidized  prices  to
families  who earn less  than  2  minimum  wages 120. In  principle  it is  expected
that,  for  a family  of five  with 2  children,  these  two food  items  provide  1070
calories  and 32 grams  of protein  per  person  per day.  Practice  may  be
different:  first,  poor  households  tend  to  be larger  than five,  and second,
even if the  total  is right,  intrahousehold  allocations  may be such  that
individuals  fall  short  of that  target. In 1988  the  tortilla  program  covered
approximately  1.08  million  families  with a  90X  price  discount  transferring
about  $  95 dollars  a  year (assuming  the  fixed  amount  of two  kilos  of tortillas
per day  per family  were actually  bought) 121. The  milk  program  covered  1.86
million  families  who  were screened  by social  workers  to qualify  (and
automatically  became  eligible  for  the  tortibonos)  and,  depending  on the  number
of children,  obtained  varying  quantities  of milk  at an 80%  price  discountl 22,
with an average  savings  of $  50  dollars  per  year.  The total  cost  of these  two
programs  was $  195  million.
Targeted  coverage  for  the  rural  poor is  attempted  through  a system  of
rural  stores  operated  by the  government's  food  marketing  and  distribution
agency,  Conasupo,  where  basic  staples  are  sold at  an average  price  discount  of
141.  The stores  are  in principle  accessible  co 5.1  million  families,  with
targeting  achieved  (in  principle)  by location. The total  cost  of the  program
in 1988  was $  51  million,  providing  an average  savings  per family  of $  10,
although  this figure  is only  an estimate,  since  there  is little  information  on
who  actually  purchases  there,  and  how  much.
Targeted  coverage  ft.r  vulnerable  groups  is  carried  out  by various  other
institutions,  and  basically  ialls  under  two  programs. One,  the "Nutrition  and
Health  Program"  run  as  part  of PASSPA  jointly  by the  Ministry  of Health,  the
Mexican  Institute  of Social  Security,  the  National  Institute  of Nutrition  and
120These  are the  so-called  'tortibonos'  and 'Liconsa'  milk  programs.
121As  of  March 1991  the 'tortibono'  progam  will be replaced  by the
program  'tortilla  solidaridad',  where  one  kilo  of tortilla  per day  will  be
freely  distributed  to any  family  earning  less  than  twice  the  minimum  wage.
122Families  with  up to 2 (3,  over  4) children  can  purchase  8  (12,  up to
24)  liters  of milk per  week.-74-
the  National  Indigenous  Institute. This  program  provides  free food1 23, health
and  nutrition  education,  and  basic  health  coverage. It targets  families
living  in areas  of acute  poverty  (identified  by some 'socioeconomic  criteria'
like  housing,  access  to  water,  etc.)  with  between  500  and  2500 inhabitantsl 24.
To qualify  for  the  program  families  must  meet one  of the  following  criteria:
have  pregnant  or nursing  women,  allocate  601  or more  of total  expenditures  to
food,  lack  drinking  water  or  waste  disposal,  or have less  than  6 years  of
schooling. In 1988  this  program  helped  215,000  families,  at a total  cost of
1.7  million. Two, the  Sistema  Nacional  para  el Desarollo  Integral  de la
Familia  (DIF),  who in  turn  operates  various  programs1 25, that  provide  free
rations  of food  itemsl 26 based  again  on some 'socioeconomic  indicators'
(education,  housing). The DIF  programs  covered  1.1  million  families  in 1988,
spending  about  $  100  dollars  per  year  per family.
2. Productive  Programs. These  are  programs  through  which  Pronasol  seeks  to
directly  increase  the  poors'  earnings  potential. They fall  under  three
categories. One,  the  Fondos  de Solidaridad  para la Produccion,  (Solidarity
Funds  for  Production),  which  so far  has concentrated  in  providing  credit  to
farmers  that  because  of their  characteristics  (high-risk,  low  yield
activities)  cannot  obtain  it from  public  or private  institutions. In 1990
400,000  farmers  in  1,350  municipios  were  provided  with credit  at zero interest
rates.  It is assumed  that this  credit  contributed  to cultivate  1.8  million
hectares. Credit  is  granted  directly  to  each  producer,  and is  not tied  to
crop  choice.
123193  grams  of powdered  milk  per day to  urban  families,  and  300  grams  of
corn in  grain,  200 grams  of  beans  and  200  grams  of  wheat flour  per  day to
rural  families.
124Although  it appears  that  these  'socioeconomic  indicators'  are  based  on
the 'index  of marginalization'  constructed  by Coplamar  (see  the  discussion  in
section  III.2).
125The two  main  programs  operated  by the  DIF  are the  PROENI,  targeted  on
children  under  four  years  of age,  and  the  PASAF,  targeted  on households  with
pregnant  and  nursing  mothers,  elderly  and  handicapped.
126Poor families  with  at least  two  members  who are  either  less  than 5
years  of age,  pregnant  or nursing,  or elderly  and  handicapped  receive  5  kilos
of  corn  flour  and 5  kilos  of beans  per  month  if they live  in  urban  areas,  and
8  kilos  of corn  and 2  of beans  if they  live  in rural  areas;  in  addition,
children  between  4 and 12  years  of age receive  5 rations  per  week consisting
of 0.2  liters  of  milk,  brecd  and  a dessert.-75-
Two, the  Fondos  de Solidaridad  para las  Comunidades  Indigenas  (Solidarity
Funds  for  Indigenous  Communities).  This program  channeled  20  million  dollars
in 1990  to 50 different  ethnic  groups  located  in 80 regions. Funds  were
channeled  directly  to the  communities'  organizations,  who  decided  the  priority
and specific  use of resources. Three,  the  Programa  de  Mujeres  en Solidaridad
(Women  in Solidarity),  that  provides  resources  to  women  so that  they  can
support  their  household  ir.come  through  productive  work.
3. Social  Services  Program. These  consist  of support  to  health  and education.
In the  area  of  health  Pronasol  helped  establish  727  new  clinics,  and  the  re-
habilitation  and  expansion  of 26  hospitals.
In education  Pronasol  has  dedicated  efforts  to the  re-habilitation  and
improvement  of 34,000  schools  in 1990 (through  the  program  Solidarity  for  a
Dignified  School). It  has  also instituted  a program  aimed  at reducing  primary
school  drop-out  rates. The  program  grants  scholarships  to  children,  and
provides  their  families  with  health  and  food  support  through  the  provision  of
food  baskets. Finally,  Pronasol  also  provides  scholarships  to young  high
school  and  university  graduates  who participate  in its  activities. In 1990
115,000  graduates  received  such  scholarships.
4. Infrastructure  Programs. Through  these  programs  Pronasol  supports
development  of the  infrastructure  in  poor  communities. The  program  Fondos
Municipales  de Solidaridad  (Municipal  Solidarity  Funds)  channeled  resources  to
1,426  municipalities  in 13 states  during  1990  to attend  'urgent  investment
needs'  as determined  by the  municipalities.  Efforts  are  also  directed  to
determine  and  clarify  ownership  rights  in  urban  squatter  areas. Through  these
programs  electricity  was  also  provided  to 3,557  rural  communities  and  poor
urban  nieghborhoods;  improved  water  supply  was provided  to 700  urban
communities. In  addition,  efforts  were  directed  to re-capitalize  and  re-
habilitate  urban  and  rural  government  food  stores. Plans  call for  Pronasol's
participation  in the  construction  of rural  roads  as of 1991.-76-
VIIJ2  Preliminary  Assessment.
A complete  assessment  of Pronasol  is difficult:  first,  because  many of
Pronasol's  programs  have  just  begun  and  their  operational  rules  are still
under  revision;  and second,  because  the  relevant  data is unavailable. For
these  reasons,  the  evaluation  and  suggestions  made  here are  preliminary,  and
focus  mostly  on methodological  issues,  leaving  matters  that  require  empirical
work for  a later  occasion. To focus  the  discussion,  it is useful  to consider
the impact  of food  and  nutrition  programs,  on the  one  hand,  and  the other
programs,  on the  other.
Directly  Targeted  Food  Supoort  Programs.
There  is a strong  case,  as argued  in  section  3.4,  to focus  direct
targeting  of benefits  only on the  extremely-poor.  At present,  however,
various  criteria  are  used to identify  the  beneficiaries  of the  food  and
nutrition  support  programs. Some  programs  (like  the  tortibonos  and the
Liconsa  milk) identify  the  poor  using  the  minimum  wage  as the  relevant
statistic. Others  (like  PASSPA)  use a  mix of location,  spending  and
educational  characteristics.  And  yet other  programs  use the  indice  de
margLnalidad  computed  by Coplamarl 27. Identification  of the  extremely-poor  is
of course  no simple  matter. On the  other  hand,  the  use  of different
indicators  to identify  what should  in  principle  be the  same target  population
may lead  to mistargeting  of the  truly  needy.  To improve  upon targeting
criteria  a strong  case  can  be made to  use a systematic  poverty  indicator.
Unfortunately,  current  problems  with  data availability  preclude  the  use
of a poverty  indicator  with the  desired  properties  like  the  one suggested  in
section  3.1128. Until  such  data limitations  are surpassed,  improvements  could
127At  times  it is  not clear  whether  the  indice  de  marginalidad  used is
the  one  computed  by Coplamar  (as  discussed  in section  III.2). Sometimes
mention  is  made of another  index  computed  by Conapo  (Comision  Nacional  de
Poblacion). I  was  unable  to obtain  information  on the  latter  index,  although
it seems  to be related  to the  former.
128Note  also that  a systemaric  attack  on poverty  needs  information  to
evaluate  progress. To be able  tc calculate  the  desired  poverty  indices,  and
to  monitor  progress  in  poverty  alleviation,  future  IES  should  have larger
samples  that  allow  for  statistical  inferences  in the  urban  and  rural  areas  of
each  state.  In  additlon,  data  needs  to  be gathered  on a  more regular  basis,
with fixed  perlodicity  (say,  every  four  years).-77-
be made unifying  indicators  for  targeted  programs. A suggestion  would  be to
calculate  the  line  of extreme-poverty  in,  say,  prices  of January  of 1991,  and
then  compute  a relevant  price index  to  up-date  it and  keep it  constant  in real
terms. This (real)  poverty  line  could  substitute  for  the  minimum  wage as a
discriminating  device. This is a desirable  change,  as the  real  minimum  wage
is  subject  to discrete  jumps  derived  from transitory  macroeconomic
disturbances. (Of  course,  regional  poverty  indices  could  be computed  if
regional  differences  in  price  levels  require  such  distinction.)
The tortibono  and  Liconsa  milk  programs  are  a clear  improvement  over
previous  programs. Not  only is the  support  targeted  (at  least  in principle)
only  on the  poor,  but  because  of the  infra-marginal  nature  of the  transfers,
distortions  in consumer  choice  are avoided. On the  other  hand,  it is  clear
that the  basic  effect  of these  programs  is to transfer  purchasing  power to  the
(mostly  urban)  poor.  Incentive  issues  aside  (see  below),  it is important  to
point  out that  such income  transfers:  (i)  fail  to exploit  the
complementarities  between  food,  basic  health  and  information  discussed  in
section  VI.4,  and (ii)  do not  address  problems  of intrahousehold  inequality.
The first  problem  may not  be an important  issue  in  urban  areas  to the  extent
that in  these  areas  fixed  costs  of access  to  health  services  may  be much
lower,  and information  about  birth  control,  water  and  food  treatment,  etc.
more readily  available. Under  these  circumstances,  transfering  income  to the
urban  extremely-poor  may allow  them to  purchase  those  complementary  health  and
educational  services  on their  own.
But the  same is  not true  of poor  rural  areas.  In these  areas  the  supply
of information  about  fertility  control,  food  conservation  and  basic  health
care,  as well as the  actual  services  themselves,  is likely  to  be deficient,
while transport  costs  are  much  higher. These  circumstances  effectively
preclude  the  rural  poor from  translating  the  income  transfered  through  the
food  support  programs  into  better  health,  more fertility  control,  more
inoculations  for  their  children,  and  better  food  preparation  and  conservation.
Thus,  the  effectiveness  of income  transfers  through  food  support  programs  is
likely  to be much lower  in these  areas.  Because  reducing  undernutrition,
fertility,  infant  mortality  and  morbidity  is the  key objective  for the
extremely-poor,  a strong  case  can  be made for  making  PASSPA-type  programs  the
centerpiece  of efforts  to  help the  extremely-poor  (both  in terms  of resources
and emphasis),  with  particular  emphasis  on the  rural  areas.  This  requires-78-
changes  in  resource  allocation,  as  PASSPA  is  the  smallest  of  all  the  food  and
nutrition  programs  currently  in  place.
The  estimates  of  purchasing  power  currently  trqnsferred  to  the  targeted
groups  through  food  support  programs  show  a  bias  against  the  rural  areas.  The
Conasupo  rural  stores  carry  an  average  benefit  of  $  10  a  year  per  family
(assuming  only  poor  families  have  access  to  theml),  while  an  urban  family  who
participates  in  both  the  Liconsa  milk  and  the  tortibono  programs  can
potentially  receive  up  to  $  145  annually.  This  is  not  only  inequitable  given
the  distribution  of  extreme-poverty  between  rural  and  urban  areas  (recall  from
table  7  that  between  two-thirds  to  three-fourths  of  total  extreme-poverty  is
accounted  for  by  rural  regions),  but  perpetuates  the  incentives  to  migrate  to
the  urban  squatter  areas 129. Differently  put,  the  current  pattern  of  directly
targeted  benefits  is  rather  different  from  what  one  would  like  to  see. This
is  not  to  argue  that  benefits  to  the  urban  areas  should  be  reduced,  but  to
point  out,  rather,  the  need  for  additional  benefits  for  the  rural  poor. It
may  be  relatively  more  difficult  to  have  benefits  reach  the  rural  poor,  but
this  is  what  a 'frontal  attack'  on  poverty  requires.  Moreover,  the  rural-
urban  imbalance  is  exacerbated  by  the  mix  of  rationing  coupons  and  generalized
price  subsidies.  The  tortibono  and  Liconsa  milk  programs  in  the  rural  areas
work  with  coupons,  while  the  Conasupo  rural  stores  offer  price  discounts.
Clearly,  there  are  non-poor  inhabitants  in  the  rural  areas  who  might  be
benefiting  from  the  price  subsidies.  Thus,  it  is  not  clear  that  the  few
resources  channeled  to  the  rural  areas  reach  only  the  extremely-poar.
The  distribution  of  resources  devoted  to  food  support  also  appears
somewhat  urnbalanced.  Out  of  the  $  900  million  spent  on  food  support  programs
in  1988,  more  than  half,  or  about  $  500  million,  were  allocated  to  untargeted
food  subsidies.  The  World  Bank  (1990a,  p.  6)  estimates  that  more  than  80X  of
these  subsidies  go  to  families  who  earn  more  than  1.5  times  the  minimum  wages.
This  implies,  roughly  speaking,  that  of  a  total  of  $  900  million  spent  on  food
and  health  support  by  the  programs  described  above,  only  about  $  500  million
benefit  the  extremely-poor 130. From  the  point  of  view  of  alleviating  extreme-
129Torche  (1990,  p.  25)  points  out  that  55X  of  the  beneficiaries  of  the
tortibonos  program  live  in  the  Federal  District  and  surrounding  metropolitan
area.
130Assuming  all  400  million  allocated  to  the  targeted  programs  indeed
reach  the  extremely-poor,  and  adding  to  this  figure  20X  of  the  500  million
spent  on  untargeted  food  subsidies.-79-
poverty  there  is  no case  for  the $  400  million  spent  on untargeted  food
subsidies. Alternatively,  in 1988  there  were  potentially  up to $  400  million
that  could  be re-directed  to benefit  the  extremely-poor.  Contrast  this  figure
with the  $  1.7  million  spent  in  the  same  year  on PASSPA.
Note that  to the  extent  that  some  food  support  programs  have as their
chief  effect  the transfer  of  purchasing  power  to  the  population,  a negative
effect  on incentives  may  be introduced. This  problem  arises  when transfers
are  means-tested,  as is the  case in the  urban  areas  wnere the  tortibono  and
Liconsa  milk  programs  are in  place. Because  such  programs  transfer  benefits
only if the  income  of participants  is less  than  twice  the  minimum  wage,
participants  will  notice  a decrease  in  net income  as earned  income  increases
beyond  this  point  (see  the  discussion  of section  VI.2).  This  effect  may  be
re-inforced  if access  to other  benefits  (like  public  housing)  is  also
contingent  on incomes  being  lower  than  the  same  cut-off  point.  Clearly,
avoiding  the  negative  effects  of  means-tested  targeting  is difficult. Their
operational  importance,  on the  other  hand,  depends  on the  size  o2 the  benefits
and  the  specific  form in  which  the  program  is implemented. But  as generalized
subsidies  are replaced  by means-tested  targeting,  it is important  to  be aware
of the  trade-offs  between  the  budgetary  advanatges  of targeting  and its
possible  incentive  disadvantages.  This suggests  the  need  to gather  and
analyze  data  characteristics  and  frequency  of benefits  by households  to  assess
the  importance  of this  issue.
Productive.  Social  and Infrastructure  Programs.
Pronasol's  activities  in infrastructure  development  are  very impcrtant.
Rural  roads,  electricity,  the  re-habilitation  of schools  and  hospitals  and
similar  investments  are  essential  to  reduce  transport  costs,  increase
mobility,  access  to information  and  to possibilities  to improve  human  capital.
Moreover,  small  infrastructure  investments  that incorporate  the  beneficiaries
in  the identification  and implementation  of  projects  have  higher  likelihood  of
success:  the  beneficiaries  have  more information  about  their  underlying  needs,
and  higher  stakes  in the  projects'  outcome. Yet it is important  to  note that
as Pronasol  extends  its  reach  into  other  areas  it  may lose  some  of its  focus
and, in an attempt  to rapidly  act in  many  areas  may  unintentionally  bias the
incentive  structure  in subtle  but nonetheless  important  ways.-80-
Consider,  for  example,  Pronasol's  scholarship-cum-food  package  program  to
reduce  primary  school  drop-out  rates. A double  rationale  can  justify  this
program. First,  as  discussed  in  section  VI.l,  poor  parents  may  not be able to
afford  the  opportunity  cost of sending  their  children  to  school  (because  of
reduced  labor  input  in the  family  farm,  say).  Second,  undernourished  children
will underperform  even  if they  systematically  attend  school. Ignoring  intra-
household  inequality,  Pronasol's  programs  can  work on these  two  margins,  and
allow  parents  to  make the investment  in ther  children's  education,  a very
desirable  outcome. On the  other  hand,  care  must  be exercised  during
implementation.  If the  value  of the  scholarship-cum-food  package  is too  high
(relative  to  household's  costs  of sending  children  to school),  parents  may
respond  to the  program  by increasing  family  size  as additional  children
become,  at the  margin,  more  valuable. Thus,  the  program  could  run  counter  to
other  efforts  aimed  at reducing  fertility. In  practice  this  effect  may  not  be
that  important,  but its  mention  calls  attention  to a relevant  issue:  the  need
to  gather  detailed  data  on the  characteristics  of the  program  so that its
short  and  medium  term  effects  can  be fully  assessed.
A similar  phenomenon  occurs  with the  program  Salidarity  Funds  for
Production. Given  current  cha.ges  in the  regulations  to rural  credit
institutions,  a program  that  provides  credit  to poor  farmers  can  play an
essential  role isolating  and  protecting  these  farmers  from  the transitional
disturbances  associated  with such  changes. Over the  medium  term,  however,  the
implications  of providing  credit  at zero  nominal  interest  rates  (and  hencep
negative  real  rates)  must  be determined,  and  the  negative  effects  of this  type
of production  subsidy  on  .armers'  choice  of technique  must  be evaluated.
Again,  the importance  of this issue  at this  point  is  difficult  to determine
and,  as  with other  programs,  data  on amounts  of credit,  default  rates,  output
and input  choices,  etc.,  is required  to determine  the  impact  of the  program,
and  of any  changes  it may  need.
Summing  UZ.
The government's  recent  efforts  at poverty  alleviation  are  very welcome
indeed. In spite  of the  stringencies  imposed  by the  macroeconomic
stabilization  program,  more resources  are  being  channeled  to the  poor.  This
is a significant  achievement. The  programs  through  which  resources  ar-  being
channeled,  moreover,  appear  to  be,  on the  whole,  well  designed. The
replacement  of generalized  price  subsidies  by targeted  programs,  and the-80-
Consider,  for  example,  Pronasol's  scholarship-cum-food  package  program  to
reduce  primary  school  drop-out  rates. A double  rationale  can  justify  this
program. First,  as discussed  in section  VI.1,  poor  parents  may  not  be able  to
afford  the  opportunity  cost  of sending  their  children  to school  (because  of
reduced  labor  input  in the  family  farm,  say).  Second,  undernourished  children
will underperform  even if they  systematically  attend  school. Ignoring  intra-
household  inequality,  Pronasol's  programs  can  work  on these  two  margins,  and
allow  parents  to make the  investment  in ther  children's  education,  a  very
desirable  outcome. On the  other  hand,  care  must  be exercised  during
implementation.  If the  value  of the  scholarship-cum-food  package  is coo  high
(relative  to  household  s costs  of sending  children  to school),  parents  may
respond  to the  program  by increasing  family  size  as additional  children
become,  at the  margin,  more  valuable. Thus,  the  program  could  run counter  to
other  efforts  aimed  at reducing  fertility. In practice  this  effect  may not  be
that  important,  but its  mention  calls  attention  to a relevant  issue:  the  need
to gather  detailed  data on the  characteristics  of the  program  so that  its
short  and  medium  term  effects  can  be fully  assessed.
A  similar  phenomenon  occurs  with  the  program  Solidarity  Funds  for
Production. Given  current  changes  in the  regulations  to rural  credit
institutions,  a program  that  provides  credit  to poor  farmers  can  play an
essential  role isolating  and  protecting  these  farmers  from  the  transitional
disturbances  associated  with such  changes. Over  the  medium  term,  however,  the
implications  of providing  credit  at zero  nominal  interest  rates (and  hence
negative  real  rates)  must  be determined,  and  the  negative  effects  of this  type
of  production  subsidy  on farmers'  choice  of  technique  must  be evaluated.
Again,  the  importance  of this  issue  at this  point  is difficult  to determine
and, as  with other  programs,  data  on amounts  of credit,  default  rates,  output
and input  choices,  etc.,  is required  to determine  the impact  of the  program,
and of any  changes  it  may need.
Summing  Un.
The government's  recent  efforts  at poverty  alleviation  are  very  welcome
indeed. In spite  of the  stringencies  imposed  by the  macroeconomic
stabilization  program,  more resources  are  being  channeled  to the  poor.  This
is a significant  achievement. The  programs  through  which  resources  are  being
channeled,  moreover,  appear  to  be, on the  whole,  well  designed. The
replacement  of generalized  price  subsidies  by targeted  programs,  and  the-81-
emphasis  on social  and infrastructure  investments  in  poor  regions  are  all
effective  means  to reach  and  help the  poor.
There  are,  however,  improvements  that  can  be made within  this  general
effort. Targeting  of direct  benefits  needs  to focus  more on the  extremely-
poor,  and  the  form  of the  benefits  needs  adjustment. Firstly,  there  remains
an imbalance  between  urban  and  rural  areas;  an imbalance  that  needs  to  be
resolved  by channeling  more resources  to the  rural  areas,  not reducing  chem in
urban  areas.  Secondly,  the  effectiveness  of the  resources  channeled  to the
rural  areas  needs  to  be enhanced. In  particular,  programs  that  exploit  the
complementarities  between  health,  nutrition  and information  need  more
attention,  since  in rural  areas  such  complementarities  cannot  be achieved  by
simply  transfering  income  to the  extremely-poor.  Thirdly,  resources  and
administrative  constraints  imply  that  much  can  be gained  by focusing
Pronasol's  attention  more on its  key  programs  than is  currer._ly  the  case.
In  addition  to its  own significant  merits,  a  high-visibility  program  can
be very  valuable  in strengthening  the  social  consensus  behind  other  structural
changes,  and  can  be a central  element  in  showing  that  such  changes  will  not  be
allowed  to increase  poverty. But the  risks  of such  a  program  deserve  mention
as well.  A key  risk  may derive  from  the impression  that  Pronasol,  by itself,
is  sufficient  for  poverty  alleviation,  and that  other  policies  can  be freed
from  poverty  considerations.  Given  the  extent  of poverty  in  Mexico,  investing
one  or one  and a  half percent  of GNP  on Pronasol  will  not  have a  sufficient
impact. But the  focus  should  not  only  lie in  allocating  larger  resources  to
Pronasol,  but also in directly  confronting  the  roots  of poverty. In this
paper  I  have argued  that  primary  poverty  in  Mexico  is the  result  of
inbtitutional  structures  and  interventions  in resource  allocation  mechanisms
that  generate  market  outcomes  which  undervalue  the  resources  owned  by the
poor.  Over the  medium  term,  the  greatest  impact  on  poverty  alleviation  will
derive  from institutional  reforms  that  tilt  market  outcomes  to benefit  the
poor.  Efforts  at reduciug  generalized  price  subsidies,  ar reforming  rural
regulations,  at eliminating  urban  bias,  and  at macroeconomic  stabilization
have  been  at the  center  of the  government's  agenda  over the  last  few  years
with,  quite  naturally,  varying  levels  of accomplishment  so far.  But  unless
the  reforms  to these  primary  determinants  of poverty  are  pursued  further,
Pronasol's  activities,  while  undoubtedly  very  valuable,  will,  so to speak,  be
like 'swimming  against  the  current'. Only  when policies  for  the  poor  become
an integral  part of the development  program  of the  country,  will the  poor  be-82-
removed  from  the  status  of  minor  particlpants  ln  development  to  the  focus  of
development.-83-
VIII.  Conclusions.
VIIILLl  SWmar  of  Result,.
I summarize  very schematically  the  key  points  of the  paper:
1.  A distinction  between  moderate  and  extreme-poverty  is  required. The
moderately-poor  lack  some  goods  and  services  that  given  the  country's  wealth
everybody  should  enjoy. The extremely-poor  have such  low  resources  as to  be
at risk of undernutrition,  with  higher  morbidity  and  potential  anthropometric
deficiencies.
2.  Undernutrition  and  m.lnutrition  should  be separated. There  are  significant
difficulties  in the  measurement  of undernutrition.  Most  estimates  of
undernutrition  in  Mexico  are  based  on the  comparison  between  exogenously  given
intakes  and  prescribed  requirements.  These  estimates  are  probably  flawed  and
overestimate  the  extent  of the  problem.
3. Indicatois  of poverty  should  incorporate  concerns  about  its  severity  and
distribution;  the  head-count  ratio  fails  to do this,  as do other 'indices  of
marginalization'  computed  by government  agencies  and  currently  used to
identify  the  poor.  The  Foster-Greer-Thorbecke  poverty  index  P(a,z)  satisfies
axioms  with respect  to severity  and  distribution  of poverty,  can  be separably
decomposed,  allows  measurement  of the  contribution  of each  region  to total
poverty,  can serve  to rank  regions  for  delivery  of benefits,  and  can  be used
to  monitor  progress  in  poverty  alleviation. The index  takes  as exogenous  the
poverty  line  z and a  parameter  a  that  measures  societies'  concern  for  the
poorest  of the  poor.  A distinction  was made  between  a line  of extreme-
poverty,  1,  and a line  of  moderate-poverty,  z.  The  monetary  cost  of each  was
estimated.
4. Based  on the 1984  Income-Expenditure  Survey  I find  that:  (i)  at most 19X  of
the  population  is  extremely-poor,  although  it is probably  the  case that  this
is an over-estimate,  (ii)  not  only is extreme-poverty  mostly  a rural  problem,
but the  poorest  of the  extremely-poor  are rural,  (iii)  the  extvemely-poor  have
larger  household  sizes,  more  children  and the  highest  dependency  ratios,  (iv)
not even  the  extremely-poor  allocate  more than  60X  of total  monetary
expenditures  to food.-84-
5. Three  main determinants  of poverty  were identified:  (i)  institutional
arrangements  - - government  policies  within  the  rural  areas  that  discriminate
against  the  poor, (ii)  urban  bias,  and (iii)  macroeconomic  uncertaint)  The
ejido  cum-private  land  tenure  structure,  together  with  other  regulations  and
policies  fail  to increase  agricultural  output,  deliver  substantial  rents  to
high income  agricultural  producers,  and  depress  the  returns  to land  and the
demand  for  unskilled  rural  labor,  the  two  main assets  owned  by the  poor.
Urban  bias in the  allocation  of social  and  infrastructure  spending  reduces  the
rural  poor's  ability  to increase  their  human  capital,  while  macroeconomic
uncertainty  and  stop-go  cycles  deprass  the  permanent  demand  for  unskilled
labor  and the  steady  stream  of social  spending.
6. Policies  to alleviate  poverty  must take  as departure  point  the  needs  and
characteristics  of each  group. As opposed  to the  rest  of the  population,  the
extremely-poor  have: (i)  lower  ability  to  bear risk,  (ii)  higher  fertility,
(iii)  higher  (cross  and  direct)  price  and income  elasticities  of demand  for
food,  and (iv)  higher  age-specific  participation  rates. In addition,
household  inequality  is  potentially  more important  at such  low income  levels.
The  moderately-poor  are  in a qualitatively  different  category  and  can: (i)
participate  more fully  in the  labor  market,  (ii)  migrate,  and (iii)  benefit
from  educational  opportunities. The  needs  of each  group  are  differert.
7.  Government  interventions  to alleviate  poverty  must  consider  intertemporal,
information,  incentive  and  administrative  constrAints. Intertemporal  issues
matter  because  poverty  alleviation  programs  must  balance  direct  consumption
benefits  today  vs. investments  that  allow  the  poor  to increase  their  income
tomorrow. Information  issues  matter  since  identifying  the  poor is difficult
and  costly. Incentive  issues  matter  since  poverty  programs  should  not create
a class  of welfare  dependents. Administrative  constraints  matter  since  risks
of corruption  and  government  failure  increase  with the  number  of programs.
8.  As opposed  to the  moderately-poor,  there  is a case  for  directly  targeted
benefits  for the  extremely-poor.  This does  not imply  that  no resources  should
be spent  on the  former  group;  it implies  that  resources  should  be devoted  to
investment. A poverty  program  has two separate  tasks:  (i)  directly  targeted
benefits  to the  extremely-poor  to reduce  fertility,  morbidity,  undernutrition
and infant  mortality,  (ii)  institutional  reforms  and  allocation  of government
resources  to increase  the  permanent  demand  for  unskilled  labor,  the  returns  to
land,  and access  of the  poor to education  and  social  infrastructure.  This-85-
approach  to  poverty  is  congruent  with the  overall  direction  that  economic
policy  has taken  over  the last  few  years,  and  concentrates  government's
attention  in  well-defined  areas.
9. Policies  for the  oxtremely-poor  need to  exploit  the  complementarities  emong
nutrition,  health  and  education. More food  by itself  will only  give
transitory  benefits  to the  extremely-poor;  it  will  not allow  them  to
eventually  get  on their  feet  and  work their  way  out  of poverty. Directly
targeted  benefits  for  the  extremely-poor  must  consist  of a  basic  package  that
simultaneously  delivers  selected  foods,  preventive  health  and  education  about
hygiene,  birth  control,  food  preparation  and  conservation  and  the like.  In
addition,  benefits  to the  extremely-poor  must all  be under  a single  program
that:  (i)  centers  attention  in regions  with the  highest  Pj[(a-l),z]  indices,
(ii)  provides  sustained  benefits,  and (iii)  delivers  food through  coupons
rather  than  price  subAidies. Food  pricing  policies  should  be divorced  from
poverty  considerations.
10.  Development  policies  to  help the  poor  must focus:  first,  on institutional
reform  of the  incentive  structure  in the  rural  areas.  Second,  on changing  the
way in  which resources  are channeled  to the  rural  areas  eliminating  price
subsidies  and increasing  investment  in rural  roads,  irrigation,  extension
services  and  the like  (i.e.,  in  areas  where  the  externalities  are the
greatest). Additional  resources  to the  rural  areas  in  the  absence  of
institutional  reforms  will  not  help the  rural  poor;  moreover,  the  focus  of
reforms  should  be to  promote  rural  development,  which  should  not  be equated  to
an increase  in food  supply,  particularly  of basic  cereals. Third,  on
eliminating  urban  bias in  the  allocation  of social  and  infrastructure
spending. Fourth,  on  bringing  private  costs  of production  in the large
metropolitan  areas,  particularly  Mexico  City,  in line  with social  costs.
11.  Current  government  programs  for  poverty  alleviation  represent  an
significant  step  forward. Pronasol's  key  programs  appear  to  be well designed.
On the  other  hand,  adjustments  are  still  required:  (i)  more  resources  need to
be channeled  to rural  areas,  (ii)  more emphasis  is required  on programs  that
exploit  the  complementarities  between  information,  health  and  nutrition,  (iii)
a  sharper  focus  by Pronasol  on its  more  effective  components  is needed.
Finally,  it is  of the  essence  to pursue  further  the  reforms  to the
institutions  and  regulations  that  are  the  primary  determinants  of poverty.-86-
VIII.2  Issues  for  Further  Research.
Many  issues  raised  in  tl-.s  paper  require  further  research.  I  conclude
with  a  brief  mention  of  seven  that  I  believe  are  among  the  most  pressing  from
the  point  of  view  of  policy.  First,  undernutrition.  More  evidence  based  on
anthropometric  indicators  is  required  given  difficulties  with  the  intake-
requirements  comparisons.  As  yet  we  have  little  systematic  information  to
tell  whether  the  central  problem  is  one  of  under  or  malnutrition.  Empirical
studies  of  food  consumption  are  also  required,  in  particular,  econometric
estimates  of  the  price  and  income  elasticities  of  nutrients.  As  noted,  there
are  no  estimates  of  these  elasticities  for  Mexico.  Yet  it  is  important  to
determine  whether  results  obtained  for  other  countries  (e.g.  Behrman  and
Deolalikar  (1987)  for  India)  carry  over  into  Mexico,  given  differences  in  diet
composition  and  consumer  behavior  across  countries.  Vill  increasing  income
improve  nutrition  or  will  more  efforts  have  to  be  channeled  to  education  and
improvements  of  the  health  environment?
Two,  the  line  of  extreme-poverty.  The  method  used  in  the  paper  to  set  x
relied  on  minimum  cost  diets  constructed  by  linear  programming  methods.  But
as  I  already  remarked,  this  can  potentially  yield  overestimates.  One
promising  line  of  research  is  to  apply  the  Greer-Thorbecke  (1986a,b)
methodology  and  calculate  z  with  respect  to  a  caloric  level  rather  than
monetary  income,  allowing  consumers  to  choose  any  diet  given  preferences  and
prices.  These  estimates  would  provide  alternative  values  for  Pj(.)  and  T(.),
which  can  serve  as  a  check  on  the  results  obtained  in  this  paper.  A second
line  of  research  is  to  obtain  disaggregated  information  on  the  components  of
own-consumption,  so  that  households  can  be  ranked  by  total  food  expenditures.
This  in  turn  will  allow  to  identify  the  extremely-poor  through  a  direct
comparison  of  f(yf)  with  the  monetary  cost  of  the  nutritional  basket.
Three,  intra-household  inequality.  As  I  remarked,  little  is  known  about
this  issue  in  Mexico,  which  can  potentially  be  very  important  given  that
children  are  over  represented  among  the  extremely-poor.  Detailed  household
studies  are  required  for  this,  but  mention  should  also  be  made  of  a  technique
recently  developed  by  Deaton  (1989)  that  tests  for  such  inequality  using  only
IES  data. Implementation  of  this  technique  seems  relatively  straightforward.
Four,  targeted  benefits  for  the  extremely-poor.  Research  is  needed  to
determine  appropriate  foods.  What  is  the  income  elasticity  of  demand  for-87-
nutritionally  adequac.  foods  that  are  also  familiar  to the  extremely-poor?
atAearch  is  also  needed  to determine  location  of PASSPA. The possibility  of
using  an algor!  hm to  minimize  P(a,y)  like  the  one  developed  by Ravallion  and
Chao (1989)  deserves  attention. Given  shortcomings  in the  coverage  of the
income-expenditure  survey  we need to ask  whether  data from  the  latest
population  census  can  be used for  this  purpose.
Five,  rural  labor  markets. Since  arable  land is  almost  exhausted
population  growth  implies  that  the  marginal  rural  poor is landless. Returns
to unskilled  ruwral  labor  will become  even  more important  determinants  of the
earnings  of the  rural  poor.  Yet, as remarked  in section  V, most  household
studies  in  Mexico  have concentrated  on land  owning  peasants. Relatively  less
is  known  about  landless  laborers. What is  their  behavior  with regards  to
migration? How  can they  benefit  the  most from  rural  reform?  Does  more
irrigation  reduce  the  seasonality  of labor  iemand  by allowing  for  double
cropping  and  similar  practices? A related  issue  concerns  aba-specific
participation  rates. I remarked  in section  VI.1 that  studies  for  other
countries  have found  these  rates  to  be higher  for  the  extremely-poor,  with
effocts  on their  demand  for  educationi  (Lipton  (1983b)). Is this  finding
confirmed  for  Mexico? Are differences  in  age-specific  participation  rates
importunt,  and  are they  explained  by differences  in income  levels,  regions  or
asset  ownership  (land/no  land)?
Six,  the land  tenure  str-ucture.  I  have made  a plausible  but not rigorous
case that  currert  institutional  arrangements  restriet  the  demand  for  unskilled
rural  labor  and  the  returns  to land. Clearly,  it  would  be much  better  to  have
a  formal  model  of the  private/ejido  land  dichotomy  to determine  if there  are
equity/efficiency  trade-offs  associated  with these  forms  of land  tenure.
Equally  important,  assuming  it is  desirable  to  develop  a fuller  market  for
land,  how should  this  be done?  Current  market  valuations  for land  may  not
reflect  its  scarcity  value  given  existing  distortions  in  prices,  entry,  land
use, etc.. More  work is  needed  on the  appropriate  sequence  for  reform.
Should  input  and  output  prices  be aligned  first? Assuming  ejidatarios  are
given  marketable  titles  to their  land,  sbould  there  be an initial  period  where
land  sales  are  banned  until  information  about  the  proper  value  of land is
generally  accessible?-89-
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